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Summary
This thesis considers an ethical framework for tobacco control policy. This is achieved by building on
existing theories of public health ethics. It includes a critique of the social processes that influence
addiction neurobiology, the complex factors that can affect autonomy in addiction, and further issues
presented by vested interests such as the tobacco industry. The central argument is that tobacco
control policies should protect the public’s health, and maximize individual freedom by providing the
conditions that promote or protect autonomy. Addiction is autonomy–undermining, so having an
option to use tobacco—an addictive and autonomy–undermining product for most users—does not
enhance freedom. An ethical tobacco control policy therefore is an interventionist approach, in which
policymakers acknowledge the complex social factors that underlie addiction susceptibility and that
these contribute to the formation and sustaining of addictions.
These ideas are incorporated into an ethical framework for tobacco control policy, which is conveyed
through relational autonomy and a set of ethical considerations. These reflect the importance of
universal measures that discourage smoking, protect others from second–hand smoke, and protect
people below age 25 from tobacco. They also emphasize the importance of restricting and exposing
tobacco industry activity, and being transparent about the ethical basis and rationale of tobacco
control measures. The ethical framework also focuses on relational autonomy: providing autonomy–
promoting social conditions and involving the community, family, and other important relationships
in the prevention and treatment of tobacco addictions. This should be done in a way that provides
extra support to socially disadvantaged groups who suffer disproportionately from tobacco–related
harm; therefore social justice is another important aspect of the ethical framework.
This framework is then used to provide ethical analyses of four recent approaches to tobacco
control: tobacco denormalization, the tobacco–free generation proposal, tobacco harm reduction, and
medicalized approaches including nicotine vaccines and genetic tests for nicotine addiction.1
1Although not the primary focus of the thesis, these analyses are intended to show how the ethical framework may






This thesis is focused on the ethical aspects of tobacco control policies. It concerns questions regarding
what tobacco control policies should do: reasons why tobacco should be regulated, how it should be
regulated, and the relevant factors that should influence tobacco control policies.1
Ongoing issues in tobacco control policy
Tobacco use is an important cause of addiction,2 death, and chronic disease. Cigarette smoking,
which represents the main form of tobacco use, affects virtually every organ and system in the
body.[1] Cigarette smoke contains over 250 harmful chemicals, of which approximately 50 are known
carcinogens.[2] Consequently, smoking is the primary cause of lung cancer, as well as other cancers
and chronic diseases such as cardiovascular diseases, chronic bronchitis, emphysema, and asthma.[1]
Approximately half of all smokers die prematurely from a tobacco–related disease,[3] and, on average,
smokers lose 20 years of productive life.[4] Smoking also directly harms the health of others through
the effects of second–hand smoke (SHS).3 This can result in deaths from chronic diseases such as
ischaemic heart disease, asthma, and lung cancer.[5]
Over the last few decades, tobacco control policies have evolved in order to minimize these harms.
Many of these policies are based on an international regulatory framework set out in the World Health
Organization’s 2005 Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC) treaty.[6] The ethical
1In other words, this thesis is a normative one focused on ethical aspects, and limited in that it does not consider at
length economic or practical factors. This point is further clarified below—under ‘methodology and scope’.
2The term ‘addiction’ remains widely disputed. Nevertheless, it is a clinically recognized disorder associated with
distinct behavioral features that indicate an impaired ability to avoid the addictive activity—see page 4.
3The sidestream smoke released from a cigarette, as well as smoke exhaled by the smoker.
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foundation of this treaty is grounded in the principles of human rights, particularly protection of the
right to health; this is achieved by discouraging smoking while permitting adults the option to smoke.
Accordingly, measures under the WHO FCTC aim to protect children from smoking initiation and
to discourage smoking among adults, by restricting tobacco sales to people over a certain age (18
years in most countries), raising the price of tobacco through taxation, and warning people about the
detrimental health effects of smoking. Cessation services are also provided to smokers who wish to quit.
Restrictions are imposed on the tobacco industry (TI) by banning all forms of tobacco advertising,
promotions, and sponsorships (TAPS), and smokefree laws are implemented in public areas in order
to protect others from the harms of SHS exposure.
Nevertheless, tobacco use remains a serious public health issue. Although tobacco control interven-
tions have significantly reduced global smoking prevalence,4 overall tobacco consumption has actually
increased due to population growth,[7] and 22% of the current global population aged over 15—over
1 billion people—smokes tobacco on a daily basis. Smoking kills approximately 6 million people per
year, of whom over 600,000 are non–smokers exposed to SHS. At current trends it is thus estimated
that, in the 21st century, 1 billion people will die as a result of smoking.[3] Smoking also continues to
have serious impacts on societies, healthcare systems, economies, and the environment.[8]
These issues persist for various reasons. Tobacco control policies vary in their implementation
level,[9] with implementation being more of a challenge in countries with limited financial resources
or where governance is weak. These are both strongly linked to TI activity, since the TI is heavily
involved in lobbying politics, filing lawsuits against states that implement restrictions on tobacco,
and propagating pro–tobacco arguments. The latter is often conveyed through debates in which
smoking is depicted as an exercise of freedom (the ‘free choice’ to smoke), liberty rights (a ‘right to
smoke’), or a beneficial activity that provides pleasure, stress relief, or has some other positive social
connotation. Tobacco regulations are then construed as paternalistic, unreasonable restrictions on
personal freedom and enjoyment.[10] Therefore the TI retains a vast amount of economic and political
power, and remains a powerful adversary to tobacco control efforts.
Furthermore, even a thorough implementation of policies based on the WHO FCTC seems to be
unable to reduce smoking prevalence below a certain threshold, which is estimated at 13–15%.[11] This
limitation may be in part because certain groups of people are less responsive to current regulatory
frameworks. This idea, termed the ‘hardening hypothesis’, is supported by the fact that, in countries
where smoking prevalence has reduced, smoking is increasingly concentrated among certain groups of
4Between 1980 and 2012, smoking prevalence has reduced from 41% to 31% (among men), and from 11% to 6%
(among women). See [7].
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people:[12] people with a comorbid mental illness, certain racial minorities, people marginalized from
the social mainstream, and people in low socioeconomic strata.[7] This trend may exist because specific
needs of these groups are not addressed in current regulatory frameworks, because these groups suffer
disproportionately from more severe tobacco addictions which in turn makes it more difficult for them
to give up smoking—or both.
Issues related to more recent strategies
It is argued, then, that a more radical strategy should be implemented in conjunction with current
regulations in order to further push down smoking prevalence.[13] Tobacco ‘endgame’ strategies aim
to near–eliminate smoking by reducing smoking prevalence to near–zero (such as 5%). One approach
is to denormalize tobacco: implement measures that imply that smoking is not—and should not
be—a normal activity in society. These discourage smoking initiation among children and encourage
adult smokers to quit.[14] However, there are concerns that it results in the stigmatization and social
marginalization of smokers.[15] Another endgame approach is to focus preventive efforts on smoking
initiation among younger generations, by denying tobacco sales to people born after a certain date.
This approach, termed the ‘tobacco–free generation’ (TFG) proposal, protects youth from smoking
initiation while not affecting current smokers.[16] However, the proposal may be considered an un-
reasonable restriction on the personal freedom of adults born after the cut–off date. This approach
therefore raises questions on the limits of tobacco restrictions, how initiation should be prevented
among children, and whether initiation should be prevented through a less restrictive means.
Policies could also employ a harm reductive approach, in which the goal is to reduce the health,
social, and economic impacts of drug use without necessarily reducing drug use itself. Tobacco harm
reduction, then, consists of efforts to find an alternative product to cigarettes that is below an ac-
ceptable harm threshold. Recent developments have focused on electronic nicotine delivery systems
(ENDS),[17] although there are also debates on the use of smokeless tobacco (SLT) as an alternative to
cigarettes.[18, 19] However, there are concerns regarding the safety of these products, their appropriate
use, and ways in which the TI may attempt to market ENDS or SLT in a way that could undermine
otherwise effective tobacco control measures. The TI, for example, may market ENDS and SLT to
youth in a way that encourages them to switch to cigarettes in later life, or that encourages dual use
among smokers rather than a complete switch to ENDS or SLT.[17, 19]
Two medical interventions—still undergoing development—may be used in the treatment or pre-
3
vention of tobacco addictions: nicotine5 vaccines, and genetic tests for nicotine addiction susceptibility.
The aim of the nicotine vaccine is to block the rewarding effects of nicotine in the brain.[20] It may be
used as a cessation therapy for smokers (as a type of self–binding strategy), or as a preventive method
in people who have initiated smoking or are likely to initiate smoking, but have not yet developed
nicotine addiction. The aim of the genetic test is to predict one’s susceptibility to developing nicotine
addiction, such that ‘high–risk’ people can be targeted for interventions such as the nicotine vaccine.
However, these interventions both rely on the idea that smoking is a medical disease, and may ignore
other important psychosocial factors. Furthermore, they may be misused by vested interests such as
the TI, and there are also concerns over whether they may result in undesirable behaviors,6 or whether
they may be used coercively.[21]
‘Addiction’: Conceptual uncertainties
Tobacco contains nicotine, a psychoactive drug7 that has the potential to establish addictive8 patterns
of use; so an important reason why tobacco, despite its deadliness, remains widely consumed is its
addictiveness. Although what exactly ‘addiction’ is remains widely disputed, it is a clinically recog-
nized disorder with distinct behavioral, psychological, and physical features, many which reflect an
impaired ability to resist the addictive activity.9 Thus it is thought that addiction is a disorder that,
to some extent, undermines one’s autonomy in this context.10[23] This thesis, too, argues that addic-
tion is autonomy–undermining but not necessarily autonomy–negating, and that this has important
implications on how policies should respond.
The question of “what is autonomy in addiction?” is particularly relevant in the context of tobacco:
a significant proportion of smokers make attempts to quit (40–50% in any given year),[24] yet very
few unaided cessation attempts are successful (just 3–7%).[25] Further, most smoking initiations occur
during adolescence,[26] before the capacity to make autonomous decisions has fully developed. Put
5Nicotine is the constituent in tobacco that gives it addictive potential—more explanation on ‘addiction’ below. For
the purpose of this thesis, ‘nicotine addiction’ and ‘tobacco addiction’ are used interchangeably.
6For example, increased smoking among adolescents on the basis that they are at ‘low risk’ of developing an addiction.
7‘Psychoactive drug’ refers to a drug that crosses the blood–brain barrier and elicits changes within the central nervous
system.
8‘Addictive drug use’ refers to a type of drug use in which the individual has developed an addictive relationship
towards his/her use of a drug. This addictive relationship is characterized by various neurological patterns, behaviors,
and psychological features (such as craving) that are further described and discussed throughout this thesis—particularly
in chapters 2 and 3.
9For example, in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th edition (DSM–5), tobacco addiction
is classified as “tobacco use disorder” and characterized by behavioral criteria that reflect cognitive dissonance regarding
tobacco use (e.g. repeated and unsuccessful efforts to quit or cut down), craving, and physical symptoms such as tolerance
and withdrawal—see [22].
10There are various definitions of ‘autonomy’, and this concept is clarified in chapter 2. For now, ‘autonomy’ in the
context of addiction refers to the ability to resist the addictive activity (i.e. tobacco use).
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together, this raises various questions: whether the decision to initiate smoking is freely made, the
extent to which—once tobacco addiction has developed—it is possible to resist using tobacco, and
what the relevant implications for tobacco control policies are.
There are various explanations of addiction and the nature of decision–making and autonomy in
addiction. These explanations, in turn, affects ideas on how addictive drugs should be regulated, how
autonomy in addiction should be maximized, and the relevant roles of the state,11 the community,12
and addicted individuals. ‘Brain disease’ theories of addiction have become particularly influential
in recent years, in response to neurobiological evidence showing the impacts of drug use on various
neurological circuits and structures.[27] They suggest that prolonged drug use triggers neurobiological
changes that undermine one’s ability to resist drug use.[28, 29] Policies that follow, then, should restrict
tobacco availability as much as possible and provide medical treatments, such as nicotine vaccines, for
addiction. Since the medicalized approach of brain disease theories often presumes that vulnerability
is largely conferred by genetic factors, they may also endorse genetic tests as a suitable prevention
strategy.[21]
Some interpretations of brain disease theories have gone further to argue that, since people with
addiction lack self–control, they are unable to make autonomous decisions regarding their drug use,[23]
or should be forced into medical therapies in order to restore ‘lost’ autonomy.[30] So brain disease
theories of addiction may endorse a heavily medicalized or geneticized approach, and, in some cases,
coercive therapy. However, this presents ethical implications if addiction does not negate autonomy,
or if a medicalized or geneticized approach turns out to be inappropriate given the psychosocial nature
and etiology of the disorder.
Otherwise, it has been argued that addictive behaviors are freely chosen. This has led into two
main interpretations. If the addictive behavior is considered socially unacceptable, ‘addiction’ tends
to be depicted as an immoral lifestyle decision that people should be deterred from. The result is an
approach in which addicted individuals are often stigmatized, socially marginalized, and—in many
cases—punished for using drugs. This approach is termed the ‘moral choice’ theory of addiction.
It has been widely criticized for its stigmatizing treatment of drug users, especially in the context of
illicit drug use (e.g. marijuana, cocaine, heroin).[31] In contrast, if the addictive behavior is considered
socially acceptable, then it tends to be portrayed as a freely chosen behavior similar to other behaviors.
Policies, then, should permit it, and impose restrictions only for the purpose of protecting others from
11For the purpose of this thesis, ‘the state’ refers to an organized political community—for example a nation or
province—accounted for by a government.
12For the purpose of this thesis, ‘the community’ refers to a group of people who live in the same area, or who share
a similar characteristic. It is used more or less interchangeably with ‘society’.
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harm. This approach has been termed the ‘liberal theory of addiction’, and would lean towards
a laissez–faire approach.[32] However, this is potentially problematic if addictive behaviors are not
freely chosen, or if they present a significant public health threat that warrants intervention.
It has also been argued that addiction is a disorder that is triggered by psychosocial influences,
and that the ability to exercise self–control over addictive behaviors depends, to some extent, on the
social environment. This has led to a more specific theory that addiction is a form of self–medication
against painful or stressful circumstances: the ‘self–medication hypothesis’ of addiction.[33] Similarly,
it has also been argued that addiction is a coping strategy against social dislocation: the loss of social,
cultural, and individual identity or belonging that occurs as a result of social change. Policies based
on such perceptions, then, should focus preventive and treatment efforts onto the social environment,
and approach people with addiction—as victims of their circumstances—from a more sympathetic
angle.[34]
Tobacco addiction is often described under a liberal theory of addiction. As mentioned above,
smoking tends to be depicted—particularly by the TI—as a freely chosen, pleasurable activity that
should be permitted and socially accepted. It is sometimes also described as a form of self–medication
against a mental illness or difficult social circumstances. Perceptions, however, have started to shift
in more recent years. Knowledge on the harms of smoking, particularly to others (especially through
SHS exposure) has led smoking to be portrayed as a socially unacceptable behavior, which supports a
moral choice theory of tobacco addiction, a moralized approach to tobacco control policy, and measures
such as tobacco denormalization. There is also increased support for a brain disease theory of nicotine
addiction, in response to neuroscientific evidence that shows the impacts of nicotine on the brain. This
may, in turn, lead to increased support for medicalized interventions such as nicotine vaccines and a
geneticized preventive approach.
It is premised in this thesis that it is still unclear what an ‘addiction’ entity is, what makes
some people more vulnerable to addiction, and which theory—of the four described13—is the most
fitting description of tobacco addiction. It also remains unclear how autonomy is manifested or
curtailed in addiction, or how tobacco control policies should aim to preserve autonomy in prevention
and treatment efforts. These considerations are important, as they can help to address some of the
ongoing issues related to tobacco addiction, such as tobacco–related health inequalities or the poor
success rates in smoking cessation.
13Moral choice theory, liberal theory, brain disease theory, and the self–medication hypothesis.
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Factors that policies should address
Further implicating these questions is the social environment, which has important influences on
patterns of tobacco addiction and tobacco use. Addictions are triggered in times of social hardship,
such as war, colonization, and social transformation.[34] Epidemiological trends, similarly, show an
elevated smoking prevalence among people from socially disadvantaged backgrounds, people with
mental illnesses, and racial minorities.14[35] Such groups also have higher rates of illicit drug use[36]
and alcoholism.[37] What are the reasons behind these trends, and what are the environmental factors
that tobacco control policies should focus on? It is possible that some people are genetically more
predisposed to problematic patterns of drug use and addiction; yet social processes also play an
important role. To be considered, then, is how social processes contribute to vulnerability, and how
policies should respond. One influence in particular that should be considered is the TI, which has
shaped the social environment, perceptions on tobacco use, perceptions on addiction, and scientific
research in ways that have led to increases in smoking prevalence and the normalization of smoking
as a socially acceptable behavior.[38, 39]
The ethical foundation of tobacco control policies
How tobacco control policies are ethically and conceptually grounded can have important implications.
It in part determines the types of intervention advocated for, and it also affects how these interventions
are accepted by policymakers and the public.[40] In other words, in order to determine how tobacco
control policies should deal with the issues raised above, they need to be based on a solid ethical and
conceptual foundation that presents a clear picture of what addiction is, as well as why, how, and to
what extent tobacco should be regulated.
Current regulations are based on discouraging rather than prohibiting tobacco use in adults. Prior-
ity is on protecting the public’s health while maintaining a certain degree of freedom to use tobacco.[41]
It is therefore important to consider the notions of ‘health’ and ‘freedom’: their precise meaning in the
context of tobacco use and addiction, how they interrelate, and how they may be preserved within an
ethical framework. Liberal theories, such as Mill’s liberalism,[42] are often drawn on in pro–tobacco
arguments in order to advocate for a ‘free choice’ to smoke, but tobacco use—due to its addictiveness—
may not be considered compatible with the notion of ‘freedom’ if addiction is a disorder that, to some
degree, is freedom–undermining. If this is the case, preserving freedom in this context may require an
14‘Racial minority’ in this thesis is used as a non–pejorative term to refer to a racial group that, relative to the social
mainstream, comprises a smaller population. In a Western country such as the USA, typical examples include African
Americans and Native Americans.
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interventionist approach rather than one that is rather less intrusive. It is also important to consider
how these ideas relate to human rights, since regulations—as mentioned above—tend to be based on
human rights principles.
Although there is no specific ethical framework for tobacco control policy, a number of ethical
frameworks and theories have been developed for public health issues more generally. These frame-
works, broadly speaking, aim to strike a balance between protecting the public’s health and preserving
the freedom of individuals. Some theories also emphasize the importance of reducing health inequal-
ities by providing better opportunities for health to people most affected by social disadvantage.[43]
Other theories go further to argue that social justice is a necessary requirement for public health,[44]
or that good health depends in part on the community and the social structures that support good
health.[45] It is unclear, though, how the concepts of ‘public health’, ‘freedom’, and ‘social justice’
fit into the context of tobacco control, how ‘freedom’ should be preserved in the context of addiction
(when the nature of autonomy in addiction remains undetermined), and what the relevant roles of
individuals, the community, and the state are.
Research problems
To summarize, there are a number of research problems as far as the ethical aspects of tobacco control
policies are concerned:
- It is unclear how tobacco control policies should address ongoing issues in tobacco control, most
notably the limitations of current regulatory frameworks and the increasing gap in tobacco–
related health inequalities.
- It is often claimed that smoking is beneficial, yet it is unclear what these benefits are, and
whether they should offset some restrictions on tobacco.
- It is unclear how tobacco control policies should address potential ethical issues presented by
more recent policy approaches, such as tobacco denormalization, the TFG proposal, tobacco
harm reduction, nicotine vaccines, and genetic tests for nicotine addiction.
- Smoking is, in many cases, addictive; yet it remains unclear what addiction is, how it affects
autonomy, and how the health and freedom of individuals should be maximized in addiction.
- It is unclear why some people are more vulnerable to (tobacco) addiction than others, and how
tobacco control policies should respond.
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- It is unclear which social factors should be addressed by tobacco control policies, how they should
be addressed, and how tobacco control policies should deal with ethical implications that result
from TI activity.
- There is as yet no ethical and conceptual foundation to underpin tobacco control policies that
has been made sufficiently sensitive to these considerations.
1.2 Research question
Accordingly, the research question of this thesis is as follows:
What are the elements of an ethical framework for tobacco control policy?
This relates to a series of sub–questions that are systematically addressed throughout different
parts of the thesis.
1. What are the relevant features of tobacco use and addiction that should guide tobacco control
policies, in terms of public health impacts (chapter 2) and neurobiological impacts (chapter 3)?
2. How does tobacco addiction affect autonomy (chapter 3), and how should tobacco control policies
aim to maximize health and freedom (chapter 5)?
3. How should tobacco control policies account for the vulnerabilities of certain groups of people
to addiction (chapters 3 and 4)?
4. What comprises a conceptual account of addiction that can inform an ethical framework for
tobacco control policy (chapters 4 and 5)?
5. How should tobacco control policies address ethical issues that arise as a result of tobacco
industry activity (chapter 4)?
6. How should tobacco control policies address ethical implications associated with more recent
strategies including tobacco denormalization, the TFG proposal, tobacco harm reduction, nico-
tine vaccines, and genetic tests for nicotine addiction (chapter 6)?
1.3 Aims
The central aim of this thesis is to develop an ethical framework for tobacco control policy (chapter
5). In doing so, this thesis also has the following sub–aims:
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1. To discuss the relevant features of tobacco use and addiction that should guide tobacco control
policies, in terms of public health impacts (chapter 2) and neurobiological impacts (chapter 3);
2. To determine how tobacco addiction affects autonomy (chapter 3), and how tobacco control
policies should aim to maximize health and freedom (chapter 5);
3. To elucidate how tobacco control policies should account for the vulnerabilities of certain groups
of people to addiction (chapters 3 and 4);
4. To develop a conceptual account of addiction that can inform an ethical framework for tobacco
control policy (chapters 4 and 5);
5. To discuss how tobacco control policies should address ethical issues that arise as a result of
tobacco industry activity (chapter 4);
6. To discuss how tobacco control policies should address potential ethical implications associated
with more recent strategies including tobacco denormalization, the TFG proposal, tobacco harm
reduction, nicotine vaccines, and genetic tests for nicotine addiction (chapter 6).
1.4 Thesis statement
The central argument of this thesis is that tobacco control policies should maximize freedom by
providing the conditions that promote or protect autonomy; this, in turn, requires policymakers to
acknowledge complex social factors that underlie addiction susceptibility, and that these contribute
to the formation and sustaining of addictions.
1.5 Methodology and scope
This thesis develops an ethical framework for tobacco control policy. This is done by building on
existing theories in public health ethics, and nuancing these with a critique of the social processes
that influence addiction neurobiology, the complex factors that can affect autonomy in addiction, and
the role of the TI. The analytical approach used in this thesis is grounded in conceptual ideas from
public health ethics, in particular theories that try to balance health and freedom within a broader
social context. Ideas are then nuanced and broadened with relevant evidence from various research
perspectives, drawing on my own primary reviews of the literature in neurobiology, genetics, epige-
netics, public health, and sociohistorical studies. The premises of this thesis are incorporated into an
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ethical framework for tobacco control policy, which is conveyed through a set of ethical considerations.
This framework is then used to provide an ethical analysis of four recent strategies in tobacco con-
trol: tobacco denormalization, the tobacco–free generation proposal, tobacco harm reduction, nicotine
vaccines, and genetic tests for nicotine addiction.
In other words, the ideas in this thesis are centered around a normative investigation that links
together empirical research from different perspectives, develops this into an ethical framework for
tobacco control policy, and applies this ethical framework into a series of ethical analyses. The reason
for this approach is that large bodies of evidence have already explored the nature of addiction, factors
that contribute to addiction susceptibility, the factors that have contributed to the current state of
affairs in tobacco control policies, and the ethical implications of all of these. However, much of this
information remains disconnected, and has not been tied into a nuanced and integrated analysis that
can be used to guide tobacco control policies.
This thesis is focused on informing tobacco control policies in regards to their ethical aspects,
with deeper but potentially distracting questions left out. For instance, a comprehensive analysis of
legal, economic, and political considerations would require a deeper investigation into legal, economic,
and political factors, which can vary considerably between different places. A deeper philosophical
enquiry may involve the integration of moral, political, and jurisprudence theories. Focus is therefore
maintained on ethical theory insofar as it is useful for policy, and on practical considerations most
crucial to the development of the ethical framework. Issues related to local and cultural context are also
beyond scope, so this thesis does not advocate for one particular policy or a set of policies adapted for
specific cultural, or political contexts; focus is maintained on the development of an ethical framework
for tobacco control policies more generally. Focus is on international policies and frameworks where
appropriate (e.g. the WHO FCTC and international human rights treaties). The focus is kept on
issues and debates that have arisen more recently, so most of the discussions and analyses will be done
in reference to developed countries where tobacco control policies are more advanced, and specific
tobacco control strategies that have become the subject of debates more recently, e.g. the TFG
proposal.
1.6 Original contribution
The original contribution of this thesis is the development of an ethical framework for tobacco con-
trol policy, that is ethically grounded, supportive of human rights principles, and sufficiently nuanced
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for the context of tobacco control. Other original contributions include: ethical analyses on recent
developments in tobacco control (tobacco denormalization, the TFG proposal, tobacco harm reduc-
tion, nicotine vaccines, and genetic tests for nicotine addiction) in reference to the ethical framework
developed in this thesis, and original discussions on the relevant features of addiction that should be
used to guide policies for tobacco addiction and others addictions more generally. The latter brings
together various research perspectives—genetic, epigenetic, neurodevelopmental, neurobiological, and
sociohistorical—into an integrated account of addiction that can inform the fields of addiction research
and policy.
1.7 Target audience
The target audience of this thesis is academics, researchers, policymakers, and others involved in
tobacco control, particularly new approaches to tobacco control (tobacco denormalization, the TFG
proposal, tobacco harm reduction, nicotine vaccines, and genetic tests). Ideas are also instructive for
those involved in public health or public health ethics more generally, particularly public health issues
related to other addictions.
1.8 Structure of the main text
Chapter 2: The basis of tobacco control policies
This chapter provides an overview of the public health impacts of tobacco use, and how these compare
to the health impacts of other psychoactive drugs. It also provides an overview of current tobacco
control policies, their limitations, ways in which these limitations are being addressed with more recent
tobacco control strategies, and potential ethical issues presented by these strategies. This chapter
also introduces ethical frameworks that may be used in addressing these issues. Focus is on ethical
approaches that aim to preserve health and/or freedom: Mill’s liberal theory, public health ethics
frameworks, and human rights. These highlight some important considerations to be carried into
the ethical framework of this thesis: the importance of distinguishing between positive and negative
freedom; of characterizing autonomy in addiction; and of exploring the interconnection between social
justice and public health in addiction. Together, these discussions provide a basis for tobacco control
policies in terms of the public health impacts that justify restrictions on tobacco, ongoing issues that
tobacco control policies should focus on, and ethical theories that may be adapted into the context of
tobacco control.
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Chapter 3: Neurobiological features of addiction
This chapter elucidates the neurobiological events that underlie addiction, as well as genetic, epigenetic,
and neurodevelopmental processes that confer susceptibility to addiction. These are considered in
terms of how interrelated social factors, such as stress, early attachment experience, and the social
environment, contribute to the neurobiological features often observed in addictions. This chapter
therefore provides neurobiological evidence for the ethical framework, particularly its focus on social
aspects and on questions regarding the nature of autonomy in addiction. This chapter also clarifies
whether addictive smoking is beneficial from a neurobiological perspective; some of the factors that
influence autonomy in addiction; the role of the social environment in addictive decision–making; and
reasons why certain groups of people—namely, young children, adolescents, and socially disadvantaged
groups—are more predisposed to developing addictions.
Chapter 4: Social context and the tobacco industry
This chapter considers the social contexts that contribute to addiction and tobacco use, with particular
focus on the TI. This chapter discusses how the TI has propagated tobacco–related public health issues
by influencing and taking advantage of social contexts and vulnerable groups of people, including
children and the socially disadvantaged. This chapter also notes how perceptions of addiction have
shifted in response to social contexts, and how this, in turn, can influence tobacco control policies.
Broadly speaking, this chapter highlights the importance of social factors in (tobacco) addiction, and
so raises important questions regarding the role of the social environment, and the responsibility of
the state in minimizing issues of social injustice by providing better support systems to groups more
affected by addiction.
Chapter 5: An ethical framework for tobacco control policy
This chapter brings together information presented throughout previous chapters to provide a concep-
tual and ethical grounding for tobacco control policies. Different theories of addiction (moral choice
theories, liberal theories, brain disease theories, and the self–medication hypothesis) are discussed in
light of the findings presented in preceding chapters, in order to determine the relevant features of
addiction that should provide the conceptual basis for an ethical framework. An ethical framework
for tobacco control policy is then developed, which builds on ethical concepts and theories introduced
in chapter 2, and discussions from chapters 3 and 4. The ethical framework is conveyed through a set
of ethical considerations, and the human rights supported by these considerations.
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Chapter 6: Application of the ethical framework
This chapter applies the ethical framework developed in chapter 5 into four new approaches to tobacco
control. These include: (1) tobacco denormalization; (2) the TFG proposal; (3) tobacco harm reductive
strategies (SLT and ENDS); and (4) medicalized interventions including nicotine vaccines and genetic
tests for nicotine addiction susceptibility.
Chapter 7: Conclusion
This chapter summarizes the research and arguments of this thesis, explains their significance and rele-
vance to the field of tobacco control, discusses the limitations of this research, and provides indications
for future research building on the work in this thesis.
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Chapter 2
The basis of tobacco control policies
Tobacco is a psychoactive drug1 that, like many other drugs of abuse,2 is harmful and addictive.3
However, tobacco use4 is also widespread and often considered to be pleasurable or beneficial in some
way. As a result, debates on the use and regulation of tobacco are ongoing.
Debates on tobacco regulation
Debates in the sphere of tobacco control policy are, generally speaking, orientated towards supporting
either public health or individual freedom. A major stakeholder in these debates is the tobacco industry
(TI), and individuals or institutions receiving funds from the TI. The TI advocates for the liberalization
of tobacco trade and minimal restrictions on its use in order to protect consumer freedom.5 The public
health community, which advocates for regulations on tobacco in order to protect public health,6 is
the TI’s strongest counterforce.
The interests of the TI (to profit from selling tobacco) and public health (to provide better condi-
tions for health) are generally considered to be fundamentally incompatible, due to the serious public
health threats presented by tobacco consumption. The World Health Organization (WHO), for ex-
ample, states that: “there is a fundamental and irreconcilable conflict between the tobacco industry’s
1‘Psychoactive drug’ refers to a drug that crosses the blood–brain barrier and elicits changes within the central nervous
system.
2‘Drug of abuse’ refers to a psychoactive drug commonly associated with social or public health problems. This could
be due to addictive use, or due to non–addictive, but socially problematic use e.g. alcohol binge drinking. This manner
of drug use will be referred to as ‘problematic drug use’ or ‘drug abuse’.
3The terms ‘addictive’ and ‘addiction’ are widely disputed. Nevertheless, addiction is associated with distinct clinical
and behavioral features (described in section 2.1.1) and neurobiological changes that can affect behavior (described in
section 3.1). Tobacco use can strongly contribute to these changes, and so tobacco as a drug is considered ‘addictive’.
Also see appendix B for definitions.
4Cigarette smoking represents the most prevalent form of tobacco use and is the most problematic (in terms of public
health burden), and so ‘cigarette smoking’, ‘smoking’, and ‘tobacco use’ are used interchangeably unless stated otherwise.
5Throughout this thesis, the arguments of this group will be referred to as ‘pro–tobacco’ or ‘anti–regulation’.
6Throughout this thesis, the arguments of this group will be referred to as ‘anti–tobacco’, ‘pro–health’, or ‘pro–
regulation’.
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interests and public health policy interests” (pg.2, [6]). Similarly, the USA’s National Institute on
Drug Abuse (NIDA) argues that: “the interests of the tobacco industry are fundamentally incompat-
ible with [NIDA’s] scientific goals and public health mission”.[46] Consequently, ongoing attempts of
the TI to resist tobacco regulations have led the TI to be depicted as a morally corrupt entity re-
sponsible for millions of tobacco–related deaths, morbidities, and addictions.[10] The TI, meanwhile,
retaliates by framing tobacco control policies as paternalistic, extremist, and authoritarian restrictions
on a freely chosen, pleasurable activity.[47, 48] These arguments are, in turn, used to support or oppose
restrictions on tobacco.
Questions raised by these debates
Debates on tobacco regulation raise a number of questions. Pro–regulatory arguments are generally
based on the premise that tobacco use is a threat to the public’s health: how and to what extent is
tobacco use detrimental to public health? What types of restrictions does this justify, and what level
of intervention should be implemented? Pro–tobacco arguments tend to be based on the idea that
smoking is a pleasurable, relaxing, or freely chosen activity. However, tobacco is also addictive;7 so to
what extent is addictive smoking freely chosen, and what are the benefits of smoking, such as pleasure
or stress relief? Tobacco control policies that have evolved from these debates, as well as those that
may be implemented in the near future, should also be reviewed in light of these considerations. Are
they too restrictive, or insufficient in addressing the issues? What ethical basis do these policies have,
and what sort of ethical framework should be used to underpin them?
These questions point to the primary goal of this thesis: to develop an ethical framework for
tobacco control policy. Proper ethical framing is crucial, for two main reasons. First, a policy that is
guided by a robust ethical framework is more likely to contribute to positive expectations. Second,
such a policy advocates highly esteemed values, such as ‘health’ and ‘freedom’, so is more likely to gain
public, political, and economic support. Such policies can also trigger social movements, in which the
ethical framing of the policy plays an important role. This has undoubtedly already happened to an
extent in the sphere of tobacco control, for both sides: pro–tobacco social movements that emphasize
the importance of freedom, and pro–regulatory social movements that emphasize the importance of
public health.[49]
There is still no robust, context–sensitive ethical framework upon which tobacco control policies
can be based. An early ethical analysis on tobacco was provided by Goodin,[50] who ultimately argued
7‘Addiction’ as a disorder is described further in section 2.1.1, under the subheading “tobacco addiction”.
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for more comprehensive restrictions on tobacco.[51] This analysis now seems somewhat outdated; since
then there have been significant changes in the field, such as the implementation of comprehensive
tobacco control policies (discussed in section 2.2.1) or the development of e-cigarettes and endgame
policies (discussed in section 2.2.3). Otherwise, it has been suggested that a set of ethical principles,
similar to the ‘Georgetown Mantra’ often used to instill ethics in clinical medicine education,8 should be
used.[40] However, these principles were initially designed for clinical contexts; they are less applicable
to public health issues such as tobacco control and addiction. A number of ethical principles and
frameworks have been developed for population–level issues within the field of public health ethics.
While none of these are sufficiently sensitive to the context of tobacco control policy, their ideas may
be further developed and adapted into the sphere of tobacco control.
Before looking at ethical theories, then, it is necessary to understand the ‘tobacco problem’ and
the context of the tobacco problem. What are the public health impacts that result from tobacco
use, how are current policies attempting to minimize these impacts, and what are the issues that an
ethical framework should pay attention to?
Aim of this chapter
The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of the public health impacts of tobacco use, ongoing
issues faced in tobacco control, and ethical theories that may be used in addressing these issues. Section
2.1 discusses the public health impacts of tobacco, and its harm profile in comparison to that of other
addictive drugs such as alcohol, cocaine, and heroin. These discussions help to determine the extent
to which tobacco should be regulated in order to protect the health of self and others, and the types of
restrictions that are justified. Section 2.2 provides an overview of the current regulatory framework for
tobacco, its limitations, recent policy developments that aim to address these limitations, and ethical
concerns raised by these. Section 2.3 discusses ethical concepts, theories, and frameworks that may be
used to underpin tobacco control policies. Together this provides a basis for tobacco control policies,
which is nuanced and made more context–sensitive using evidence in chapters 3 and 4, and eventually
developed into an ethical framework for tobacco control policy in chapter 5.
8These ethical principles include non–maleficence (“to do no harm”), beneficence (“to do good”), justice (“to act with
fairness”), and respect for autonomy (“to be free from controlling influences”)—see [52]. It was suggested that these
principles could be used to guide tobacco control policies, alongside two additional principles: truthfulness (to disclose
the truth and employ only evidence–based arguments) and transparency (“to fully disclose and have fair dealings with
all collaborative partners”)—see [40].
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2.1 The public health impacts of tobacco use
2.1.1 Tobacco: The current public health situation
Mortality and morbidity
Tobacco use is arguably one of the most important global public health issues that exists. Currently
there are over one billion daily smokers worldwide, half of whom will die prematurely from smoking.
In the 20th century, smoking killed 100 million people; in the 21st century, it will kill 1 billion if current
trends continue. Thus, smoking currently kills approximately 6 million people worldwide annually,
which is more than HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis combined.9 This figure is expected to rise to
8 million annually by 2030.[3] In other words, tobacco is the single largest cause of easily avoidable
death, and responsible for approximately 1 in 10 of all adult deaths worldwide.
Since the life expectancy for an average smoker is reduced by 14 years,[53] and most tobacco–caused
diseases are chronic, smoking also significantly affects the length and quality of life. Annually, it is
responsible for 6.9% of the total years of life lost, and 5.5% (57 million) of the world’s total disability–
adjusted life years (DALY).10[54] In other words, on average smokers lose—as a direct consequence of
smoking—approximately two decades of productive life.[4] Smoking negatively affects virtually every
organ and system in the body. It compromises fitness, reduces fertility, and is responsible for roughly
30% of cardiovascular diseases such as stroke, heart attack, aneurysm, hypertension, and vascular
disease. It also causes fatal respiratory diseases such as chronic bronchitis, emphysema, and asthma,
and is responsible for roughly a third of all cancers. These include 90% of all lung cancers (the
deadliest cancer in terms of the amount of people killed), colorectal cancer (the 2nd deadliest), and
other common cancers, such as cancer of the breast, prostate, cervix, and liver. Smoking is also
associated with a wide range of other fatal or debilitating conditions, such as diabetes, rheumatoid
arthritis, and cataracts.[1]
Put together, the serious health risks presented by smoking have led to a general consensus that
there is no level at which smoking can be considered ‘safe’. Consequently, the general advice ‘consume
in moderation’, which may apply to other unhealthy substances such as sugar or alcohol, does not
apply to tobacco. For policies, this means that interventions that aim to minimize smoking prevalence
9Smoking presents a significant public health threat in virtually every country in the world. Previously, smoking was
concentrated mostly in developed countries. Nowadays, smoking rates have stabilized in most developed countries, and
smoking prevalence is starting to increase in developing countries (particularly in Asia) as a result of increased marketing
activities by the TI, weak economic and political infrastructures, and a reduction in smoking prevalence in developed
countries. So it remains very much a global issue—see [7].
10DALY is a measure of overall disease burden, expressed as the number of years in which the quality or length of life
is significantly reduced by the effects of ill health, disability, or early death.
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as much as possible are strongly justified—at least from a public health perspective.11
The effects of second–hand smoke
Exposure to second–hand smoke (SHS) is another major health concern. SHS is similar in composi-
tion to inhaled smoke, and so contains at least 250 harmful chemicals, of which over 50 are known
carcinogens.[2] Non–smokers exposed to typical levels of SHS on a daily basis, at home or at work, have
a 25–30% increased risk of heart disease, and 20–30% increased risk of lung cancer.[53] There is no safe
level of SHS exposure, so a zero–risk threshold is also applicable when considering a suitable level of
SHS exposure. This applies particularly to children, who are especially sensitive to the effects of SHS:
SHS exposure puts them at a heightened risk of developing middle ear infections, asthma, Sudden
Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS), acute respiratory illness (risk is increased by 50–100%), behavioral
disorders, and smoking in future.[5]
Smoking during pregnancy can also have serious consequences on a child’s development, with ef-
fects such as miscarriage, stillbirth, premature birth, low birth weight, and congenital abnormalities
such as cleft lip.[55] Heavy smoking during pregnancy can result in the baby being born with nico-
tine dependence,[56] and predispositions to other behavioral and neural conditions such as substance
abuse.[57] Furthermore, paternal smoking affects sperm quality, which in turn may increase the child’s
risk of suffering from postnatal health problems such as SIDS, genetic diseases, physical malformations,
and childhood cancer.[58]
Despite these risks, SHS exposure remains common. An estimated 35% of all non–smoking adults
are exposed to SHS in everyday life, and 40% of all children worldwide (700 million) are exposed to
SHS at home.[5] Even in countries such as the USA, where smoking prevalence is relatively low (18%)
and smokefree laws are comprehensive and well–enforced, most (54%) children aged 3–18 years are
regularly exposed to SHS, mostly in the home.[1] Consequently, the worldwide public health burden
of SHS exposure is high: of all tobacco–caused deaths, non–smokers killed by the effects of SHS
represent approximately 15% (currently over 600,000 people per year).[3] Therefore current policies
do not sufficiently protect people from SHS, particularly children, because there are very few policies
that address SHS exposure in the home. They also reflect injustice, since most non–smokers killed
by SHS exposure are women (64%) and children (31%). These deaths are typically from chronic
diseases that affect the quality and length of life: lower respiratory infections or asthma (in children),
and ischaemic heart disease, asthma, or lung cancer (in adults). The total disease burden from
11They may not be justified, however, within liberal frameworks that hold ‘freedom’—even at the expense of health—as
the pre–eminent value. Further discussion on this point is made in section 2.3.
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these deaths corresponds to approximately 10.9 million DALY, which is 19% of the total DALY as a
consequence of active smoking.[2]
Since there is no safe exposure level to SHS, policies should aim to minimize exposure as much as
possible.12 This applies in particular to places where children are often present, due to their increased
sensitivity to the effects of SHS. In other words, the implementation of smokefree laws and other
measures that protect others from SHS exposure are essential. Measures should also be taken to
reduce smoking in pregnancy, as to protect the development of young children.13
Tobacco addiction
Smoking causes addictive states. Although ‘addiction’ remains a highly contested term,14 it is a neu-
robiopsychosocial disorder, with clear neurobiological,15 behavioral, and psychological manifests. In
general, addictions—including tobacco addictions—are clinically diagnosed using behavioral criteria.
In the 5th Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM–5),16 for example, diagnostic
criteria for ‘tobacco use disorder’ tend to reflect behavioral dissonance regarding the use of tobacco:
consuming more than intended, persistent (and often unsuccessful) efforts to quit or cut down, contin-
ued use despite persistent or recurring problems that result from use, or difficulty in abstaining despite
knowledge of the potential risks. Other criteria include craving,17 physical tolerance,18 and physical
withdrawal.19[22] In other words, (tobacco) addiction is defined by clear behavioral and psychological
features, some which may affect the ability of the individual to avoid or cease using a drug—in this
case tobacco.
12This does, however, come at the expense of the freedom of smokers to smoke in places where others are present.
Ethical frameworks that address this trade–off are discussed in section 2.3.
13While ‘children’ in this context may refer to unborn babies, the aim here is not to enter into debates on foetal rights
or the moral status of unborn babies. The point is that parental smoking before a child is born can result in the child
suffering health complications after birth and throughout the life course.
14There is still no consensus on what addiction is. It has been argued, for example, that ‘addiction’ is a freely
chosen, appetitive behavior similar to other behaviors. However, this thesis disputes this idea due to the neurobiological,
behavioral, and clinical features that distinguish addictive behaviors from other behaviors. These are generally related
to an impaired ability to avoid the addictive pursuit. These issues are discussed further in section 5.1.
15Neurobiological processes involved in addiction can, in turn, affect psychological and behavioral functions. They are
described at length in chapter 3.
16DSM–5 is currently one of the most important tools for the diagnosis of mental disorders.
17A psychological criterion. According to DSM–5, craving is: “an intense desire or urge for the drug that may
occur anytime, but is more likely in a relevant environment where the drug was obtained or used” (pg.483, [22]). The
neurobiological processes that underlie craving, as well as its significance for tobacco control policies, are discussed in
section 3.1.
18DSM–5 defines physical tolerance as: “requiring a markedly increased dose of the substance to achieve the desired
effect or a markedly reduced effect when the usual dose is consumed” (pg.483, [22]). In the context of smoking, this may
be reflected by a higher number of cigarettes consumed per day (CPD), or a reduction in the usual effects or benefits
gained from smoking a cigarette.
19DSM–5 defines physical withdrawal as: “a syndrome that occurs when blood or tissue concentrations of a substance
decline in an individual who had maintained prolonged heavy use of the substance” (pg.483, [22]). In the context of
smoking, this is usually reflected by temporary withdrawal symptoms such as headache, nausea, anxiety and irritability
when tobacco consumption is not sustained.
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The addictiveness of tobacco is mostly owed to the neurological actions of nicotine. Nicotine im-
pacts neurological circuits in a similar way to other addictive drugs, such as heroin, cocaine, and
methamphetamine.20 Nicotine delivery through a cigarette is extremely rapid; inhalation allows nico-
tine to be absorbed into the brain within seconds. This, in turn, increases its addictive potential. Many
cigarettes are also designed to increase the potency of nicotine, through the addition of bronchodila-
tors such as cocoa and licorice, or freebasing21 agents such as ammonia.[39] This further increases
their addictive potential and can make it very difficult for people, particularly those who initiated at a
young age,22 to quit. Consequently, tobacco has a high conversion to dependency23 rate. For example,
a comparative study found that, of those who ever try smoking, an estimated 32% will develop an
addictive pattern of use later in life;24 this is significantly higher than for heroin (23%), cocaine (17%),
and alcohol (15%).[60]
The dissonance commonly observed among adult smokers suggests that the majority of smokers
are addicted to tobacco by the time they reach adulthood. An estimated 90% of adult daily smokers25
regret having ever started smoking.[61] Regret is an indicator of cognitive dissonance, which closely
matches criteria related to behavioral dissonance that are used to diagnose addictions in sources such
as DSM–5.[22] Furthermore, smoking cessation produces significant health benefits even within a short
time of quitting,[5] and so in any given year roughly 40–50% of smokers try to quit.[24] Yet, most
of these quit attempts are unsuccessful despite the smokers’ desire to abstain, which corresponds to
behavioral criteria for addiction (see above). Unaided, the success rate is just 3–7%; with the use of
aids,26 this increases to a modest 25%.[25] Although it is difficult from the above to derive the exact
proportion of smokers who have developed addiction, a conservative estimate is that the majority
of adult smokers—50% or more—are, to some degree, addicted to tobacco.27 This is an important
20Primarily in mesolimbic dopamine pathways that affect reward–seeking behavior, the ability to control behavior,
cravings, and other processes. Further discussion is provided in section 3.1.
21‘Freebasing’ is a chemical process that detaches a drug from its salt base, allowing for a faster absorption into the
brain. The technique is also used to increase the ‘high’ of other drugs, such as cocaine, which is freebased into ‘crack’
cocaine and smoked in a similar way to tobacco.
22This point is important because, at a younger age, people are more vulnerable to developing addiction—see the
discussion below, under the subheading “smoking initiation”.
23In this thesis, the terms ‘addiction’ and ‘dependence’ are used interchangeably.
24This figure is variable, and depends on many other complex factors such as age of initiation or how many times
smoking is repeated after the first try. Addiction is more likely to develop if age of initiation is younger, and smoking
occurs over a prolonged period. For example, the conversion to dependency rate for children below age 15 is estimated
to be over 50%; higher if smoking is repeated over a prolonged period.[59]
25Based on a survey of over 8,000 smokers across Canada, the USA, the UK, and Australia.
26Various approved cessation aids are available, such as nicotine replacement therapy (NRT), medicines such as vareni-
cline and bupropion, or psychological aids such as cognitive and behavioral therapy.
27Part of the reason why it is difficult to derive the global proportion of addicted (as opposed to non–addicted) smokers
is because many smokers don’t seek medical help, and because ‘smoking’ status is defined variably. It may be inferred
that a daily smoker is addicted to some degree, so often ‘smoker’ is defined as one who ‘smokes on a daily basis’, but
sometimes also ‘smokes daily or occasionally’ or ‘smokes on a weekly/monthly basis’. It was mentioned above that over
one billion people currently smoke tobacco on a daily basis; hence it may be inferred that currently over one billion
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point for tobacco control policies, because addiction can significantly undermine an individual’s ability
to avoid using tobacco.28 Measures should then aim to minimize the development and sustaining of
addictions.29 Furthermore, the low success rates in cessation reflect a need for better access to cessation
services, as well as more effective approaches to treating tobacco addictions and preventing relapse.
Smoking initiation
Adolescence is the time when most initiations occur: most before age 18,[26] and virtually all by
age 25, by which time most addictions have developed.[63] Thus, tobacco addictions generally develop
during a time when the neurological capacity to preconceive long–term risks is not yet fully developed,
and the brain is more sensitive to developing addictions than it is in later adulthood.30 Adolescents
typically underestimate the addictive potential of nicotine: an estimated 92% predict that they will
quit within a year, although in reality only about a third will succeed during that time frame.[64]
This fact is well understood by the TI, who have intensively promoted cigarettes to youth since the
early 1900’s.31 The implication is that adolescents are a group that require special protection, both
from initiation and from targeting by the TI. Tobacco control policies should therefore be sensitive to
the contexts of initiation, and the reasons why—and ways in which—adolescents are neurobiologically
more predisposed to developing addictions than adults.
Vulnerable populations
Adult groups among whom smoking tends to be concentrated include men,32 people from low socioe-
conomic strata, racial minorities such as African Americans and Natives, and people with a comorbid
mental illness. Smoking rates among people with schizophrenia, for example, are estimated at over
80%; with depression 50–60%; and with alcoholism or other substance abuse problems roughly 60%.[65]
Moreover, in areas where tobacco control policies have reduced overall smoking prevalence, smoking
people are, to some extent, addicted to tobacco. It is reasonable to conclude that this comprises the majority of all
tobacco users—i.e. all people who smoke on a regular or occasional basis.
28A thorough analysis of the effects of addiction on autonomy and decision–making is done in chapters 3 and 4.
29I have also discussed this point in a relevant paper. The argument was that there is a difference between ‘recreational
use’ and ‘maintenance use’ (see appendix B for definitions); the latter is associated with addiction, whereas the former
is not. This was argued to be an important consideration for tobacco control policies, because of the large proportion of
addicted smokers. See [62].
30The neurodevelopmental processes that owe adolescents their heightened susceptibility to addiction are explained
further in section 3.2.4.
31This has played an important role in triggering smoking initiations and sustained tobacco addictions among youth,
and is an important consideration for tobacco control policies—further discussion in section 4.3.
32In many developing countries, particularly in Asia, smoking among men is far more prevalent than among women, but
the women are fast becoming targets for tobacco promotions in the name of ‘gender equality’. However, the discussions
in this thesis are focused on places where tobacco control policies are more developed. In such places gender disparity is
usually smaller, and smoking prevalence among men is only slightly higher than among females.
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has not decreased significantly among those with comorbid mental illness.[35] This could reflect the
fact that they are more strongly addicted to cigarettes, that tobacco control policies have not been
sufficiently tailored to meet their specific needs, or both. Consequently, health inequalities—and the
reasons behind these—continue to be improperly addressed by tobacco control policies. It is im-
portant, then, to consider the underlying mechanisms that render these groups more vulnerable to
tobacco use and addiction than others, and ways in which tobacco control policies should address
these. Later—using evidence from chapters 3 and 4—it is argued that it is important for tobacco
control policies to pay attention to factors that contribute to social injustice.
Socioeconomic costs
Besides having serious and direct consequences on the health of self and others, smoking also carries
a substantial socioeconomic burden, both in terms of direct healthcare costs and indirect costs such
as losses in labour productivity, fire damage, and environmental harms from littering and tobacco
farming. Direct tobacco–related healthcare costs are, for many countries, enormous. In the USA, for
example, they are estimated at $96 billion annually.[8] Excise taxes do in part compensate for this
loss, though far from sufficiently. It was estimated that, for an American smoker, the monetary value
of direct health damage from a single pack of cigarettes is $35, while excise taxes in the USA stand
well below $10 per pack.[66] It was also argued, mainly by the TI, that smoking actually boosts the
economy, because many smokers die before they are eligible to claim their pension funds.[67] However,
TI–independent sources, using more comprehensive calculations, have argued that this is offset by
reduced labour productivity and taxable income, as well as increased disability benefits.[68] Further
indirect costs—such as environmental and fire damage—vary between places,33 but actually represent
the bulk of total economic cost in some nations.[8]
The harms that result from tobacco use are on multiple levels, significant, and ubiquitous, and
so tobacco affects even those who do not smoke or who are never exposed to SHS due to its wider
impacts on the economy, society, and environment. Thus, tobacco provides a good example of how the
welfare of the community and of individuals are interconnected. This provides a justification for the
allocation of resources towards tobacco control programmes, even if these resources are to be taken
from those who are not directly affected by tobacco (further discussion in section 2.3).
33For example, countries that, due to a dry, hot climate, are more affected by bush fires caused by cigarette butt waste,
or where tobacco farming represents a larger agricultural area.
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2.1.2 Tobacco compared to other addictive drugs
Restrictions on tobacco are generally justified, due to the widespread harms that result from its
use. However, regulations on tobacco are often quite permissive, especially in relation to those for
other psychoactive drugs such as cocaine and marijuana; these drugs are generally under a scheduling
system,34 whereas tobacco is not. One question, then, is whether tobacco control policies correctly
reflect these harms in comparison to policies that exist for other addictive drugs.
Harm profile
How do tobacco–related harms compare to the harms associated with other potentially addictive
drugs? A 2007 study used a panel of experts to rank various drugs35 according to their harm profile,
in three categories:[69] (1) physical harm to self (acute, chronic, and complications associated with
intravenous use); (2) addictiveness; and (3) harm to others (either direct36 or indirect37). Tobacco
ranked highly in a number of categories. For chronic physical harm it ranked first; for social costs
related to healthcare it ranked second (after heroin); and for addictiveness it ranked third (after
heroin and cocaine). Tobacco ranked lower in other categories, because tobacco intoxication does not
usually result in impaired judgement, aggression, hallucinations, or other such symptoms. It is also
not injected, and so does not contribute to intravenous–related health complications. However, it is
interesting to note that tobacco use, which is often associated with the notion of ‘free choice’ in pro–
tobacco arguments, is considered addictive even in comparison to various illegal drugs. It also ranks
highly in terms of social costs, which attests further to the argument that tobacco–related harms, at
some level, affect everyone in society (see section 2.1.1). Tobacco–related harms in terms of chronic
disease, death, and addiction were deemed sufficient to classify tobacco under schedule B;38 a stark
contrast to its current legal status.[69]
34The sale of scheduled drugs is not legally permitted, and sanctioned with penalties such as fines or imprisonment.
Unscheduled drugs such as tobacco and alcohol, in contrast, can be legally sold within defined limits (for example, to
adults over a certain age).
3520 psychoactive drugs, both licit and licit, including: tobacco, alcohol, heroin, cocaine, amphetamine, street
methadone, barbiturates, ketamine, benzodiazepines, buprenorphine, Ecstasy, LSD, 4–MTA, cannabis, anabolic steroids,
methylphenidate, solvents, khat, alkyl nitrites, and GHB.
36For example, through intoxication–induced violence or exposure to SHS.
37For example, socioeconomic costs incurred by hospitalization.
38In line with the British drug scheduling system. Illicit, psychoactive drugs are either under schedule A (the most
controlled substances, e.g. heroin, cocaine), schedule B (next level down, e.g. barbiturates, amphetamine), or schedule
C (lowest level, e.g. benzodiazepines).
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Patterns of use
The overall use of scheduled drugs such as cocaine, heroin, and cannabis, due to their illegal status in
most jurisdictions, is less prevalent than tobacco, and among the world’s adult39 population remains
stable at approximately 5% (167–315 million people). Among these, an estimated 11% (16–39 million
people) are addicted,40 mainly to forms of cocaine and/or opioid drugs.[36] This is a strong contrast
to tobacco use, which appears to be addictive for the majority of adult smokers.41 As with tobacco,
most initiations of the use of illicit drugs are before age 18, and most addictions develop before age
25.[70] Illegal drug use, as with tobacco use, is also typically concentrated among people from low
socioeconomic strata (e.g. the poor, the unemployed), racial minorities (e.g. African Americans,
Natives), and those suffering from comorbid mental disorders.[36]
Patterns of alcohol use are similar: global consumption remains stable, and most alcohol users initi-
ate before age 25.[37] However, the proportion of addicted users is, like illegal drugs, considerably lower
for alcohol than for tobacco; an estimated 2–9% of adult alcohol users are clinically dependent,[71]
whereas for tobacco this figure is over 50% (see section 2.1.1). Since both drugs are legally available
in most countries,42 this disparity most likely reflects variations in the addictiveness of nicotine versus
alcohol, the mode of administration (inhalation versus oral),43 and social perceptions regarding the
appropriate uses of tobacco and alcohol. Although alcohol use is prevalent among minority groups
as well as the mainstream, the pattern of alcohol use varies; addictive use is generally concentrated
among the most socioeconomically deprived, and racial minority groups.[37]
Public health burden
The use of illicit drugs creates a considerable public health burden. Drugs such as heroin are often
injected with dirty needles, which leads to collapsed veins, infections of the heart lining and valves,
abscesses, and infection with HIV, hepatitis B, and hepatitis C. A significant proportion of injecting
drug users live with HIV (11.5%) and hepatitis C (51%), and an estimated 100,000–250,000 deaths
per year occur directly through drug use, which represents 0.5–1.5% of all adult deaths.[36] The
most common cause of such deaths is overdose.[72] Although these figures are notably lower than
for tobacco, they do not take into account indirect drug–related deaths, such as accidents caused by
39In this case, defined as 15–64 years of age.
40By clinical definition; see section 2.1.1.
41This is likely to be in part due to tobacco’s legal status.
42All countries except: Bhutan (tobacco); Afghanistan, Brunei Darussalam, Iran, Maldives, Mauritania, Pakistan,
Saudi Arabia, Somalia and Sudan (alcohol).
43Inhalation allows a far quicker absorption of a drug than oral administration, and is therefore likelier to result in
addiction.
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drug intoxication or drug–related criminal activity. These costs, though difficult to estimate, likely
far outweigh the direct burdens mentioned above.[31]
Meanwhile, alcohol, which like tobacco remains a legal44 substance, is the world’s third largest
risk factor contributing to the most DALY. Tobacco ranks sixth, and illicit drugs 18th. As with
tobacco, alcohol is implicated in a wide range of diseases; however, another reason it ranks so highly
is because of alcohol–induced intoxications that lead to violence, accidents, lost work productivity,
child abuse, and child neglect. Harmful alcohol use, then, is responsible for roughly 4.5% of the global
burden of disease and injury, and 4% of all deaths worldwide (2.5 million deaths annually).[37] This
is approximately 40% in relation to the death burden caused by tobacco. While tobacco does not
significantly intoxicate its users, it still far outshines all illicit drugs and alcohol in terms of the public
health burden caused by its correlation with many chronic diseases. It is estimated to cause up to
40% of all addictive substance–related hospitalizations, and 60% of all addictive substance–related
deaths.[69]
Policy implications
The above analysis demonstrates at least three important points. First, tobacco use is extremely
harmful—even in comparison to the use of illicit drugs—in terms of chronic health and mortality
burdens. Yet it remains legally available, which means that it is sui generis as a legal substance
associated with such significant health threats: it is the only legally available substance that, when
used correctly, kills half of its users.[39] Second, addictions to all substances compared—tobacco,
alcohol, and illegal drugs—tend to be clustered among people from socially disadvantaged groups, and
initiating the use of these substances occurs mostly among youth. There are important neurobiological
and social reasons for these vulnerabilities, that are discussed in greater detail throughout chapters
3 and 4. This, in turn, highlights the role of various social processes and factors in triggering and
sustaining (tobacco) addictions, and the importance of paying attention to issues related to social
injustice (further discussion in section 2.3).
Third, tobacco is addictive to a far higher proportion of users than other drugs: the majority
of tobacco users are addicted to tobacco, whereas the proportion of users addicted to alcohol or
illicit drugs lies closer to 10%. This is likely to be due to multiple reasons. Pharmacological reasons
may include the psychoactive properties of nicotine, its rapid mode of administration (inhalation), or
features in the design of cigarettes that increase their addictive potential (for example, the addition of
44‘Legal’ in this context refers to free sale of the product within defined limits, for example to people over a certain
age.
26
bronchodilators and freebasing agents). Other reasons may relate to the social connotations of smoking
(discussed in chapter 4), or the current legal status of smoking. Yet, it is clear from these discussions
that tobacco is sufficiently harmful to warrant restrictions. It is necessary, then, to consider the types
of restrictions that are currently implemented on tobacco, their limitations, and ways in which these
limitations are being addressed in more recent developments.
2.2 Tobacco control policies
The most important regulatory framework for tobacco control at current is the WHO Framework
Convention for Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC) treaty, which entered into force in 2005.[6] The WHO
FCTC was developed in response to mounting evidence attesting to the harms of tobacco, successful
litigations against the TI,45 and major anti–tobacco movements that started throughout the 1990’s.
Currently, 177 countries are a Party to the WHO FCTC, and so it has set a precedent for tobacco
control policies in most countries in the world.[73]
The WHO FCTC, broadly speaking, calls for a global approach to gaining control over tobacco, its
public health impacts, and the TI. It is based on overarching human rights principles set out in United
Nations (UN) treaties. The right most emphasized in the WHO FCTC is the right to “. . . enjoyment of
the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health”(pg.2, [6]), and “. . . without distinction
of race, religion, political belief, economic or social condition”(pg.3, [6]). Focus is also on children’s
rights, in particular to “recognize the right of the child to the enjoyment of the highest attainable
standard of health”(pg.3, [6]).
2.2.1 Measures under the WHO FCTC
Measures endorsed by the WHO FCTC treaty are evidence–based,46 and target tobacco demand as
well as supply in order to discourage tobacco use. Therefore the overall approach is to strike a balance
between freedom and health: preserving the option to smoke, yet within a limit at which the health of
self and others is, to some extent, protected.47 Accordingly, tobacco supply is reduced by controlling
45Arguably the most important litigation against the TI was in 1998, by 46 US states against four major tobacco
companies (Philip Morris, R.J. Reynolds, Brown & Williamson, and Lorillard). It led to a Master Settlement Agreement,
which forced the companies to compensate the states $206 billion towards Medicaid costs, stop advertising to youth,
disband TI–funded research organizations, and release 40 million previously confidential industry documents onto the
Internet. See [65] and the discussions in chapter 4.
46As in, at the time the WHO FCTC was drafted, there was a strong evidence base attesting to the harms of tobacco, the
urgent need to concert a globalized approach to tobacco control policy, and the possible reductions in smoking prevalence
if the measures would be implemented. Since it went into force, the evidence base for the latter has strengthened.
47This approach is based on libertarian paternalism, an ethical concept in which healthy choices are encouraged, while
unhealthy options (e.g. smoking) are still permitted, but discouraged. This approach is discussed further in section
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illicit tobacco trade and sales to youth, for example by raising the minimum age of sale to 18. Tobacco
demand is reduced via measures described below.
Smokefree laws
It has been correspondingly argued that smokefree laws are necessary because SHS exposure is re-
sponsible for a significant number of mortalities and health issues among non–smokers, particularly
children. SHS is still harmful when it travels from one room to another, or when it is filtered through
a ventilation system, so smokefree laws should be comprehensive and well–enforced if they are to offer
proper protection.[5] Comprehensive smokefree laws are effective: experiences in a number of coun-
tries demonstrate that they are popular among the public, beneficial to the hospitality industry, and
significantly improve health.[74] For example, in California, smokefree laws in bars resulted in sharp
reductions in respiratory symptoms among workers within just two months of their implementation.[75]
Besides protecting others, comprehensive smokefree laws also encourage cessation among current
smokers. In Ireland, for example, they encouraged 46% of smokers to consider cessation. Among those
who had quit, 80% reported that smokefree legislations were a primary motivating factor, and 88%
reported that they prevented relapse.[76] Comprehensive smokefree laws also help to raise awareness on
the harms of SHS, which encourages smokers to make their own homes smokefree, thereby protecting
their own family members from exposure to SHS.[77] They also contribute to the denormalization48
of smoking, especially if implemented in indoor and outdoor recreational settings (for example bars,
restaurants, parks, concert venues). This effect tends to discourage smoking initiation among youth
and encourage cessation among smokers; however, it may also stigmatize or marginalize smokers, as
a segregation between smokers and non–smokers is then created. It has also been argued that this
leads some smokers to smoke more in their own homes, which, in turn, exposes others in the home to
higher levels of SHS.49[78]
Cessation services
The WHO FCTC recommends the provision of approved cessation services such as a national quit line,
medicines such as NRT, bupropion, or varenicline, and cognitive behavioral therapy.[79] As mentioned
in section 2.1.1, it is necessary to provide such services because, without them, the success rate for
cessation is just 2–7%. With use of these aids, the rate of cessation success is higher but still just
2.3—also see [41].
48‘Denormalization’ in this context refers to any measure that indicates that smoking is not, or should not be, considered
a normal activity in society.
49Ethical issues associated with tobacco–denormalizing smokefree laws are discussed in section 6.1.
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25%. More effective approaches to cessation should therefore be sought along with current measures.
This need is reflected in more recent developments on tobacco harm reductive strategies and nicotine
vaccines (see section 2.2.3).
Among smokers, the primary motivators for cessation appear to be personal health (for 71% of
smokers), followed by pressure from family, friends, or a partner (52%), the price of tobacco (47%),
and the effects of SHS on non–smokers (35%).[80] Thus, raising awareness on the negative impacts of
smoking on personal health and the health of non–smokers, and raising tobacco prices, are likely to
increase smokers’ motivations to quit. Otherwise, as mentioned above, cessation can be encouraged
by denormalizing tobacco though this may stigmatize smokers. Support from loved ones may also
increase cessation success. There is evidence that smoking cessation typically occurs in social clusters
(e.g. spouses or friends quitting together),[81] so it is also important to harness social support from
close friends, family, or a partner. The significance of this idea is an important clue to the ethical
framework developed in this thesis, and is discussed further in chapter 3.
Providing warning
The WHO FCTC recommends the use of media campaigns and warning labels on tobacco packaging
to provide information to the public on the negative health impacts of smoking. Advertising done
through a diverse range of media can reach people of a lower socioeconomic status, who seem to
be less responsive to anti–tobacco TV adverts.[82] Large, pictorial, and rotated health warnings on
tobacco packaging are also effective, and tend to encourage positive trends such as public acceptance
of other tobacco control measures, and fewer initiations among children.[83] These measures can
also be used to shape public opinions and behaviors regarding tobacco, to denormalize and discourage
smoking. This generally requires adverts with a stronger message (for example, that smoking is socially
undesirable), and sustained exposure over a prolonged period.[84] Youth are particularly responsive to
such campaigns.[85] However, as with some smokefree laws, the denormalizing effect of these measures
may stigmatize or marginalize some smokers.
Restrictions on tobacco advertising, promotions, and sponsorships
Tobacco advertising, promotions, and sponsorship (TAPS) have been used by the TI to promote
smoking in ways that have contributed—in very important ways—to the current public health sit-
uation.50 Therefore banning TAPS should be an essential part of tobacco control strategies. Bans
50This is discussed at length in chapter 4.
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on TAPS should be comprehensive, since the TI tends to promote tobacco products through indirect
means when direct means51 are banned. Popular indirect means utilized by the TI include: ‘brand
stretching’, in which a cigarette brand is promoted by a non–tobacco product of the same name;52
free distribution of products; promotional discounts; product placements in movies and entertainment;
TI–funded ‘anti–smoking campaigns’;53 philanthropy; and sponsored events.[9] The tobacco packag-
ing itself is another form of advertising, since the cigarette brand is used by the TI to forge smoker
identities, particularly in youth.[86] Thus, large pictorial warning labels, fewer branding elements,
and ultimately plain packaging54 can help youth to perceive smoking less favourably, and increase the
likelihood that smokers will quit or cut down.[87]
Taxation
The WHO FCTC recommends that excise taxes on tobacco should comprise at least 75% of the retail
value. Tobacco, due to its addictiveness, has a relatively low price elasticity.55 Nevertheless, con-
sumers will still respond to price increases. In developed countries, youth and people on a low income
are generally more responsive to price increases.[79] Taxation is considered to be the most effective
intervention in reducing tobacco consumption, encouraging cessation, and discouraging smoking ini-
tiation among youth. Although taxation is contested on the grounds that it is ineffective or results in
illicit tobacco trade, this is not necessarily the case provided that governance is good.56 Tobacco tax
is also a source of government revenue, which can be funded back into tobacco control programmes.
Therefore, taxation—along with strong compliance mechanisms—remains a highly endorsed measure
by the WHO FCTC.
51Direct means of advertising include TV, cinemas, radio, print media, outdoor displays, point of sale displays, and
Internet.
52For example, R.J. Reynolds, the producer of Camel cigarettes, had a ‘Camel’ clothes line which was marketed under
the same logo and style.
53These campaigns are actually designed to increase smoking initiation among youth and are therefore a form of
tobacco promotion. See section 4.3.
54‘Plain packaging’ is a mandate on cigarette packs that requires all cigarettes to be sold in a standardized package,
with no branding elements, a standard font which states the brand, and large pictorial warnings on all sides of the
package. It was pioneered in Australia in 2012, with other countries (e.g. Ireland and New Zealand) now following suit.
55Price elasticity is a measure of the extent to which demand for a product changes, proportional to and following
a price change. A price elasticity above 1 is considered high. A price elasticity of around 0.4 indicates that, as prices
increase by 10%, demand will go down by 4%. The price elasticity for tobacco varies per country, but on average is
estimated at 0.4.
56In Norway, for example, taxation is high (73% of the retail value) but illicit tobacco trade is uncommon, since rules
are well–enforced. Conversely, illicit tobacco trade is high in countries such as Armenia, where taxes are low (25% of the
retail value) but compliance to licit trade is weak. See [39].
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2.2.2 Impact of measures under the WHO FCTC
Progress
Since the entry of the WHO FCTC in 2005, international progress in tobacco control has escalated
significantly. Over a third of the world’s population is now covered by at least one efficient tobacco
control measure (such as taxation or smokefree laws),[9] and smoking rates have dropped sharply,
especially in developed countries. Consequently, it is estimated that, as a result of policies based on
the WHO FCTC, 7.4 million lives were saved between 2007 and 2010. Most of these are attributable
to measures based on taxation (3.5 million lives) and smokefree laws (2.5 million lives).[88] Further-
more, smoking prevalence has declined globally between 1980 and 2012 from 41.2% to 31.1% (among
men), and from 10.6% to 6.2% (among women). This is arguably one of the greatest public health
success stories over the last 40 years.[7] Accompanying this has been a normative shift—particularly
in countries where implementation of tobacco control measures has been quite thorough57—towards
more denormalized perceptions of smoking and a higher acceptance of tobacco regulations.
However, due to substantial population growth over the last 40 years, the number of cigarettes
consumed worldwide has increased by 26%; the net result is that the global tobacco market has
actually grown.[7] In other words: progress in tobacco control has been remarkable, but insufficient.
Consequently, the serious public health issues described in section 2.1.1 are ongoing, and warrant
further implementation of measures under the WHO FCTC, as well as other measures that tackle
issues otherwise not addressed by the WHO FCTC.
Limits of implementation
As discussed in section 2.2.1, the implementation of tobacco control measures must be comprehensive
for them to be fully effective.58 However, the implementation of most measures is poor or incomplete
in most places.[9] This is due to various reasons: the TI is involved in political lobbying, expensive
lawsuits against states wishing to regulate tobacco, and spreading pro–tobacco arguments that smoking
is an exercise of freedom, individual rights, beneficial, or has some other positive social connotation.
57In general, this refers to developed nations where there are good infrastructures and economic resources to fully
implement these policies, and where political will has been strong. Good examples include Australia, Canada, and
Finland.
58‘Fully effective’ is defined separately according to the type of strategy. For smokefree environments, all public
places should be completely smokefree, or at least 90% of the population covered by complete subnational smokefree
legislations. For cessation therapy, a national quit line, NRT, plus an additional cessation service should be covered. For
warning, large pictorial warning labels must be rotated on all tobacco packaging, and national media campaigns should
be conducted continuously and regularly on different media including TV and/or radio. Bans on TAPS should be on all
direct and indirect forms of tobacco promotions. Taxation should comprise at least 75% of the retail value. See [9].
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This can significantly reduce the political will to implement effective tobacco control policies, and can
compromise the overall acceptance of regulations on tobacco. These issues are, as one may expect,
most apparent in places where political lobbying by the TI is strongest, or where the financial resources
to fight TI–led lawsuits are limited.
Accordingly, there are considerable regional variations in the strength of tobacco control measures.
This in turn affects smoking prevalence, because implementation levels are, generally speaking, in-
versely proportional to smoking prevalence.59 Furthermore, developed countries that have based their
tobacco control policies on the WHO FCTC tend to share a common trend: a smoking prevalence
that has dropped in recent years, followed by a plateau. This plateau tends to occur after the imple-
mentation of tobacco control policies has ‘stalled’. In countries where policies stalled at a low level
of implementation, smoking prevalence remains relatively high (over 30%); in countries where policies
have been thoroughly implemented, but remain unchanged after that, smoking prevalence remains
at roughly 15–20%.[9] Thus, in regions such as the EU, where most tobacco control policies have
now stabilized and implementation levels are mixed, smoking prevalence has not significantly changed
between 2009 and 2012 and remains stable at approximately 28%.[89]
This has two important implications. First, ongoing work in fully implementing measures under
the WHO FCTC is necessary to achieve a continued reduction in smoking prevalence. Second, when
full implementation of these measures is achieved, smoking prevalence is unlikely to reduce much
further below 10–15%.60 This means that additional strategies are necessary, as a 15% smoking
prevalence is still significant and would result in over 7% of the world’s population losing, on average,
20 years of productive life; not counting those affected by SHS exposure and the social, economic, and
environmental costs. Moreover, there is evidence that these impacts would have a disproportionate
effect on socially disadvantaged groups, thus contributing to health inequalities.
Tobacco–related health inequalities
In developed countries where measures under the WHO FCTC have been implemented, adult smoking
is increasingly concentrated among the poor, the socially marginalized, certain racial minorities, and
people suffering from co–morbid mental illnesses, particularly schizophrenia.[7] These people tend to
be less responsive to tobacco control policies, which has led to a ‘hardening hypothesis’: the argument
that, when smoking prevalence drops, the smokers that remain are on average more reluctant to
59Thorough policies are usually accompanied by a sharp drop in smoking rates, and/or a low smoking prevalence.
60It has been estimated, for example, that measures based on the WHO FCTC, if implemented fully, would bring the
world prevalence of smoking down to 15.4% in 2020, and 13.2% in 2030. See [11].
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quit.[12] This may explain in part why measures based on the WHO FCTC appear unable to reduce
smoking prevalence below a certain threshold. The reasons behind this trend are explained from a
neurobiological perspective in section 3.2, and from a social perspective in chapter 4. In both cases,
the effects of social hardship, marginalization, and stress are demonstrated as having a significant
impact on later patterns of addiction. These in turn relate to issues of social injustice; to tackle these
should be an important aspect of tobacco control policies.
2.2.3 Further developments in tobacco control
It has been argued that, due to the limitations of the tobacco control measures described above, it
is necessary to pursue more innovative strategies that go beyond measures embraced by the WHO
FCTC.[13] Such strategies should not neglect evidence–based measures based on the WHO FCTC;[90]
however, they could be implemented in addition to these measures to maximize their impact or to
fill ‘gaps’—such as tobacco–related health inequalities—currently not addressed by the WHO FCTC.
However, these innovative strategies in themselves also raise a number of ethical concerns.
Tobacco–denormalizing ‘endgames’
Tobacco endgames are strategies61 that aim to more or less eliminate62 tobacco consumption. Their
rationale is that the current public health situation remains unacceptable, and discouragement mea-
sures based on the WHO FCTC—though effective—are insufficient, so more innovative strategies with
a stronger goal—elimination—are necessary.[94] Places considered well–placed for a tobacco endgame
are those with strong political leadership, a good public acceptance of tobacco regulations, and a low
(15% or below) or rapidly decreasing smoking prevalence.63 Some of these places officially strive to be
tobacco–free by a certain year: Ireland and New Zealand by 2025,[96, 97] Scotland by 2034,[98] and
Finland by 2040.[99] A tobacco–free goal by 2035 has also been proposed for Canada.[100]
Their strategies all build from measures based on the WHO FCTC, and are strongly focused on
creating a social movement that denormalizes tobacco and discourages smoking initiations among
youth. The Irish strategy, for example, states that:
“Making smoking less attractive to children and young people and increasing its social
61Strategies vary. Some proposed strategies—not considered further in this thesis—include regulating the supply or
content of tobacco: for example by imposing a ‘sinking lid’ on tobacco import quotas,[91] regulating the TI,[92] or
replacing for–profit TI with a regulated market that encourages the use of less harmful nicotine products.[93] These
strategies are not considered further because of their practical difficulties in gaining co–operation from the TI.
62‘Eliminate’ is defined variably. Some define it as a smoking prevalence of near–zero, others as below 5%. For the
purpose of this thesis, ‘eliminate’ in the tobacco endgame context refers to a smoking prevalence below 5%.
63For example, places such as Uruguay, Australia,[90] and California.[95]
33
unacceptability are key elements in the denormalization of tobacco. Denormalization of
tobacco at every level of society is one of the key strategies for protecting children.”(pg.41–
42, [96])
The Scottish and New Zealand strategies, similarly, emphasize the importance of a social movement
that creates an environment in which children, particularly those from socioeconomically deprived
areas, do not want to smoke.[98, 101] The essence of New Zealand’s strategy, for example, is:
“. . . about creating a national identity that protects our children by being proud to be
tobacco free. This will be achieved through a social movement against tobacco in New
Zealand.”[101]
More specific measures include encouraging parents to create smokefree homes, protecting children
from the marketing practices of the TI, restricting the sales and display of tobacco (to prevent youth
from buying tobacco), implementing plain packaging, and creating smokefree outdoor areas, partic-
ularly where children are often present (e.g. playgrounds, schools, parks).[96, 97, 98, 99] However,
there are concerns that the tobacco–denormalizing effect of these strategies will stigmatize smokers.
This could, in turn, widen the health inequality gap because socially disadvantaged groups tend to be
more affected by stigma. This approach therefore raises questions regarding the extent to—and ways
in—which it is ethical to denormalize tobacco for the purpose of discouraging smoking, and special
considerations that should be made for socially disadvantaged groups.64
Prohibitive approaches
Other tobacco endgame advocates have proposed that tobacco sales should be prohibited.[102] One
country—Bhutan—has done this since 2004, although compliance has been uncertain and their policy
was criticized for being too draconian.[103] An arguably more lenient approach, under consideration
in Singapore,[16] Tasmania,[104] and the UK,[105] is the tobacco–free generation (TFG) proposal. It
would work by denying tobacco sales to citizens born after a certain date, such as 1st January 2000,
by making an amendment to the current minimum age of sales law. In most countries, including
Singapore, Australia, and the UK, the minimum age for tobacco sale is 18 years; the TFG proposal
would amend this law such that tobacco sales are prohibited to all individuals aged under 18 years and
all citizens born on or after 1st January 2000.[16] This would effectively phase out tobacco sales to an
entire cohort of citizens, without affecting tourism or foreign employment, imposing further restrictions
64An ethical discussion of these points is made in section 6.1.
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on current smokers, or criminalizing people who initiate smoking regardless of the amended law. The
TFG proposal would also, over time, increase the generation gap between smokers and non–smokers,
which would create a ‘norm cascade’ that denormalizes smoking as an outdated phenomenon.[106]
The rationale of the TFG proposal is that it prevents smoking initiation among younger gener-
ations, which makes it especially relevant in places where smoking initiation is a major concern. In
Singapore, for example, smoking among the youngest adult cohort (aged 18–29 years) has increased
from 12.3% in 2004 to 16.3% in 2010.[107, 108] Accordingly, proponents of the TFG proposal argue that
younger generations should be a primary focus of tobacco endgame strategies.[106] However, the TFG
proposal raises questions regarding the limits of prohibition in the context of tobacco. Pro–tobacco
arguments often claim that smoking is a freely chosen activity that is—albeit harmful—pleasurable or
beneficial in some way. Is it ethical, then, to deny the option to initiate smoking to an entire cohort
of citizens, even in adulthood? The TFG proposal also does not necessarily help current smokers
in overcoming their addictions, or protect others from SHS exposure; yet these two issues are—as
discussed in section 2.2.1—significant. It is therefore necessary to assess whether—and the circum-
stances under which—it is ethical to deny an individual the option to initiate smoking, and how other
tobacco–related issues should be addressed alongside the implementation of the TFG proposal.65
Tobacco harm reduction
Harm reduction is an approach that aims to reduce the adverse health, social, and economic conse-
quences of drug use without necessarily reducing drug consumption.66 From a public health perspec-
tive, harm reduction is considered ethical because it tends to minimize the negative health impacts
of drug use without increasing drug use itself, and can bring addicted individuals closer to treatment
services which increases their chances of recovery.67 This has led to ideas that a similar approach
could work for tobacco. Tobacco harm reduction, then, involves finding an alternative product to
cigarettes—the most harmful and prevalent form of tobacco use—that addicted smokers can switch
to or use to wean off nicotine altogether.68 A variety of alternatives to cigarettes exist, but most are
65Ethical analysis of these points is made in section 6.2.
66A harm reductive approach has been adopted for various illicit drugs. Methadone, for example, is often prescribed
to wean people off heroin addictions, while clean needles are provided to injecting drug users to prevent infections and
the spread of diseases such as HIV.
67A comprehensive analysis on the benefits of harm reductive strategies for illicit drugs, particularly in comparison to
more punitive approaches that still prevail in many jurisdictions, was made recently in [31]. For further discussion on
the ethical implications of punitive approaches to preventing and treating addictions, see section 4.2.
68Harm reduction principles may also be adapted into an endgame strategy. For example, it was proposed that nicotine
could be eliminated from tobacco to prevent the development of addictions in youth.[109] The TI could be forced to
commit to the phasing out of cigarettes, while weaning options, such as SLT and ENDS, are introduced onto the
market.[110] Alternatively, I have argued elsewhere that cigarettes could be phased out in a similar fashion to the TFG
proposal, while permitting the use of alternative, less harmful products as part of an integrated endgame strategy—see
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not considered sufficiently safe to be part of a tobacco harm reduction strategy. Pipes, cigars, bidis,
kretek, shisha, and other such forms still cause addiction and cancers, and are harmful to non–smokers
through the effects of SHS; these harms are not at a threshold that is much lower in comparison to
cigarettes.[112] However, there are two potential products that have received considerable attention in
debates on tobacco harm reduction: smokeless tobacco (SLT), and electronic nicotine delivery systems
(ENDS).
SLT is an oral tobacco product that does not enter the lungs. It can result in addiction, cancers,
oral diseases, and heart disease.[112] However, forms of SLT with a low nitrosamine (carcinogen)
content (LN–SLT) are less harmful than cigarettes; the estimated risk of mortality and disease from
LN–SLT, relative to cigarettes, is just 5–9%.[113] LN–SLT is also not associated with fatal respiratory
diseases such as emphysema and lung cancer, and does not directly affect the health of non–users.69 In
Sweden, LN–SLT is a popular cigarette alternative (for an estimated 12% of Swedes),[114] and has led
to a steep decline in smoking prevalence and associated tobacco–related diseases.[115] Consequently,
smoking prevalence in Sweden is just 16%, which is notably lower than the EU average of 28%.[80]
However, the use of SLT remains banned in many places, and in others is considered problematic.
In South Africa, for example, SLT is affordable and designed to deliver high levels of nicotine, which
encourages addiction in adolescence and cigarette smoking later in life.[116] In India, the use of SLT
often results in later cigarette smoking and chronic disease; most people in India are unaware of these
harmful effects.[117]
ENDS are devices that deliver nicotine to the lungs through a vapour in a similar fashion to
cigarettes. They do not contain tars or other pyrolysis products found in tobacco, so are ostensibly less
harmful than cigarettes. However, because of regulatory loopholes,70 there are few restrictions on their
marketing, use, and design. The market for ENDS is booming: in 2014 an estimated 466 brands were
sold, in a market that is now worth roughly $3 billion.[17] ENDS vary widely in their ingredients,[118]
and the safety of their design.[119] In general, they contain lower levels of harmful chemicals than
cigarettes, although some varieties have been found to contain toxicants such as formaldehyde and
acrolein at a similar level as is found in cigarettes.[17] The long–term health consequences of the
repeated use of ENDS is not yet clear, and it is also not known whether the vapour released by ENDS
is harmful to non–smokers;[120] hence the risk of using ENDS relative to cigarettes is unknown.[121] It
[111]. However, for the purpose of this thesis, focus is maintained on a conventional harm reduction approach, which
simply entails permitting the use of an alternative product.
69Except in utero or during breastfeeding, and so LN–SLT is not considered safe to use for pregnant or lactating
women.
70ENDS have escaped regulation in most countries, because they are relatively new to the market, and are not classified
as a medicinal product or a tobacco product.
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is known, however, that ENDS can be highly addictive, and can cause nicotine–related complications71
in those using ENDS as well as others who breathe in the exhaled vapour.[122]
As a result, opinions remain divided on whether either product should be permitted onto the
market. There are in principle objections to substances that, though safer than cigarettes, are still
addictive and potentially harmful to self and others. There are also concerns over how the TI will use
LN–SLT or ENDS to undermine current tobacco control policies. A switch from cigarettes to LN–SLT
or ENDS should be complete, because the health benefits of reducing cigarette consumption are far
less than those obtained from complete cessation.[17] However, LN–SLT and ENDS could be designed
and marketed to encourage dual use with cigarettes rather than a complete cessation from cigarette
smoking.[17, 19] There are also concerns that a loose regulation of ENDS will renormalize smoking,
act as a gateway72 for youth into cigarette smoking, or lead to heavier cigarette smoking among dual
users, due to the high and unregulated nicotine content in ENDS.[123]
This raises various ethical questions. Are the harms presented by SLT and ENDS sufficiently low to
justify their use within a harm reductive strategy? How might the implementation of a harm reductive
approach backfire (i.e. undermine current tobacco control measures), and how should this be avoided?
The potential for LN–SLT and ENDS to be used as cessation or weaning aids also raises questions
regarding the treatment of tobacco addictions. If smokers can successfully quit with approved cessation
aids, is it necessary to wean them onto potentially harmful products? Are there certain groups of people
with more severe addictions who might not be able to quit smoking cigarettes without use of these
alternative products? These questions require a more detailed look at the commercial environment
(i.e. the marketing strategies of the TI), and the factors that can enhance—or undermine—one’s
ability to successfully quit smoking.73
Medicalized strategies
Recent advances in genetic and neuroscientific research have stimulated interest in developing med-
icalized strategies, in order to provide more effective approaches to preventing and treating nicotine
addiction. Two medical interventions, currently in development, have caught recent attention: nicotine
vaccines, and genetic tests for nicotine addiction.
The aim of the nicotine vaccine is to provide a lasting, active immunization against nicotine by
71Nicotine constricts the blood vessels which can result in cardiovascular–related complications. It is also a tumour
promoter, which means that it is not carcinogenic in itself, but can contribute to the cellular processes that eventually
lead to cancer—see [17].
72The ‘gateway’ effect refers to the idea that the use of one substance among youth will wean them onto other
substances.
73This is done in chapters 3 and 4. An ethical analysis of tobacco harm reduction is done in section 6.3.
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stimulating the production of antibodies that sequester nicotine molecules in the bloodstream. So
although the vaccine cannot prevent the act of smoking, it blocks the addictive, rewarding effects of
nicotine in the brain, which in turn prevents addictions from developing in vaccinated individuals who
initiate smoking.[20] The vaccine can also be used as a self–binding tool for addicted ex–smokers,[124]
as the absence of nicotine reward may help to prevent relapse.[20] Nicotine vaccines are, so far,
generally safe and well–tolerated in Phase II and Phase III clinical trials, although their efficacy
remains low.[125, 126] The aim of genetic tests for nicotine addiction is to predict an individual’s
susceptibility to developing nicotine addiction. ‘High–risk’ individuals could then be targeted more in
tobacco control policies, or for patient–specific interventions such as the nicotine vaccine.[21]
Both nicotine vaccines and genetics tests remain technologically flawed, and are not yet part of
a formalized tobacco control strategy. However, concerns have been raised over their potential effi-
cacy, application, and ethical implications.[127] Their application in preventing nicotine addiction in
adolescents is considered to be particularly ethically contentious, due to their potential for coercive
use.[128] The role of vested interests, such as the TI, in these interventions is also concerning. Japan
Tobacco, for example, provided substantial funds to three biotechnology companies involved in genetic
and vaccine work: Genesys and Corixa for a lung cancer vaccine, and British Biotech for research on
genetically engineered proteins that may prevent heart diseases.[129] It is necessary, then, to explore
ways in which vested interests may use these interventions and relevant research in ethically problem-
atic ways.74 There are also concerns that nicotine vaccines and genetic tests are too medicalized, and
thereby ignore important psychosocial aspects of smoking. This requires an analysis of the extent to
which addiction susceptibility is genetic, and whether addictions should be prevented and treated via
medicalized—as opposed to psychosocial—approaches.75
2.3 Ethical grounding for tobacco control policies
The above descriptions have highlighted important points about the goals that tobacco control policies
might have, the types of interventions that are justified, and ongoing and potential issues that policies
should focus on.
The public health impacts of tobacco use are serious even in comparison to those that result from
alcohol or illicit drug use; widespread in the sense that they affect self, others, societies, economies, and
the environment; and ongoing despite current regulatory efforts. From a public health perspective,
74The marketing and research tactics of the TI are discussed in chapter 4, and an ethical analysis of these two
interventions is done in section 6.4.
75A discussion of the role of genetic factors in conferring susceptibility to tobacco addiction is done in section 3.2.1.
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then, a policy that restricts the option to smoke is considered ethical. However, this comes at the
expense of the freedom to smoke and may result in other ethical issues (discussed in section 2.2.3). To
what extent, on what grounds, and in which ways is it ethical to restrict the choice to smoke for the
protection of public health, and what sort of ethical theory or framework can be used to determine
this? Smoking affects the health of others exposed to SHS; this argument has been used to justify
smokefree laws in order to minimize SHS exposure. Minimum age of sale laws, denormalization, bans
on TAPS and other measures are intended to protect children from smoking initiation. Adults are
permitted to use tobacco, yet discouraged from this on the grounds that it is a serious detriment
to their health. On what grounds are restrictions on tobacco ethically justified for the protection of
others, children, and self? Further, a growing gap in tobacco–related health inequalities highlights
the need for an ethical framework that pays attention to the effects of social injustice. It is also
uncertain—from the above discussions—what addiction is, what the precise meaning of ‘freedom’ is
in addiction, and therefore how freedom should be preserved or maximized in this context.
These questions all point to uncertainties regarding the meaning of ‘freedom’ and ‘health’ in the
context of tobacco control policy, and uncertainties on how to preserve them. Yet, the notions of
‘health’ and ‘freedom’ are important in tobacco debates; as discussed above, they have been used
to support pro–tobacco (freedom) and pro–regulatory (health) arguments, and to support or oppose
restrictions on tobacco. These concepts and their application in debates can have important influences
on tobacco control policies: the type of policy that is implemented, and its acceptance by policymakers
and the public. Thus it is important to look at ethical theories and frameworks that aim to support
‘freedom’ and/or ‘health’, particularly those which have been most influential in tobacco debates or
similar public health contexts. Liberalism is a philosophy often used in pro–tobacco arguments; it holds
freedom—also referred to as ‘liberty’—as its most important value. Meanwhile, public health ethics
theories have tried to balance or reconcile freedom with public health. Human rights—particularly
the right to health—have also been used to support tobacco control measures under the WHO FCTC
treaty, and so it is important to assess their potential application in this context. This section, then,
provides a background of relevant ethical concepts, theories, and frameworks that are further nuanced
and developed into an ethical framework for tobacco control policy in chapter 5.
This section starts off by clarifying the key concepts used in tobacco debates (section 2.3.1).
‘Health’ is such a concept: what is ‘health’, what is ‘public health’, and why is it necessary to protect
it? Pro–tobacco arguments tend to emphasize smoking as a pursuit of pleasure. What is ‘pleasure’,
and how does it relate to other concepts such as ‘freedom’ and ’health’? ‘Freedom’ has also dominated
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debates, particularly from the pro–tobacco side: what is ‘freedom’ in the context of smoking, and how
does it relate to other important concepts such as ‘autonomy’? Discussion then proceeds onto theories
and frameworks based on liberalism (section 2.3.2), public health ethics (section 2.3.3), and human
rights (section 2.3.4).
2.3.1 Concepts in tobacco debates
Health
‘Health’ has been defined by the WHO in their constitution as: “a state of complete physical, men-
tal and social well–being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity.”[130] Thus, health is
considered in a negative and positive sense: the absence of disease or infirmity (negative), as well
as the presence of complete physical, mental and social wellbeing (positive). Health in the negative
sense (disease or infirmity) is usually measured scientifically, by biomedical determinants such as the
presence of an infection. Health in the positive sense, on the other hand, may be thought of as a
normative construct, measured in terms of a comparison to what is generally considered a healthy
ideal that individuals should aspire to. Negative and positive health are closely interrelated, since one
provides conditions for the other.[131]
The WHO’s definition of health, particularly its positive aspect, has been disputed on the basis
that it sets too high a threshold.[132] It is also very broad, since ‘health’ could be considered as a
single aspect of wellbeing which may include other aspects such as attachment or personal security.[44]
Nevertheless, this thesis follows the WHO’s definition, due to the important interconnections between
physical, mental, and social health in the context of addiction.76 The high threshold of ‘health’ as
defined by the WHO can be interpreted as an aspiration in which health is considered synonymous
with wellbeing. It is in this way that ‘health’ is referred to throughout this thesis.77
Collective health
Due to the globalized nature of tobacco use and its direct health impacts on others, ‘health’ should also
be considered collectively. ‘Population health’, then, is the health of a population, while ‘population’
or ’the public’ refers to a collection of individuals who, to some extent, all have ‘public’ lives that
involve relationships and interactions with others.[133] ‘Public interests’ are interests that provide a
76Chapter 3 argues that neurobiological processes both affect and are affected by thought processes; these, in turn,
influence and are influenced by ‘social health’, such as the quality of social relationships. Chapter 4 argues that the
structures within a society also influence these. Thus, ‘health’ in the context of addiction encompasses one’s physical
and mental integrity, the quality of social relationships, and the structures of the society itself.
77For the purpose of this thesis, the terms ‘health’ and ‘wellbeing’ are used interchangeably.
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benefit to the collective or the public rather than an aggregate benefit to individuals.[134] Provision
of a good or service in promoting a public interest, that would be unattainable by individual action,
is a ‘public good’.[133] Thus ‘public health’ is a public good, as it consists of the efforts made to make
a social setting more conducive to health, with the ultimate goal of preventing disease, improving
longevity, and promoting health.78 This is achieved through organized efforts of society, with a focus
on prevention rather than on cure, and on the population rather than on individuals.[43] Tobacco
control, as a branch of public health, is also a public good and consists of the organized efforts
of society to create infrastructures and conditions for a healthier lifestyle free from tobacco–related
diseases and mortalities.
The communitarian79 focus of public health implies that it may lose sight of the wellbeing of
individuals. However, the wellbeing of the community and of the individual are strongly interlinked.
To some extent, an individual’s wellbeing depends on the wellbeing of the community.80 Healthy
individuals, as an aggregate notion, in turn contribute to the wellbeing of the community. Further,
some interactions between an individual and others involve what have become commonly called ‘social
contracts’. These are broadly and essentially co–operations between the state and the individuals, or
between individuals as coextensive agents within communities. These social contracts may protect
individuals from harm,81 provide goods that maximize their wellbeing,82 or impose a reciprocal duty
on others.83[124]
Social justice
Health is unfortunately not spread equally; as mentioned in section 2.1.1, the negative health impacts
of tobacco use are generally concentrated among socially disadvantaged groups. This idea is widely
recognized in public health more generally: social determinants of health—such as employment status,
income, education, and social support networks[137]—can significantly influence the health of indi-
viduals, and are important sources of health inequalities. Social justice has also been recognized as a
78Not all define public health in this way, but this thesis follows this particular definition, which can be attributed to
the Nuffield Council on Bioethics.[43]
79‘Communitarianism’ is a theory that emphasizes the social constitution of human lives, and the importance of the
community and solidarity—see [135].
80This is particularly true in the context of addiction, because the social environment can have important impacts
that, in turn, can predispose an individual to addiction. More discussion in chapters 3 and 4.
81There are lots of types of social contracts that are beyond the scope of this discussion—see [124]. In the context of
tobacco control, a social contract that protects others from harm is exemplified by smokefree laws. They are imposed
by the state onto smokers, to not smoke in certain places in order to protect the health of others.
82One such good may be public health, which—as discussed above—is a public good.
83‘Reciprocity’ is a type of transaction in which one party provides a benefit or avoids harm to another; this favour
is returned by the other party—see [124]. In the context of tobacco, for example, a reciprocal transaction is established
between smokers and the state if excise tax from tobacco is used to subsidize cessation services for smokers.
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necessary requirement of public health.[44] In the context of tobacco, this thesis, similarly, argues that
there are important interconnections between public health and social justice. Accordingly, tobacco
control policies should recognize these interconnections, and find ways to tackle the relevant factors—
social determinants—that put some groups of people at a higher risk of developing tobacco–related
diseases than others. Minimizing social injustice as a necessary component of reducing tobacco–related
health inequalities is in turn important for ensuring the welfare of the community.84
Agency
‘Health’ is related to other concepts, such as freedom, autonomy, and therefore agency. Agency, in
capturing these elements, may be described as follows:85
“An agent is one who acts. In order to act, one must initiate one’s action. And one cannot
initiate one’s action without exercising one’s power to do so. Since nothing and no one
has the power to act except the agent herself, she alone is entitled to exercise this power,
if she is entitled to act.”[138]
In other words, to have agency is to have an authority over oneself that is grounded in the mental
capacity for free action86 (autonomy—discussed next) as well as the external conditions that permit
this action (freedom—also discussed below).
Autonomy
In general, autonomous actions are considered to be those which are conceived on the basis of on one’s
own motives, reasons, and values.[139] Yet for most individuals, decisions are not generally free from
the influence of others or emotions: they are subject to social and cultural contexts, desires, relation-
ships, and values.[140] This does not necessarily imply that most individuals are not autonomous; it
is rather a reflection on the importance of context and relationships in human decision–making and
autonomy. This is particularly true in addiction.87 Hence autonomy, for the purpose of this thesis, is
referred to in a relational sense. ‘Relational’ can take on various meanings: it may be used to imply
84For example, if taxpayers’ money is allocated to smoking cessation programmes for socially disadvantaged people,
the taxpayers who do not directly benefit from these programmes will still benefit in a wider sense, but only if the
cessation programmes help to minimize health inequalities and promote the overall productivity and flourishing of the
society.
85Although there are numerous other ways to define ‘agency’, this is a working definition that draws out key elements
necessary for the analysis in this thesis.
86‘Free action’ may also refer to ‘purposive action’: action that is in accord with one’s own motives, reasons, and
values.
87This is explained further in chapter 3, which discusses important ways in which the social environment and relation-
ships can influence addictive decision–making and autonomy.
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that autonomy does not require self–sufficiency, that agents are socially and relationally embedded, or
that relational processes—such as social relationships—are necessary for autonomy.[141] In this thesis,
‘relational autonomy’ refers more broadly to the idea that social processes, such as social relationships,
are important in human decision–making and can affect an individual’s autonomy.
In this view, social conditions can suppress or promote autonomy. Autonomy–promoting conditions
are those that allow individuals to realize and form their own preferences and values, and pursue or
maintain wellbeing in their own way. Autonomy–suppressing conditions, meanwhile, limit these.
Oppressive conditions can also lead to the formation of preferences that are actually adaptations
to difficult or unjust circumstances, but internalized as one’s own. This process, termed ‘adaptive
preference formation’, is considered non–autonomous because it does not necessarily contribute to self–
realization, wellbeing, or the formation of authentic values and preferences.[142] It is later argued—in
chapter 3—that adaptive preference formation is an important characteristic of many addictions,
since addictions are largely coping mechanisms against stressful or oppressive circumstances, and do
not necessarily reflect what the individual truly wants or would have wanted otherwise. In this view,
autonomy in addiction is incomplete and hinges, to an extent, on the social and relational environment.
The idea of authentic preferences and ‘what the individual truly wants or would have wanted
otherwise’ is usefully illustrated by Frankfurt’s first– and second–order desires. According to Frankfurt,
desires are hierarchical: first–order desires reflect what one wants (‘I want to X’); second–order desires
involve some higher reflection on whether ‘X’ is really desired (‘I want to want to X’). Where there
is conflict between first–order desires, action is only considered autonomous if it is in accord with the
second–order desire.[143] Put into the context of addiction, a smoker may have two first–order desires:
to quit and to smoke. These conflict, and so the individual may reflect on this further to generate the
following second–order desire: ‘I want to want to quit smoking’; which conflicts with the first–order
desire to smoke. If the individual then quits smoking, it is in accord with the second–order desire
and therefore autonomous; but if the individual smokes, it is in accord with the first–order desire—
not the second–order desire—and not autonomous. This point is important in addiction, because—as
mentioned in section 2.1.1—addictive behaviors are often associated with signs of cognitive dissonance.
Negative and positive freedom
Freedom,88 which refers to the external conditions that permit free action, is another concept that—
along with ‘health’—has been emphasized in tobacco debates. Pro–tobacco arguments often highlight
88‘Freedom’ and ‘liberty’ are used interchangeably in this thesis.
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the importance of freedom obtained from minimal state interference: the ‘freedom to smoke’. However,
advocates of tobacco regulations have also used the notion of liberty to argue for smokefree laws.[10]
A high importance is often attached to freedom;89 it is noteworthy that smoking restrictions were not
implemented and widely embraced by the public until the harms of SHS exposure became known, and
this became emphasized as a ‘freedom’ or ‘right’ to be free from SHS–induced harm.[10, 47]
In the context of intervention, freedom may be construed in two ways:[145] in its negative sense
(external conditions that minimize state interference), and in its positive sense (freedom created by
state interference that intends to promote autonomy).[146] Therefore it is necessary to think of freedom
not just in a negative sense, but also in its positive sense.90 In this view, the capacity for free action
hinges in part on conditions and infrastructures created by the state, and ‘harm’ is the failure to
protect autonomy or to provide conditions that promote autonomy, including the failure to eliminate
options that ultimately restrict autonomy. Thus, state interventions extending into individual choices
are ethically justified, provided that their aim is to protect or promote autonomy.[147] This concurs
with the idea that autonomy is relational and is affected by social conditions,[141] and contrasts to
the view that freedom arises solely from having options, and that the solution to maximizing freedom
lies in minimal state intervention.[144]
Health or freedom: Which takes priority?
The importance of health and freedom is reflected in ethical debates on tobacco, so this thesis considers
both of equal significance. This raises important questions on how these two values interrelate and
how they should be protected in an ethical framework for tobacco control policy. When freedom is
construed in a negative sense, it tends to clash with ‘health’; but if construed in a positive sense, health
and freedom interrelate in important ways, especially in the context of some health issues—such as
addiction—that can undermine an individual’s autonomy. Recognized as such, some interventions
that maximize health could also maximize freedom, thus resolving the tensions in debates that camp
health and freedom against one another as clashing values.91
89Harris, for example, considers freedom to be an essential human quality that prevails over perfection: “Autonomy
surely requires not only the possibility of falling but the freedom to choose to fall, and that same autonomy gives us
self–sufficiency” (pg.103, [144]).
90In this thesis, ‘freedom’ is referred to in both its negative and positive sense.
91Later, this thesis argues that one of the main reasons why there is a perceived tension between freedom and health,
at least in the context of tobacco debates, is because these debates have overly narrowed the concept of ‘freedom’ into its
negative sense. However, if the concept of ‘freedom’ is broadened into its positive and negative sense, and the autonomy–
undermining effects of addiction are recognized, tobacco control interventions that promote health are not necessarily
incompatible with freedom—provided that they help to treat or prevent addictions.
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Pleasure
A final concept that is oft–emphasized in pro–tobacco debates is that of ‘pleasure’. In this thesis,
‘pleasure’ refers to a transient state that is usually referred to as a ‘high’ in the context of psychoactive
drug use. Later, it is argued that addictive behaviors can be compatible with the notion of pleasure but
not with the notions of positive freedom or autonomy, and in this sense, having the option to smoke,
particularly in cases of addiction, does not enhance ‘freedom’. However, freedom and pleasure—as
they are defined here—are often conflated in pro–tobacco arguments, because having an option to
enjoy the pleasurable effects of smoking tends to be construed as an exercise of freedom. Thus it
is important to characterize ‘pleasure’, both in terms of its neurological manifestations, and how it
relates to freedom in addiction. It is time, then, to look at liberty–preserving theories in more detail.
2.3.2 An overview of Mill’s liberal theory
The liberal philosophy of Mill holds freedom as the pre–eminent factor from which human individuality,
diversity, and communities can flourish. Many arguments in tobacco debates—particularly from the
pro–tobacco side—follow highly individualistic, liberal ideas derivative of his ‘harm principle’:
“That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a
civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either
physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.”(pg.13, [42])
In pro–tobacco arguments, the harm principle is used to resist smoking restrictions. In pro–
regulatory arguments, it is engaged as a justification for smokefree laws that protect the health of
others. However, there are some nuances in Mill’s liberal philosophy that tend to be overlooked in
tobacco debates—discussed next.
The scope of ‘harm to others’
What counts as ‘harm to others’ in the harm principle is unclear in tobacco debates. In most anti–
regulatory arguments, ‘harm’ has taken a narrow scope, referring only to unavoidable, direct, and
physical harm to others, particularly harm elicited through SHS exposure. Tobacco companies such
as Philip Morris, for example, are opposed to tobacco restrictions, although they accept some smokefree
laws aimed at protecting others from SHS. On their website, Philip Morris argues that smokefree laws
are acceptable only in public areas where non–smokers must go, such as hospitals and public transport
services, but smokefree laws in recreational areas, such as restaurants and bars, are unethical on the
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grounds that non–smokers can opt not to visit these places.[148] However, in many pro–regulatory
arguments, the scope of ‘harm’ has been widened to include indirect harm,92 harm through inaction,93
and non–physical harm.94 These would essentially support further restrictions on tobacco use.[149]
The harm principle can therefore be used to support arguments on both sides, depending on how
‘harm’ is interpreted.[150] It does not, however, include harm from which: “the inconvenience is one
which society can afford to bear, for the sake of the greater good of human freedom.”(pg.63, [151])
This refers to actions that may disagree with others’ moral values,95 but that otherwise do not present
any threats to others. This thesis will refer to these harms as ‘moral harm’, and will not count them
in any assessments of tobacco–related harm.96 However, non–moral harms are taken into account,
including those that are avoidable, indirect, caused through inaction, and non–physical. From the
discussion in section 2.1, it is clear that smoking is causal of a multitude of severe harms, and that
further restrictions on tobacco use are ethically justified even within Mill’s liberal framework.97
Justifying paternalistic actions
Paternalistic98 actions are generally considered unethical within liberal frameworks. Such interferences
could, for example, result in an authoritarian rule in which human actions are controlled by the ide-
ologies of the state. However, there are forms of paternalism that may be considered more acceptable.
Mill considered paternalistic actions in the best interests of children as ethical, since children are not
yet capable of forming their own sound judgements. He also considered soft paternalism99 to be more
acceptable.[153] In the context of tobacco control policy, this presents uncertainties over the extent to
which certain groups of people should be protected from their own actions: young people who may
not have yet reached the maturity of their faculties, and addicted smokers whose smoking may not be
fully voluntary.
If addicted individuals are considered completely incapable of exercising voluntary control over their
92For example, the economic impacts of smoking on society.
93For example, failure to implement policies that would prevent smoking initiation among children or that would
protect ex–smokers from relapse.
94For example, the emotional impacts of a tobacco–related death on family members.
95Actions that may be considered morally repugnant by some but that are otherwise harmless, for example adopting
a purple mohican hairstyle.
96This is primarily because considering this type of harm has influenced the policies of some psychoactive drugs in
very counterproductive and unethical ways—see section 4.2.
97For example, the harm principle—when broadened to include avoidable harm—would also justify smokefree laws in
places where non–smokers may choose to go, such as bars and restaurants.
98In this thesis, ‘paternalism’ follows Dworkin’s definition: interference with another person, against his/her will, on
the perceived basis that this interference will bring a benefit to that person or protect him/her from harm. See [152].
99‘Soft paternalism’, as defined here, applies to instances in which an individual’s action is not voluntary or knowl-
edgeable, or a temporary intervention is necessary to assess whether the agent is able to act voluntarily; for example
in cases of mental impairment. ‘Hard paternalism’ refers to instances in which the individual’s action is voluntary and
knowledgeable.
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addiction, coerced therapy may be considered justified on the basis of soft paternalism.100 However, it
is also possible that autonomy is, as a result of the addiction, not completely negated but undermined to
some degree; this means that the autonomy of the individual lies above a threshold at which coercive
therapy is justified, yet below a threshold at which no intervention is necessary. In such cases, special
considerations may be made within an ethical framework that aims to promote the autonomy of
addicted individuals. Thus, it is necessary to assess the nature of autonomy in addiction, in order to
determine whether addiction is a condition that—by definition—undermines autonomy, and if so to
what degree, and on which basis.101
Mill’s conception of freedom
As argued in section 2.3.1, freedom should be considered in both its negative and positive sense;
yet Mill’s liberalism presumes that the necessary conditions for freedom are pre–existent and do
not need to be created by the state. Freedom, then, is maximized by minimal state interference
and referred to in its negative sense.[146] However, if addictive smoking is autonomy–undermining,
then a necessary condition for freedom—autonomy—does not yet pre–exist and should be created
by the state. Therefore a limitation of Mill’s liberal theory, as applied in tobacco debates, is that its
conception of ‘freedom’ is interpreted too narrowly. Furthermore, if the freedom of addicted individuals
is undermined in part due to autonomy–undermining social circumstances or the effects of the drug,
then maximizing the liberty of individuals may in fact require state interventions that tackle these
conditions.
The role of communities
Communities are also important in maximizing the liberty of individuals. As argued in section 2.3.1,
the wellbeing of individuals and the wellbeing of the community are interlinked. Mill also recognized
this to some extent in his utilitarian theory, because he acknowledged that utility is maximized through
liberty in a broader sense.[151] In other words, allowing individuals to act freely promotes human
individuality, diversity, and flourishing, which in turn promotes the flourishing of the community.
However, Mill’s liberalism is generally interpreted as a very individualistic theory in which communal
welfare must yield to individual freedom. It is also criticized for focusing insufficiently on inequalities
100Caplan, for example, has argued that: “An addict cannot be a fully free, autonomous agent precisely because they
are caught up in the behavioral compulsion that is addiction . . . [so] it may be possible to justify compulsory treatment
involving medication or other forms of therapy”(pg.1919, [30]). In other words, lost autonomy may be ‘restored’ by
coerced therapy.
101This is done in reference to neurobiological evidence in chapter 3.
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as a result of social injustice.[43] However, the above arguments show that Mill’s liberalism is not
necessarily incompatible with promoting the welfare of a community or social justice, provided that
‘freedom’ is correctly interpreted in a broader (positive and negative) sense, and that opportunities
for freedom are distributed in a way that helps the most socially disadvantaged groups.
Summary
Mill’s liberal philosophy has formed an important foundation for many tobacco debates, particularly
those that support minimal restrictions on tobacco. However, liberalism has often been interpreted
very narrowly, and is deliberately narrowed to be incompatible with state interventions that promote
public health. Nevertheless, a broader interpretation of ‘freedom’, ‘harm’, and the interconnection
between the welfare of communities and of individuals may actually support public health goals in a
way that is compatible with a liberal framework. It is necessary, then, to build on liberalism by using
ethical theories or frameworks that recognize the importance of public health interventions and the
opportunities they provide.
2.3.3 An overview of public health ethics
Theorists in public health ethics have attempted to go beyond Mill’s liberal theory in order to develop
ethical frameworks more applicable to the context of public health. As discussed in section 2.3.1,
public health deals with populations, not individuals, and one of its primary goals is to create infras-
tructures and social conditions that enable members of a society to live more healthily. An ethical
framework for public health should therefore account for populations rather than having too strong
of an individualistic focus.[154]
Libertarian paternalism
One approach is to strike a balance between public health and freedom by incorporating a concept
termed ‘libertarian paternalism’. Libertarian paternalism has gained recent popularity as a level
of intrusion at which people are encouraged to make healthier lifestyle decisions, yet still permitted
access to unhealthy options. This is achieved by creating disincentives for unhealthy options, changing
default policies (while still allowing other unhealthier options), or creating incentives for healthier
options.102[41] In the context of tobacco, it works by making tobacco products less desirable through
means such as taxation and warning labels. As discussed in section 2.2.1, regulatory frameworks for
102These three strategies also form part of the Nuffield Council for Bioethics’ intervention ladder, in which interventions
are graded according to their level of intrusion. The intervention ladder is discussed further below.
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tobacco are already taking this approach. However, libertarian paternalism—while helpful—focuses
insufficiently on health inequalities and the social conditions that underlie these, and is insensitive
to the relational nature of autonomy in addiction. Thus, an ethical framework that goes beyond
libertarian paternalism and Mill’s liberal theory, and that takes into account relational aspects of
addiction, is necessary.
Stewardship
Another concept in public health ethics that has been particularly influential is stewardship. The
WHO, for example, states that “stewardship in health is the very essence of good government” (pg.117,
[156]). Stewardship assumes that the necessary infrastructures and social conditions for freedom and
human flourishing are not pre–existent, particularly for people affected disproportionately by health
inequalities, so they should be provided by the state.[157] Governments are then viewed as having a
responsibility to protect the health of their citizens and to minimize health inequalities. A particularly
influential stewardship model for the public health sphere was presented by the Nuffield Council on
Bioethics, on the grounds that Mill’s liberalism is too individualistic, fails to take into account the
value of the community and public goods, and cannot sufficiently address health inequalities.[158] To
accommodate these issues, the Nuffield Council’s ‘stewardship model’ was proposed as a revised form
of liberalism.[43]
The basic premise of the stewardship model is that it requires states to pay attention to the
needs of individuals as well as the collective,103 thus minimizing health inequalities while balancing
the requirements for liberty and health. Some interventions judged as paternalistic within Mill’s
liberal framework are then considered a necessary component of stewardship.[159] However, it has
been argued that stewardship, as an ‘extended liberalism’, does not differ significantly from Mill’s
liberalism and is essentially a framing tool in which some paternalistic interventions can be made more
acceptable.[154] Another criticism is that the stewardship model remains too conservative and context–
insensitive.[160] For tobacco, for example, the stewardship model recommends the implementation of
smokefree legislations in public spaces, cessation programmes, raising the minimum age of sale to
18 years, and corporate social responsibility (of the TI).[43] However, these measures do not differ
significantly from those that would fall within the scope of other liberal frameworks.104 They are also
103The Nuffield Council, for example, states that: “the concept of ‘stewardship’ is intended to convey that liberal states
have a duty to look after important needs of people individually and collectively. It emphasises the obligation of states to
provide conditions that allow people to be healthy and, in particular, to take measures to reduce health inequalities. The
stewardship–guided state recognises that a primary asset of a nation is its health: higher levels of health are associated
with greater overall well–being and productivity” (pg.xvi–xvii, [43]).
104For example, it was argued in section 2.2.1 that tobacco control measures endorsed by the WHO FCTC aim to
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insensitive to the effects and etiology of nicotine addictions105 and the characteristic behaviors of the
TI;106 both which warrant interventions quite distinct from those outlined by the Nuffield Council.
Under the Nuffield Council’s stewardship model, an appropriate balance between liberty and health
is achieved using an ‘intervention ladder’ which grades interventions according to their level of intru-
siveness. The most permissive interventions (such as inaction or providing information) are placed
towards the bottom of the ladder, while more restrictive interventions (such as disincentives, choice
restriction, and choice elimination) are placed progressively towards the top, reserved only for issues
that cause the most harm. Every intervention, including inaction, requires justification.[43] Hence the
ladder reflects the importance of preserving freedom while securing the requirements of public health.
Where along the ladder tobacco should be placed, then, depends largely on the nature and severity
of the harms it causes, the extent to which it is responsible for health inequalities, and the extent
to which exposure to tobacco–related harm can be avoided by individual action.107 However, the
intervention ladder has been criticized on the basis of having too heavy a focus on preserving liberty,
and not acknowledging the interconnections between freedom and health.[160] This thesis, too, argues
that the interconnection between freedom and health should be recognized.
Ethical principles for public health
It has been suggested that public health interventions should be based on a set of ethical principles
that are sensitive to the collective nature of public health. These principles could include: (1) the
harm principle; (2) employing the least restrictive or coercive means in order to maximize liberty; (3)
reciprocity;108 and (4) transparency.109[155] Other ethical principles, based on a relational conception
of public health,110 have been suggested. These principles are (1) relational autonomy;111 (2) social
discourage tobacco use; hence they are based on libertarian paternalism principles. Some interventions, such as smokefree
laws or providing cessation therapy, also fall within the scope of Mill’s liberalism.
105Described in chapter 3.
106Described in chapter 4.
107These points are discussed further in section 5.2.
108The reciprocity principle is defined and justified as follows: “Complying with public health requests may impose
burdens on individuals. These may involve sacrifice of income or time and in general, these should be compensated.
The reciprocity principle holds that society must be prepared to facilitate individuals and communities in their efforts
to discharge their duties” (pg.102, [155]).
109The transparency principle refers to how decisions are made, which: “should be as clear and accountable as possible.
As much as possible, the decision–making process should be free of political interference and coercion or the domination
by specific interests” (pg.102, [155]).
110In other words, a conception of public health as involving social relationships. This puts a stronger emphasis on the
relationships between individuals, social factors that may affect an individual’s health (for example, social determinants
of health), and relational autonomy.
111Relational autonomy was described in section 2.3.1.
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justice;112 and (3) relational solidarity.113[45] These three principles, it is argued, go further in em-
phasizing a commitment to minimizing health inequalities and promoting flourishing as a collective
pursuit.[45] This thesis recognizes the importance of all of these principles, and will build on them in
chapter 5 in the development of an ethical framework for tobacco control policy.
2.3.4 An overview of human rights
Human rights, due to their relevance in international law and relations, can be used to strengthen an
argument, ethical framework, or policy that is protective of human rights. As one may expect, human
rights have been used to support arguments in tobacco debates, on both sides. This section briefly
introduces these arguments, the relevant human rights, and how human rights relate to some of the
concepts and ethical theories described in preceding sections.
Underlying principles
In an international context, human rights exist in a number of treaties.114 The main treaty is the
United Nations (UN) Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).[161] Other international UN
treaties include the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)[162] and the Inter-
national Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),[163] as well as rights treaties
designed to protect specific groups, such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC),[164]
the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW),115[165] the 1965
International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD),[166] and
the 2006 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).[167]
A common thread in all of these treaties is their moral foundation, which is summarized in UDHR:
“recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of
the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world” (preamble,
UDHR).
112This principle is described as follows: “social justice reflects our relational understanding of persons as socially
constituted and situated . . . [and seeks] to correct rather than worsen systematic disadvantages in society” (pg.203, [45]).
113‘Solidarity’ refers to common interests, common purposes, the benefits of social cohesion, and co–operations whether
altruistic, reciprocal, or based on some other type of social contract. ‘Relational solidarity’ refers to a solidarity that is
committed to social justice, such that: “when we attend to relational solidarity, we need to be attentive to the increased
and quite particular risks faced by members of some social groups as compared with others” (pg.204, [45]).
114Human rights treaties also exist at more regional levels, but since this thesis focuses on tobacco control in an
international context, reference will be made primarily to the treaties listed here.
115The CEDAW treaty is considered relevant in the context of tobacco control, due to the rising prevalence of smoking
among women in developing countries. However, this thesis focuses on ongoing issues in areas where tobacco control
policies are more developed, and where smoking prevalence is more gender–equal. Hence CEDAW will not be considered
further here.
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In other words, the point of human rights is to protect the value and inherent dignity of human
beings, which includes the protection of agency.116 Accordingly, there are human rights that aim
to protect the preconditions for agency: life, health, liberty, privacy, and self–determination—among
many others. The concepts described in section 2.3.1 are also relevant to human rights. The concept of
‘health’ as defined by the WHO may—as mentioned in section 2.3.1—be interpreted as an aspiration,
synonymous with wellbeing. In the constitution of the WHO, it is proclaimed that: “enjoyment of the
highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of every human being without
distinction of race, religion, political belief, economic or social condition . . . ”.[130] In other words,
‘health’ as an aspiration is also a right, and so the WHO’s definition of ‘health’ is very much grounded
in human rights theory.
Although human rights are often seen as individualistic, they may also promote communitarian
values such as social justice, communal welfare, and public goods (such as public health). For ex-
ample, it has been argued that, due to the universality of human rights, they impose a reciprocal
duty onto others.[136] A right to be free from “torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment” (UDHR article 5) requires that individual A refrains from such actions directed at
individual B ; however, individual B must also refrain from such action directed at individual A, be-
cause both individuals A and B possess this right. The protection of individual rights also protects
human wellbeing, which in turn protects the wellbeing and flourishing of the community because the
wellbeing of the community and of its individuals are interrelated—see the discussion in section 2.3.1.
Human rights applied in pro–tobacco arguments
In pro–tobacco arguments, rights that are often engaged are the right to self–determination (ICESCR
article 1, ICCPR article 1) and the right to liberty (UDHR article 3, ICCPR article 9). These
right are then translated into a ‘right to smoke’, or a liberty right of manufacturers to produce
and sell tobacco. The right to privacy (UDHR article 12, ICCPR article 17) has also been used to
defend smoking as a private activity, and equality rights (UDHR articles 2 and 7, ICCPR articles
2 and 26, ICESCR article 2) have been used to argue that tobacco restrictions are discriminative
against smokers.[169, 170] Tobacco regulations, particularly laws mandating smokefree public areas,
are then construed as violating these rights and as undermining the personal freedom and enjoyment
of smokers. These arguments are then used to oppose restrictions on tobacco, encourage pro–tobacco
116Some have gone further to argue that the moral foundation of human rights is to protect agency. A full discussion of
the philosophical basis of human rights is beyond the scope of this thesis, so it is assumed that human rights should protect
agency and the necessary preconditions for agency (which, as discussed in section 2.3.1, are freedom and wellbeing). For
the reasoning behind these conclusions, see [168].
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social movements, and gain political support for the liberalization of tobacco use.[171]
Based upon a conception of negative freedom, the rights to self–determination, liberty, and privacy
all appear to support a minimal state, and would be presented—as they have been in pro–tobacco
arguments—as contrasting with rights that support tobacco restrictions, such as the right to health.
However, as argued in section 2.3.1, freedom and health are interrelated in important ways when
‘freedom’ is correctly construed in its positive sense; consequently, the right to liberty and the right
to health may also interrelate and support one another.117
Human rights to support tobacco control
As mentioned in section 2.2.1, the right to health (ICESCR article 12) forms the ethical basis of the
WHO FCTC treaty.[6] It has also been used to support smoking restrictions to protect the health of
others: groups such as the Canadian ‘Non–Smokers’ Rights Association’,[172] and the USA’s ‘Amer-
icans for Non–Smokers’ Rights’[173] have emphasized the right to be free from SHS as a health
right.[171] Due to the relevance of human rights in international law and relations, it has also been
argued that tobacco control should be grounded in human rights, in order to support governments
in their tobacco control efforts. This could include, for example, using human rights arguments in
tobacco control advocacy,[40] and to motivate policymakers and the public to become more involved
in a pro–regulatory social movement.[171] It may also entail drafting stronger anti–tobacco laws based
on human rights, using shadow reports to track a nation’s progress in tobacco control, or allowing
aggrieved individuals to present human rights–based lawsuits against the TI.118[175]
In addition to the right to health, other rights of relevance to tobacco control include the rights to
life (UDHR article 3, ICCPR article 6) and social conditions conducive to health (UDHR article 25).
Children’s rights are also highly relevant to tobacco control policies. As discussed in section 2.3.2,
even in liberal theories it is recognized that children are not yet fully capable of forming their own
sound judgements, and therefore need others to act in their best interests. This idea is also evident in
childrens’ rights, most of which are outlined in the CRC treaty. Most noteworthy for tobacco control
are the child right to life and healthy development (CRC article 6) and the child right to a safe and
clean environment (CRC article 24). Due to the special circumstances that may predispose children
117Later, it is argued that addiction is autonomy–undermining, and so interventions that promote non–addiction can
promote health and freedom; these measures are also compatible with liberty and health rights. These ideas will be
developed further throughout chapter 5, once the nature of autonomy in addiction—and the factors that influence
it—have been clarified.
118I have also argued elsewhere that the TFG proposal supports human rights principles, and that human rights may
be drawn on in support of such a strategy—see [174].
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to addictions in later life119 and the marketing activities of the TI,120 children’s rights to be protected
from violence (CRC article 19), drugs and drug trade (CRC article 33), and exploitation (CRC article
36) are also relevant.
Otherwise, equality rights (UDHR articles 2 and 7, ICCPR articles 2 and 26, ICESCR article 2)
are also relevant to ethical debates on tobacco, since—as discussed in section 2.1.1—certain groups of
people tend to suffer disproportionately from tobacco–related harm.[175] There are additional treaties
designed to protect certain groups. Racial minorities are protected from discrimination under ICERD,
and CRPD protects the rights of the severely mentally ill. In particular, those with severe mental
illness have a right to health without discrimination on the basis of their mental illness (CRPD article
25), and a right to be protected from exploitation (CRPD article 16). For certain racial groups, such
as indigenous peoples, the right to cultural participation and identity (UDHR article 27) is important.
This right may appear to have no relevance to tobacco control; however, as will be explained in chapter
4, interventions that protect these rights may also protect individuals from developing addictions, since
resistance to addiction hinges—to some extent—on a supportive social environment and sociocultural
integration.
2.4 Summary
This chapter has provided an overview of the public health impacts that result from smoking, ongoing
issues faced in tobacco control policy, and ethical theories and frameworks that may provide a basis
for tobacco control policies.
Section 2.1 has shown that tobacco—even in comparison to alcohol and illicit drugs—is a serious
threat to public health and that interventions to minimize smoking prevalence are justified. Inter-
ventions that tackle different aspects of the problem may be ethically justified on different grounds.
For example, smokefree laws that protect others from SHS exposure are justified on the basis of the
harm principle, while interventions that protect children from smoking initiation are considered ethical
on the grounds that children are not yet fully capable of exercising sound judgement. Interventions
that minimize tobacco–related health inequalities may be justified within an ethical framework that
promotes social justice; however, how this issue should be addressed remains unclear. It is also im-
portant for policies to prevent and treat tobacco addictions, as this affects the majority of tobacco
users and can significantly compromise their ability to quit. However, what addiction is—and what
119These circumstances, and their potential effects on a child’s development, are described in section 3.2.
120Many of these activities tend to be directed at children, which makes them more vulnerable to initiating smoking.
See section 4.4.
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special considerations this creates for policies—remains unclear. So ethical approaches discussed in
section 2.3—liberalism, libertarian paternalism, the stewardship model, and ethical principles for pub-
lic health—are instructive, but remain insensitive to some critical aspects of addiction.
The concept of ‘freedom’ was identified as playing an important role in tobacco control policies.
Maximizing positive freedom requires that state interventions promote or protect autonomy; however,
the nature of ‘autonomy’ in addiction remains unclear. If addiction does not affect autonomy, state
interventions that prevent or treat addictions do not necessarily enhance positive freedom. How-
ever, if addiction is autonomy–undermining, state interventions should provide autonomy–promoting
conditions in order to maximize positive freedom. If autonomy is undermined to the extent that ad-
dicted individuals are completely incapable of resisting drug use, a stronger intervention level—such
as coercion—may be justified. Further, smoking may have beneficial effects—such as pleasure or stress
relief—that influence the decision to smoke. It is necessary, then, to look at the nature of addictive
decision–making: relevant neurobiological processes, and the factors that influence these processes.
This information will, in turn, help to answer questions on how policies should proceed in maximizing
the freedom of addicted smokers, and whether this would require a minimal or an interventionist state.
This chapter has also highlighted that two groups are especially vulnerable to tobacco addiction:
adolescents and socially disadvantaged groups. What makes these people more susceptible, and how
should policies respond? A deeper look at the mechanisms of susceptibility in adolescents and socially
disadvantaged groups, and the relevant factors, can instruct policies on which interventions are re-
quired and why. In the case of adolescents—who are most vulnerable to initiation—it is important
to consider the nature of smoking initiation, the influence of the TI, and age–related mechanisms
of susceptibility. This helps to answer more specific questions such as: how should adolescents be
protected from smoking initiation? Is the TFG proposal too restrictive, and how may adolescents be
affected by interventions such as tobacco harm reduction and nicotine vaccines? In the case of so-
cially disadvantaged groups, it is necessary to look at relevant social factors, and ways in which these
factors interact with neurobiological processes that affect one’s susceptibility to addiction. This helps
to answer specific questions such as: what makes socially disadvantaged groups more susceptible to
tobacco addiction? Are genetic tests a promising predictive tool, or are social factors more relevant?
What should policies do—and avoid—in order to minimize tobacco–related health inequalities?
It is time, then, to take a closer look at the neurobiological features of addiction, genetic and
neurobiological mechanisms of susceptibility, and how these are interrelated to social and relational
processes. Together, this can provide a conceptual basis for tobacco control policies in terms of ‘what
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Neurobiological features of addiction
The aim of this chapter is to elucidate the neurobiological events that underlie addiction, as well as
the genetic and neurobiological processes that confer a susceptibility to addiction. This will help to
answer some of the question raised in chapter 2 regarding the nature of addiction. Chapter 2 has
already argued that ‘addiction’ is a mental disorder associated with distinct behavioral, physical, and
psychological features; still unclear, however, is whether addictive smoking is beneficial (for example,
pleasurable or stress relieving), the extent to which it is autonomy–undermining, and what the factors
that affect autonomy in addiction are. Also unclear is what makes some people more susceptible to
addiction than others, and what the mechanisms behind this are.
These questions are considered in this chapter using neurobiological evidence. This evidence, which
is typically used in support of ‘brain disease’ theories of addiction,1 is then nuanced by considering
interrelated social factors such as the effects of stress, early attachment experience, and the social
environment on the developing brain. The relevant neurobiological literature is vast: thousands of
papers and books have been written on the subject, and countless pieces of neuroscientific evidence,
in humans as well as species with similar brains (such as non–human primates and rats) support
this literature. Thus, key pieces of information are presented and developed into a more integrated
neurobiological account of addiction that goes far beyond information typically presented in conceptual
debates. In particular, focus is on how external factors (‘nurture’) influence an individual’s addictive
neurobiology.
The structure of this chapter is as follows: section 3.1 reviews key findings from the neuroscientific
literature to give an overall description of the neurological characteristics that typify the addictive
1‘Brain disease’ theories of addiction argue that addiction is a chronic and relapsing brain disease, caused by prolonged
drug used that results in neurobiological changes that make it difficult for the individual to avoid drug use. Brain disease
theories are discussed and critiqued further in section 5.1.2.
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state. Section 3.2 builds on this to discuss, from various biological perspectives (genetics, epigenetics,
and developmental neurobiology) how different mechanisms of susceptibility can contribute to the
development of these neurological characteristics, before initiation of drug use. The argument that
will be presented throughout this chapter is that (tobacco) addiction is a complex disorder, with
important neurobiological, psychological, relational, and social aspects; but with its roots ultimately
embedded in social contexts. Addiction, then, arises not just as a result of drug use but also as a by–
product of social injustice; autonomy in addiction is relational, and affected by autonomy–undermining
social conditions. This calls for an ethical framework that emphasizes the importance of social justice,
relational autonomy, and the promotion of positive freedom through state interventions that protect or
promote the autonomy of addicted individuals. In other words, the neurobiological evidence presented
throughout this chapter supports an interventionist approach, in which the prevention and treatment
of addictions, particularly for the most vulnerable groups, is prioritized.
3.1 The brain in addiction
In general, the brains of drug–addicted people are characterized by a number of profound differences
that distinguish them from the brains of non–addicted people. They are structurally different:2 they
contain less grey matter3 in the cerebral cortex,[176] and less white matter,4 which affects neurological
maturation.[177] Prolonged drug use is also associated with neuroplastic changes that durably alter
the structure and branching patterns of neurons.[178] These structural changes are often described—
especially in brain disease theories of addiction—as a consequence of prolonged drug use; however,
adverse life experiences, such as abuse, can have a similar impact.5 Significant changes have also been
observed in two important neurotransmitter systems: the endorphin–opioid system (EOS),[179] and
the mesolimbic dopamine system.[180]
Prototypical drugs of abuse6 increase extracellular levels of dopamine in the mesolimbic system,
in both addicted and non–addicted individuals, through variable mechanisms. Nicotine, for example,
binds to nicotinic acetylcholine receptors (NAChR) which triggers the direct release of dopamine
2It is unclear whether these structural differences are a cause or consequence of prolonged drug use. These struc-
tural differences are also not observed in all addictions and may be present in some non–addicted individuals, so these
observations refer to a general—rather than an exclusive—trend.
3Nerve cell bodies in the brain.
4The fibres that connect nerve cell bodies to one another in the brain. They are important in neurological development
and communication between different nerve cells and regions.
5These effects are described at length in section 3.2.2. How long it takes for them to develop is uncertain. The extent
of the neurological change is correlated with the severity of the addiction, and is of degrees, and so addiction is not a
categorical (black or white) diagnosis.
6Addictive drugs that are typically associated with social or public health problems: for example heroin, cocaine,
alcohol, and tobacco.
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from cells;7[181] cocaine inhibits the reuptake of dopamine; methamphetamine elicits both actions.
Opioid drugs such as heroin bind to opioid receptors to release endogenous opioids, which indirectly
increases mesolimbic dopamine levels.[182] In all cases, the net result is that dopaminergic reward
pathways originating in the ventral tegmental area (VTA) and substantia nigra (SN) in the midbrain
are activated. Activation occurs primarily in the mesolimbic pathway (which projects to the nucleus
accumbens (NAc)),8 but also the mesostriatal pathway (projecting into the dorsal striatum),9 and
mesocortical pathway (projecting into the frontal cortex).[180]
These pathways are all interconnected, and involved with many other structures, in both cortical
and subcortical regions, that mediate processes such as memory, reward, salience attribution, motiva-
tion, craving, inhibitory control, decision–making, emotional regulation, mood, and interoception.[183]
They also interact with other essential transmitter systems such as the EOS, which is involved in no-
ciception, hedonic reward, and emotional attachment,[179] and the stress response.[184] Put together,
all of the behavioral and psychological features that typify the addictive state10—the motivation to
procure drugs, the excessive value attributed to them, impulsive behavior, tolerance, cue– and stress–
triggered craving, relapse, denial and other cognitive and emotional aspects—can be mapped out in
various neurobiological circuits.
It becomes clear throughout this chapter that these abnormalities are in part, but not exclusively,
a consequence of prolonged drug use. Environmental factors, such as stress, also have important
neurobiological impacts. Recognition of this has important ethical implications for tobacco control,
since certain social factors should then be addressed in tobacco control policies along with tobacco
use itself. Below, these neurobiological impacts are described in terms of circuits involved in reward,
behavioral inhibition, interoception, attachment, and stress.
3.1.1 Dopaminergic reward and memory pathways
As mentioned above, virtually all prototypical drugs of abuse, in addiction and non–addiction, in-
crease activity in the mesolimbic dopamine pathways that produce sensations of reward, motivation
and desire. Naturally reinforcing activities11 elevate dopamine levels in a similar way, but the phar-
macological effects of addictive drugs are usually more potent. While food, for example, can increase
7In addition to the direct release of dopamine, nicotine triggers the release of adrenaline, which gives it stimulant
properties. Chronic cigarette smoking also reduces the activity of neurotransmitters monoamine oxidase (MAO)–A and
MAO–B. This results in a net increase in adrenaline and dopamine, which augments the effects of nicotine. See [181].
8‘NAc’ is also referred to as the ‘ventral striatum’.
9‘Dorsal striatum’ is also referred to as the ‘caudate putamen’ (CP).
10Some of these features were described in section 2.1.1 in reference to clinical diagnostic criteria for addiction: most
notably craving and behavioral signs of cognitive dissonance.
11Such as eating palatable food, exercise, or social bonding.
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dopamine levels in this pathway up to 50%, methamphetamine can increase them by 1200%.[185] The
mode of administration is also important: the faster a drug absorbs and enters into the brain, the
more reinforcing (and addictive) it is. This is an important point for tobacco, because nicotine from a
cigarette is absorbed into the brain within seconds and produces high drug concentrations comparable
to those administered intravenously. Thus cigarettes are more addictive in this sense than other forms
of nicotine that are delivered more slowly (e.g. nicotine patches), or other drugs not administered
intravenously or by inhalation (e.g. alcohol).12[186]
In addiction, dopaminergic pathways exhibit pronounced shifts in the prediction of rewards, the
incentive value assigned to reinforcers, and the association of learned cues to specific rewards that
persist for years after abstinence.[183] These characteristics have been observed in virtually all drug
addictions, as well as in non–drug addictions such as the consumption of excessive quantities of
sugar,[187] or water;[188] over–eating;[189, 190] sex;[191] and compulsive patterns of behaviors such
as kleptomania, gambling, shopping, and Internet use.[192] The events underlying these shifts seem
to involve mesolimbic, mesostriatal, and mesocortical dopamine pathways, and have been explained
in terms of two mechanisms: (1) physical tolerance, and (2) the conditioning of neutral stimuli into
drug–related cues.
Physical tolerance mechanisms
When neurochemical pathways in the brain are subjected to abnormal, sustained levels of excitation,
they readapt their activation levels through a number of homeostatic mechanisms to produce a state
of physical tolerance. Tolerance mechanisms are drug–specific and can occur through different path-
ways.13 In addictions more generally, there are also adaptations in dopaminergic pathways that are
associated with behavioral changes. In drug–addicted individuals, consistent observations are that
the availability[193] and numbers[194] of their dopamine receptors are lower, which renders them less
physically responsive to the same quantity of their drug of choice.[195] This can result in compensatory
behavior, in which individuals who have lost their motivation for everyday activities resort to drug
use to maintain an acceptable dopamine baseline level.[194] This effect has been demonstrated in mice
with low dopamine receptor levels, that were trained to drink alcohol: when their receptor levels were
12This is an important point when considering slippery slope arguments: the idea that a regulation on tobacco will
justify the regulation of other unhealthy products, such as alcohol and sugar, in a similar way. However, the point made
here indicates that cigarettes are—by design—far more addictive than any other legal substance, and so regulations on
other unhealthy products are not justified along the same reasoning. See section 5.2 for further discussion.
13In the case of nicotine, NAChR becomes desensitized to the effects of nicotine. During periods of abstinence, the
desensitized NAChR become responsive again, which triggers cravings and withdrawal symptoms; these symptoms are
alleviated during smoking when nicotine binds these receptors. See [181].
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replenished through infusions (directly into the NAc), they drank less; when the receptors were again
lost to natural attrition, their drinking increased.[196]
The mouse experiment demonstrates that having a low level of dopamine receptors can incite higher
levels of drug consumption. For humans, the implication is that those with low dopamine baseline
levels are less likely to respond to natural reinforcers, and more likely to show addictive behavioral
patterns. This view supports a self–medication hypothesis of addiction.14 Prolonged drug use can
trigger this state. However, low dopamine receptor levels may also be pre–existent before the initiation
of drug use, predisposing the individual to addiction.15 Protracted drug use in such individuals is likely
to create a vicious circle in which the drug of choice, while giving some temporary relief, in the long
term contributes towards the mental states against which the individual is self–medicating in the first
place.
What does this means for addicted smokers? Nicotine is known to produce reinforcing effects
including a mild euphoria, reduced stress and anxiety, and increased energy. These effects are asso-
ciated with a nicotine–induced increase in dopamine and adrenaline levels. However, these benefits
occur only during nicotine intoxication; when the effects of nicotine wear off—typically within two
hours—physical tolerance mechanisms contribute to a more unmotivated, dysphoric state of mind,
often characterized by cravings and withdrawal symptoms.[197] In other words, smoking does not sus-
tainably increase one’s mental wellbeing; it can only give a transient, subjective sense of pleasure. This
explains, to some some extent, why smokers tend to describe their smoking as pleasurable, despite the
detrimental effects it has on their overall wellbeing.
Cue conditioning
Upon prolonged drug use, there are also changes in dopaminergic pathways that convert otherwise
neutral stimuli into potent drug–related cues. The cue–conditioning process involves prefrontal cortical
brain regions that assign an excessive salience to drugs (see section 3.1.2); this activates the amygdala
upon exposure to relevant cues. In the amygdala, which directly innervates the NAc, ‘hot’16 memories
are formed. They tend to shift attentional processes towards emotionally salient stimuli, which explains
why drug–addicted individuals often spend a lot of time thinking about or procuring drugs, especially
14The self–medication hypothesis of addiction is described and critiqued at length in section 5.1.3. In general, it
describes addictive behaviors as coping mechanisms against dysphoric, unmotivated states of mind. These may be partly
brought on by a low dopamine baseline level.
15The mechanisms behind this, and relevant implications, are described in section 3.2.
16‘Hot’ does not refer to temperature, but is a standard term in affective neurobiology which refers to neuroplastic
processes related to affect/emotions, impulsive behaviors, lust, and cue–triggered behaviors. ‘Hot’ is used interchangeably
with ‘affective’ or ‘affect–driven’.
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upon exposure to a relevant cue (e.g. a smell or place they associate with drug use).[198] Cue exposure
alone can increase dopamine firing in midbrain and prefrontal regions, which corresponds to craving;
as soon as the drug is taken, craving is alleviated, and firing decreases.[199] As a result, cue exposure
alone is often sufficient to produce relapse.[200, 201] What this means in the context of tobacco is that
tobacco–related cues—such as tobacco advertising, promotions, and sponsorship (TAPS) or watching
other people smoke—can trigger intense cravings and relapse, and can significantly undermine the
ability of tobacco–addicted individuals to avoid using tobacco.17
Furthermore, there is a neuroanatomical dissociation between the processing of conscious and
unconscious information; the latter which primarily activates the amygdala.[202] The unconscious
activation of this affective pathway is observed, for example, in cocaine–addicted individuals exposed
to subliminal cocaine cues: upon exposure, they experience cravings and activation in the orbitofrontal
cortex (OFC),18 limbic system, and striatum.[203] It is thought that this pathway constitutes hot
neurological pathways that relay cues detected by the OFC to the amygdala, where they are conveyed
as the conscious experience of affect, rather than thought. Cues that trigger these affects can be so
subtle that they are not consciously registered.19 Affective neuroplasticities can run independently of
cognitive systems. This may explain in part why addicted individuals often describe their addiction
as a ‘split’ between emotional drives, and rational, inhibitory thoughts: having an insatiable desire to
take a drug, despite knowing how harmful it is.20
Declarative ‘cool’21 memories are processed in the hippocampus. In general, it is thought that cool
processes, mediated by the prefrontal cortex (PFC), work by vetoing hot, subcortical processes (see sec-
tion 3.1.2). Similarly, cool neuroplasticities in the hippocampus are thought to override hot neuroplas-
ticities in the amygdala. In addiction, however, the hot system becomes less responsive to information
provided by the cool system, which further favours an attentional shift towards cue–triggered, affect–
driven behavior.[204] Thus, emotions are an important component of addictive decision–making, since
emotional processes become less likely to respond to rational thoughts. Resisting drug use may also
be more difficult in times of stress, since hot processes are also important in the stress response, which
limits hippocampal growth (see section 3.1.5), particularly in early childhood, when hippocampal de-
17This is arguably one reason why smokefree laws in recreational settings contribute to increased cessation success. It
was mentioned in section 2.2.1, for example, that smokefree laws in Ireland prevented relapse in 88% ex–smokers.
18The OFC is a part of the PFC that has important roles in producing cravings through the detection of drug–related
cues, behavioral control, and interpreting the emotional salience of situations. More detail in section 3.1.2.
19Further explanation in sections 3.1.2 and 3.2.2.
20This ‘split is also reflected in Frankfurt’s hierarchy of desires described in section 2.3.1, and the behavioral criteria
used to diagnose addictions described in section 2.1.1.
21‘Cool’ does not refer to temperature but to neuroplastic processes that are affectively neutral, and related to cognitive,
rational function and the inhibition of emotional and impulsive behaviors. They often serve to veto ‘hot’ processes.
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velopment is especially sensitive to environmental stressors (see section 3.2.2). For tobacco–addicted
individuals, the implication is that it is difficult to simply exercise a rational choice to not smoke;
especially when exposed to tobacco–related cues or stress.
Habit formation
Habit formation is another neuroplastic process, mediated in the dopaminergic mesostriatal path-
way which projects into the dorsal striatum. When neurological pathways that enforce a frequently
repeated behavior are formed in this structure, the behavior gradually becomes automated—for ex-
ample, walking—and to change it requires significant conscious effort.[194] Thus, habitual learning
is especially relevant to addictive behaviors enforced very frequently. In the case of smoking, an
average smoker who smokes 20 cigarettes per day and takes 12 puffs per cigarette is repeating the
reinforcement process 240 times per day. An addiction to cigarettes can then become deeply ingrained
into an individual’s routine as a ‘habit’, and this routine may further reinforce the addiction through
mechanisms in the dorsal striatum.[205]
This particular mechanism raises a number of questions regarding the nature of addictive decision–
making, since addictive behavior is then said to be automated and non–voluntary, or a constant
struggle between an unconscious ‘habit’ and the conscious resistance to that habit. While a desire
for drug–related reward22 no doubt plays an important role in addiction, it has been argued that
addictive decisions are—to some extent—irrational,23 and that this irrationality is characterized by
neuroplastic processes in the mesostriatal pathway that enforce habitual drives.24 This may imply
that addictive behaviors are not in line with the individual’s own motives, reasons, and values and
therefore non–autonomous; however, it may be possible to overcome these habitual drives if addicted
individuals are able to train their conscious recognition of them, and shift their attentional biases
elsewhere (see section 3.1.3).
3.1.2 Inhibitory processes in the frontal cortex
The PFC is the most highly evolved cortical structure in the human brain. It consists of two major
subdivisions: the OFC and dorsolateral PFC (dlPFC). Closely connected to these is another cortical
22Mediated through the NAc in the dopaminergic mesolimbic pathway—see section 3.1.1.
23There is a vast literature in addiction that disputes whether addictive decisions are ‘rational’ (in line with what the
individual really wants) or ‘irrational’ (in conflict with what the individual really wants). This thesis will not go too far
into this literature—refer to [206].
24Schroeder, for example, has argued that: “desires no doubt play some role in what [people with addictions] do. But
insofar as [they] are moved by their addictions, they are moved by forces other than desires. And so they are moved
irrationally” (pg.394, [207]).
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area, the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). The PFC is often described as the executive control centre of
the brain: where long–term decisions are made, alternatives are considered, and behaviors considered
socially inappropriate are inhibited. It does this by vetoing subcortical processes that would otherwise
endorse the inappropriate action.[208] Thus, the PFC is often considered as the seat of ‘free won’t’: the
structure that provides one the ability to exert free–willed, inhibitory control over one’s actions.[209]
Communication between the prefrontal cortex and the striatum
The PFC communicates with dopaminergic networks in the striatum. A consistent finding in the
brains of addicted individuals is that dopamine receptor availability is reduced in this network, even
months after abstinence. This is associated with reduced activity in various frontal regions including
the dlPFC, OFC, and ACC.[183] As mentioned at the start of section 3.1, in addiction, the frontal
cortex typically has a lower volume of grey and white matter. This, in turn, is thought to reduce
the individual’s capacity to exercise functions mediated by prefrontal regions, including goal–directed
behaviors, inhibition of impulsive or socially inappropriate behaviors, and cognitive decision–making.25
The extent to which these processes are impaired is also a predictor of the severity of the addiction;
this is also the case with nicotine addiction.[210] Thus a common assumption, particularly in brain
disease theories of addiction, is that the lack of behavioral control observed in many addictions is a
result of prefrontal change, and that these changes are caused by prolonged drug use.[29] However,
prefrontal changes, especially to the OFC, are also triggered by adverse socioaffective experiences
during critical developmental periods. The implication of this is that behavioral (and neurobiological)
dysregulations are not necessarily a result of drug–taking; these changes could be pre–existent in
individuals exposed to stress or other hardships during critical windows of neurodevelopment, or as a
result of an inherited predisposition.26
The right orbitofrontal cortex
The right side of the OFC is an important prefrontal area for integrating information about the
environment with internal affect. It is a dense region of opioid, dopaminergic, and noradrenergic
innervations, intimately connected to subcortical regions (amygdala, hypothalamus, and VTA) and
sensory inputs (touch, smell, sound, vision, and taste). The OFC evaluates the emotional significance
of stimuli, and uses this information to inhibit or permit the activation of limbic regions, create affective
neuroplastic changes in the amygdala, and divert attention to emotionally salient situations. Thus, it
25However, it is uncertain whether these changes are a cause or consequence of prolonged drug use.
26These points will be discussed further, in reference to neurobiological evidence, in section 3.2.
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functions as an emotional detector, and is activated when a situation is interpreted as ‘wrong’.27[211]
As mentioned in section 3.1.1, cues detected by the OFC are not necessarily consciously registered,
and the information it registers is often experienced as affect rather than thought.28
This function is important for the development of newborn babies who are not yet able to cogni-
tively register their environment. For example, the OFC of a baby can detect emotional arousal of
its mother through her pupil dilations, which—unconsciously—trigger a heightened state of emotional
wellbeing in the infant.29[212] Thus, the OFC plays an important role in emotional development, and
in the correct interpretation of the emotional salience of situations. In other words, the OFC is an
important structure for relational aspects of human life, especially emotional wellbeing.
In addiction, there are pronounced changes in OFC function. During detoxification, it is hypoac-
tivated, but during cravings it is hypermetabolic; this hyperactivation corresponds to the intensity
of the subjective cravings.[213] In other words, activation of the OFC relays a message to the limbic
system that something is ‘wrong’, and that the individual must correct the error by procuring drugs;
this is subjectively felt as craving. Activity in the OFC also increases in other compulsive disorders,
such as Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD),30 and so it is thought that the OFC mediates cravings
independent of reward. This may explain in part why drug–seeking patterns tend to continue, even
when the drug is no longer rewarding.[214] Hence there is a point—especially in severe addictions—
at which the drug reduces overall wellbeing and loses its potency to produce a pleasurable effect.31
Hyperactivation of the OFC also occurs during intoxication, but only in addicted subjects;[215] thus,
the OFC confers special functions specific to the addictive state. These are most likely related to the
excessive emotional salience that the OFC has attributed to the activity.[216]
27‘Wrong’ in the sense of unexpected, anomalous, or threatening. For example, when an individual is hungry, the OFC
sends a ‘wrong’ signal—often upon exposure to a food–related cue, such as the smell of food—to alert the brain, which
in turn sends a hunger signal in order to encourage the individual to procure food.
28In other words, the individual experiences a ‘feeling’ rather than a conscious thought. For example, a decision to eat
could be made two ways: noting that it is time to eat (conscious thought), or feeling a sudden urge to eat upon exposure
to the smell of food, even though it is not yet time to eat (affect).
29This point is important in the discussion on addiction susceptibility, because poor interaction between the mother
(or primary caregiver) and infant can, via mechanisms mediated through the OFC, affect neurobiological development in
a way that predisposes the infant to developing addictions in later life. A healthy development of the OFC, particularly
in early childhood, is therefore essential for healthy emotional development (and resistance to developing addictions). A
more detailed discussion, in reference to evidence from neurodevelopmental biology, is provided in section 3.2.2.
30OCD and addiction are similar in that they both exhibit compulsive behaviors, along with pronounced changed in
the dopaminergic mesostriatal pathway. In both disorders, the individual may get a sense of relief when the craving or
compulsion is satisfied. However, in OCD, the individual does not obtain a positive reward or ‘high’ from the activity.
31This is another point supporting the idea that the ‘pleasure’ associated with addictive activities does not contribute
to overall wellbeing.
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Implications for addictive decision–making
What do these points illustrate about the nature of addictive decision–making? A breakdown in
communication between the PFC and the striatum results in emotional drives (for example conditioned
cues such as those described in section 3.1.1) becoming more internalized, intensified, and pushed
beyond conscious awareness. Meanwhile, rational, inhibitory drives elicited by the PFC become more
difficult to exercise. The ability to resist drug use is therefore undermined in a bidirectional manner.
This effect is likely to be intensified further upon exposure to drug–related cues, as the OFC assigns an
excessive emotional salience to them. This results in a stronger attentional bias towards drug–related
cues, and—in some cases—a craving for drugs even when drug use is no longer rewarding. In other
words, in addiction, the capacity for abstinence is generally undermined through multiple mechanisms
that are involved in emotional and behavioral regulation.
In some brain disease theories of addiction, this information is interpreted as implying that addicted
individuals have lost their autonomy.32 This interpretation can have important ethical implications. It
has been argued, for example, that people with addictions are not capable of giving informed consent
to participate in studies related to their addiction,[23] or that the coercive treatment of addictions
‘restores’ lost autonomy.[30] However, the reality is more complex: the prefrontal changes described in
this section are not necessarily and solely the result of prolonged drug use,33 and they are of degrees.
Thus, the inhibition of addictive behaviors is difficult but not necessarily impossible, and in most
cases this ability will vary depending on the severity of the addiction. This is an important point
when considering the nature of autonomy in addiction: if autonomy is undermined to some degree but
not completely negated, states may be justified in providing autonomy–promoting conditions, though
coercive interventions would be considered hard paternalistic and therefore unethical. One question,
then, is whether people with even the most severe addictions still retain some ability to resist drug
use.
3.1.3 Interoceptive and attentive processes
Interoceptive34 and attentive processes are relevant to the discussion on autonomy in addiction. As dis-
cussed above (in sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2), neurobiological processes in addiction—such as habitual and
cue–triggered drives—are often subconscious or experienced as affect rather than conscious thoughts.
32‘Autonomy’ here follows the description in section 2.3.1: action in accord with one’s motives, reasons, and values.
In the context of addiction, it refers to the ability to resist drug use if this is what the agent wants.
33They may also be triggered by events prior to the initiation of drug use—see section 3.2.
34Recognition of one’s own internal mental states such as emotions, desires, and mental representations.
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These drives can become internalized as values or emotional preferences, in a non–autonomous pro-
cess that was introduced in section 2.3.1 as ‘internalized preference formation’.[142] Becoming aware
of these internalized preferences—through interoceptive and attentive processes—is an important step
in overcoming an addiction, because it gives addicted individuals an enhanced capacity to shift their
attention elsewhere, recognize drug–related scenarios that should be avoided, or exercise a conscious
resistance to cravings. This last point draws on Frankfurt’s theory of hierarchical desires: enhancing
one’s capacity to resist first–order desires by training the capacity to act in accord with one’s second–
order rationalizations. Self–control is another important process that flows from these. This section
explores whether this process is possible in terms of the relevant neurobiological mechanisms.
Interoception
Interoceptive ability is diminished in many addictions. Only a small percentage of those who require
substance abuse treatment report a perceived need for therapy;[217] many others who do undergo
therapy go through phases of ‘denial’. While relatively little is known on the neurobiological mech-
anisms underlying interoception, it involves parts of the PFC, ACC, parietal cortex, and insula. In
addictions, damage to the insula is thought to reduce interoceptive and emotional awareness, while
damage to parts of the PFC and ACC has been associated with a lack of awareness about one’s own
social incompetence.[218]
Interoceptive ability may also be compromised by the neurological shifts typically observed in
addictions: neuroplastic projections into the dorsal striatum that drive habitual behaviors, and cue
conditioning processes in the amygdala (see section 3.1.1). Automatized behaviors are rarely con-
sciously registered, so overcoming them requires a high level of self–awareness. Similarly, the recog-
nition of cue–conditioned impulses requires significant interoceptive skills, as well as willful efforts to
gain control over them. It logically follows that high levels of self–awareness and self–directed mental
effort (‘willpower’) are needed in individuals whose neurochemistry is more strongly directed towards
habitual or cue–directed behavior; and so overcoming an addiction requires strong development of
these skills as a counter–force to one’s own neurological biases.[219]
Neurobehavioral therapy
In overcoming compulsive disorders such as addiction and OCD,35 identification with ‘neurological
counter–forces’—self–awareness and willpower—and using them over a prolonged period seems to
35The similarities and differences between these two disorders are highlighted in section 3.1.2.
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weaken the neuroplastic changes that typify the disorder, thus reversing ‘brain damage’ and restoring
lost autonomy. A study in OCD is illustrative.[220] OCD, like addiction, is characterized by compulsive
behaviors in which the OFC and basal ganglia36—among other regions—are hyperactivated. Positron
emission tomography (PET) scans of 18 patients with moderate to severe OCD, free of medications,
were done before and after a course in mindfulness training. During this training, they were shown
PET scans of their brains, and told that their compulsions were a result of intrusive neurological
‘faults’. They were taught how to overcome these faults by becoming more aware of them, willfully
resisting them, and focusing their attention elsewhere. It was thought that this could weaken the
neuroplasticities contributing to OCD, and enforce ‘healthy circuitry’ in other brain regions.
Results showed that 12 of the 18 patients had significantly improved, and their improvements
corresponded to reduced metabolic activity in the basal ganglia, OFC, and right thalamus. In other
words, their self–directed mental efforts had changed the circuitry of their brains in a top–down
manner, in structures that would otherwise have triggered compulsive, uncontrolled behavior.[220]
Comparable effects have been observed in similar studies on stroke, Tourette’s syndrome,[211] spider
phobia,[221] depression[222], stress, schizophrenia, anxiety,[223] and repeat studies with OCD.[224]
Similarly, when addicted individuals succeed in conscious efforts to control their cravings, this also
reduces activity in the OFC.[225] This has led to a new therapeutic approach termed ‘neurobehavioral
therapy’, in which interventions aim to address the underlying neurobiological mechanisms implicated
in the disorder, but through behavioral methods such as cognitive behavioral therapy and awareness
training.[222]
The capacity for top–down neuroplastic change
What does this mean for addicted individuals? Self–sustained efforts and awareness in countering an
addiction could direct neuroplastic changes that support non–addictive behavior, such as the prefrontal
inhibition of processes in the amygdala. Self–directed neuroplasticity of this sort has been termed
“top–down plasticity”,[226] as it originates in one’s high–order functions and affects neurophysical
structure.37 The implication is that, even in the most severe addictions, the individual cannot be
considered non–autonomous on the basis that addiction has neurobiological manifestations, since
these can also change in response to the individual’s own efforts. However, it should be emphasized
that these efforts can be extremely difficult to exercise, especially in severe cases. This means that it
36Also referred to as the dorsal striatum, the region that produces habitual, automated behaviors such as those
described in section 3.1.1.
37This is different from “bottom–up plasticity”, in which neurological structures are altered in response to changes in
the level of sensory input.
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is important to bring out individuals’ abilities to overcome their addictions through top–down action.
In the clinical context, this may entail making better use of therapies that make people more adept
at understanding and controlling their addictions.
Evidence presented in section 2.1.1 also indicates that certain social conditions can present signifi-
cant challenges to forming these top–down plasticities. For example, those who are constantly exposed
to drug–related cues would need to make constant efforts to overcome cravings; those who can easily
avoid these cues would only have to exercise these efforts occasionally.38 This idea has been discussed in
the ego depletion hypothesis of addiction: the theory that individuals’ self–control—“ego”—resources
are depletable, and it is therefore necessary to provide environmental conditions that maximize these
resources.[227]
In the context of tobacco, ‘ego–depleting’ environments may include those in which addicted smok-
ers are constantly exposed to tobacco–related cues, such as TAPS or watching others smoke in public.
Restrictions on these—such as bans on TAPS and smokefree laws—are justified as they enhance the
ability of addicted smokers to resist smoking. The tobacco industry (TI), which is primarily responsi-
ble for creating social environments abundant with tobacco–related cues,39 should not be absolved for
its marketing activities on the basis that addicted smokers—to some extent—retain an ability to avoid
using tobacco. On the contrary, a ‘free choice’ to smoke or not smoke is significantly undermined by
the social conditions that the TI itself provides as well tobacco use itself,40 and so the TI’s argument
that smoking is a freely chosen activity is still—according the the evidence presented here—inaccurate.
3.1.4 Euphoria and affect: The endorphin–opioid system
The EOS has important communications with the dopaminergic reward system, is located throughout
similar brain regions (VTA, NAc, PFC, amygdala) and is implicated in addiction. Usually when an
addictive drug is taken, or when a rewarding activity is carried out (e.g. sex or exercise), the EOS
elicits feelings of hedonic reward, or euphoria, through the release of β-endorphin peptides that bind
to opioid receptors in the brain.[228] This euphoria can be blocked by disabling µ-opioid receptors (the
receptor subtype most implicated in addiction) through a µ-opioid antagonist such as naltrexone.41
Thus, activation of the EOS is necessary and sufficient for producing hedonic reward, in both drug– and
non–drug–related behaviors. The EOS also has important functions in pain relief and attachment.
38In later sections, the effects of stress and social support are emphasized; these are also important factors that can
enhance or undermine an individual’s ability to resist drug use—see the discussions in sections 3.1.5 and 3.2.
39A discussion on the marketing activities of the TI is provided in sections 4.3 and 4.4.
40Along with these, oppressive and stressful social conditions are also relevant. These conditions are identified and
discussed further in section 3.2 and chapter 4.
41Naltrexone is often used in the treatment of alcoholism and opioid addiction.
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Physical pain is registered in the thalamus, but its subjective impact is experienced in the ACC.
Emotional pain is neurologically experienced in the same way: the ACC is activated when a subject
feels socially isolated,[229] or sad, and this impact is reduced by activation of the EOS in the ACC.[230]
Role of the endorphin–opioid system in early attachment
The ability of the EOS to reduce the subjective impact of emotional and physical pain is crucial to
infants. When an infant is in potential danger (e.g. physical pain, or separated from its parent), it
experiences pain as a warning signal, and cries to bring the parent back. When the parent soothes
the infant, the EOS is activated, which ameliorates the dysphoria and produces a feeling of safety and
attachment.[231] The EOS is also counter–regulatory to the stress response (see section 3.1.5), which
further soothes and relaxes the child.[232]
Thus, a proper functioning of the EOS is crucial for secure attachment,42 and the development of
efficient coping mechanisms against emotional pain and stress. If the EOS is impaired, infants lose
the motivation to warn their parent when they are in danger. This is observed, for example, in mice
lacking the µ-opioid receptor.[233] In humans, poorly attached infants tend to tune out to painful
surroundings or employ their own, often ineffective, self–soothing mechanisms such as sucking their
thumb.[185] Also, since the EOS plays an important role in controlling the stress response, impaired
EOS function—triggered by a poor early attachment experience—tends to affect an individual’s ability
to cope with stressful situations later in life (see section 3.2.2).
Similar to infants’ thumb–sucking, drug use in later life has been described by the self–medication
hypothesis of addiction as an inefficient, temporary coping mechanism against emotionally painful
or stressful experiences. A low opioid receptor level, which incites a dysphoric state, may trigger
compensatory drug use;43 addictive drugs such as nicotine then temporarily put the user into a
euphoric, soothed state by activating the EOS. A low number or availability of opioid receptors can
be a result of a poor early attachment experience or stress (see section 3.2.2), as well as prolonged
drug use. Hence there are important interconnections between emotional pain, stress, and addiction;
especially if the emotional pain or stress occurs in early life.44
In cases of prolonged drug use, a vicious cycle is created which further throws the EOS out of
balance: µ-opioid receptors are internalized and desensitized, and homeostatic counter–mechanisms
42And vice versa; see section 3.2.2.
43This was described in the context of dopamine in section 3.1.1: individuals experiencing an unmotivated, dysphoric
state of mind, in part triggered by a low dopamine receptor level, may turn to drug–seeking behavior as compensation.
44Therefore it is important to discuss the development of the EOS in early childhood, because this is when a predis-
position to addiction through these mechanisms is most likely to develop. For further discussion, see 3.2.2.
70
(through the dynorphin peptide which binds to κ-opioid receptors) are upregulated.[234] These effects
are related to increased craving, and are, to some extent, reversed when the drug user goes into
abstinence.[235] Thus, the overall responsivity of the EOS is further reduced through drug use, which
in turn contributes to cravings, dysphoria, and stress between periods of intoxication.[179] This may
explain in part why individuals addicted to drugs—even drugs such as nicotine, that are legal, socially
accepted and presumably rewarding—generally experience higher levels of stress and depression than
non–addicted individuals.[236]
Implications in the context of tobacco
What does this mean for addicted smokers? First, emotional pain and stress play an important role
in addictive decision making. The implication is that, during times of pain and stress, non–addicted
smokers are more likely to develop an addiction, or addictions can become more severe. Emotional
hardship, then, is an important trigger for relapse and the onset of tobacco addiction, and social
conditions that propagate pain and stress play an important role in this process (further discussion in
section 3.2). Second, prolonged smoking reduces overall activity of the EOS, which leads to an overall
increase in a smoker’s stress levels and therefore a reduced level of mental wellbeing (except during
periods of nicotine intoxication). Thus, although smoking can give a transient sense of wellbeing,
it actually reduces overall wellbeing outside periods of intoxication and contributes to the dysphoric
states the smoker is trying to avoid in the first place. In other words, addictive smoking, though
perceived as pleasurable, is actually—neurobiologically speaking—detrimental to mental wellbeing
through the actions of nicotine on dopaminergic pathways and the EOS. In other words, smoking is
not a suitable coping mechanisms against emotional pain or stress; if anything, addictive smoking
makes these issues worse.
3.1.5 Stress: The hypothalamic–pituitary–adrenal axis
As hinted in the above, there is also an important, well–established neurobiological relationship be-
tween stress and addiction.
The stress response
Emotional stress triggers the release of adrenaline and noradrenaline through the autonomic nervous
system (ANS) for an acute ‘fight or flight’ response, and a slower, more protracted response through ac-
tivation of the hypothalamic–pituitary–adrenal (HPA) axis. The hypothalamus releases corticotropin
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releasing hormone (CRH) and arginine vasopressin (AVP), which trigger the release of adrenocorti-
cotropic hormone (ACTH) from the pituitary, which triggers the release of glucocorticoids from the
adrenal gland. Glucocorticoids affect many bodily functions such as the immune system, metabolism,
the ANS, and the brain in preparation for ‘fight or flight’. In the brain, they bind to glucocorticoid
receptors (GR) and mineralocorticoid receptors (MR). Both receptors also act as genetic transcrip-
tion factors, so their activation can have long–lasting repercussions on the stress response and related
systems,[184] and may be influenced by epigenetic processes (see section 3.2.3).
Given the protracted, widespread effects of the stress response, fine control of the HPA axis is
essential. Negative feedback loops exist through GR/MR in the hippocampus and frontal cortex. The
OFC, which is an important brain region in addictions (see section 3.1.2), is also able to inhibit the
HPA axis through noradrenergic innervations to the hypothalamus, through a corticolimbic circuit that
runs from the OFC to the lateral tegmental area.[237] As mentioned in section 3.1.4, the HPA axis also
has important communications with the EOS: β-endorphin peptides inhibit the HPA axis through µ-
opioid receptors, while self–inhibitory EOS mechanisms (dynorphin which binds to κ-opioid receptors)
elevate HPA activity. Chronic stress exposure upregulates these inhibitory mechanisms, which in turn
reduces the overall activity of the EOS.[238] Morphine, a µ-opioid agonist, blunts activity of the HPA
axis in times of stress, but not in the absence of stress; thus, the EOS seems to exert a feedback
inhibitory function over the HPA axis only when it has already been activated by stressors.[239] The
implication is that addictive drugs such as nicotine, which act on the EOS, are likely to have a more
potent effect in times of stress.45
The effects of stress exposure over the life–course
Stressful experiences, from the prenatal to the adult life, have significant impacts on stress–inhibitory
mechanisms, which can throw the system off balance to favour a persistent shift towards activation
of the HPA axis. Neurobiological details of this shift, and evidence of stress as the causal basis, are
well–characterized in animal models. In humans, due to ethical limitations on research protocols most
of the data is associative. Put together, however, evidence strongly suggests that early exposures to
stress can have long–lasting impacts on an individual’s reactivity to stress well into adulthood,[184]
and that the underlying neurological processes can affect various neurobiological circuits and structures
implicated in addiction.
Stress exposure starts in utero. When rat mothers are exposed to stress, more glucocorticoids
45In the case of nicotine, there is evidence that smoking (temporarily) ameliorates stress, and that this is a commonly
cited reason for smoking, relapsing, or not quitting—see [197].
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pass through the placenta to reach the fetus. Consequently, fetal HPA axis activity increases, which
slows down brain development,[240] reduces the numbers of GR/MR in the hippocampus,[241] shunts
developments of the OFC and ACC,[242] and increases the levels of the stress hormone CRH in
the amygdala.[243] In later life, these rats show learning impairments linked to limited growth of
the hippocampus, and increased anxious or depressive behaviors linked to stress–related effects on
the amygdala. They also demonstrate an enhanced sensitivity to drugs of abuse, through the close
interactions of glucocorticoids with the EOS and dopaminergic reward system.[244] Maternal anxiety,
depression, stress, and the synthetic equivalent of stress—glucocorticoid treatment—seem to affect
human babies in a similar way: activity of the HPA axis is increased, and neural and cognitive
developments are slower.[245] Thus, exposure to stress in the prenatal period may affect a number of
brain regions implicated in addiction (amygdala, OFC, ACC) in ways that can predispose an individual
to addictive behaviors.
In infancy, the hippocampus undergoes a critical growth period which makes it particularly stress–
sensitive during this time.46 Stress–induced damage to the hippocampus may impair its capability to
provide GR/MR–mediated feedback inhibition on the HPA axis, which in turn reduces an individual’s
capacity to cope with environmental stressors. Moreover, it was mentioned in section 3.1.1 that
the hippocampus is important for the processing of affectively neutral, ‘cool’ information, which
can veto affect–driven, ‘hot’ processes in the amygdala. Chronic stress, while reducing hippocampal
capacity, also enlarges the amygdala;[247] together, this further favours an attentional shift towards
cue–triggered, affect–driven processes mediated by the amygdala, and the impulsive behaviors often
observed in addictions.
The PFC, similarly to the hippocampus, vetoes limbic affect–driven processes (see section 3.1.2),
and inhibits the HPA axis through GR/MR–mediated feedback inhibition. It is also stress–sensitive,
particularly during adolescence when it undergoes a rapid growth spurt.47 Hence, similarly to the
hippocampus, its vulnerability to stress is heightened during a critical developmental period.48 Stress
affects cortical areas in a number of ways. Stress stunts developments of the OFC and ACC, which
reduces their capacity to inhibit the HPA axis or mediate pain relief through the EOS.[184] Stress also
reduces the numbers of opioid receptors in the PFC. Since the EOS is inhibitory on the HPA axis,
impairment of its function further drives the stress response while also limiting other crucial EOS–
46In a study on women with depression, for example, those who had been exposed to early childhood trauma had a
lower hippocampal volume that those who had not—see [246].
47Further discussion on neurobiological development in adolescence, and how this affects one’s susceptibility to addic-
tion, is provided in section 3.2.4.
48Repeated sexual abuse, for example, is associated with a reduced hippocampal volume if abuse took place in early
childhood, but with a reduced PFC volume if abuse took place in adolescence—see [248].
73
mediated functions such as pain relief, attachment, and euphoric reward.[232] Impaired EOS function,
induced by stress, may also contribute to the dysphoric states that trigger drug use. Furthermore, it
was mentioned in section 3.1.2 that impairment of prefrontal function is a predictor of the severity of
drug use. Thus, stress–related disruptions of prefrontal development may predispose the individual to
higher levels of drug use in later life, or a higher severity of addiction.
The relationship between stress and addiction
There are potent, stress–sensitive neurobiological pathways that can affect an individual’s reaction to
addictive drugs throughout the life–course. This may explain why stress is such a common trigger for
relapse into drug use.49 It is also relevant in early childhood and in adolescence, when stress exposure
may confer a predisposition to addiction.50 Exposure to stress, or a low coping capacity against stress,
can blunt the rewarding effects of a drug through neurobiological mechanisms that may in turn trigger
a conversion from casual use to dependence or a higher daily consumption. The rewarding effects of
nicotine, for example, are blunted by chronic stress.51 For addicted smokers, this means that stress
is an important trigger for tobacco addiction; yet, as explained in section 3.1.4, tobacco use in these
cases actually makes this problem worse. The implication is that the factors that contribute to stress
should be addressed in order to help prevent and treat tobacco addictions. This is especially relevant
for young children and adolescents, and groups of people more affected by stressful circumstances.52
3.1.6 A summary of the brain in nicotine addiction
Throughout this section, some important neurobiological features of addiction were highlighted that
help to address some of the questions raised in chapter 2. They are reiterated and answered below,
and will be returned to in the development of an ethical framework in chapter 5.
Does addictive smoking provide any overall benefits?
Evidence in sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.4 indicates that all activities perceived as rewarding, in both ad-
diction and non–addiction, impact dopaminergic circuits and the EOS in ways that elicit a sense of
49This is demonstrated as an association in humans—see [249]. The biological relationship has been observed in rat
experiments: in rats trained to take cocaine, drug use initiation or relapse does not occur unless glucocorticoid (stress
hormone) levels are above a certain threshold—see [250].
50This point is further discussed in sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 (early childhood) and section 3.2.4 (adolescents).
51One observed mechanisms is through the upregulation of an enzyme (acetylcholine esterase–R) which breaks down
nicotine in the striatum—see [251].
52These points are explored further in section 3.2 (in terms of the neurodevelopmental processes in early childhood
and adolescence that can confer a susceptibility to addiction) and chapter 4 (in terms of the social processes that make
some people more vulnerable to addiction).
74
reward, hedonic pleasure, and relaxation. On this level, during nicotine intoxication, smoking can
provide these benefits. However, in addiction and outside intoxication, the levels of dopaminergic and
opioid activation are decreased through homeostatic adaptations. Addictive nicotine use contributes
to these adaptations, and so smoking actually contributes to the negative states of mind the smoker
is (temporarily) trying to ameliorate. The result is a transient sense of pleasure or relaxation, which
makes many smokers interpret their smoking as a source of pleasure or stress relief. In general, how-
ever, smoking has the opposite effect which in turn also contributes to dependence. In other words,
addictive smoking does not provide an overall benefit to the mental wellbeing of smokers and is a
counterproductive means to manage stress, dysphoria, and other negative states of mind.
Is addictive smoking freely chosen?
In section 3.1.1, it was shown that, in addiction, there are neurobiological shifts towards cue–driven and
habitual behaviors; the result is that exposure to tobacco and tobacco–related cues leads to cravings
and cue–driven, habitual behavioral patterns that can be difficult to control. Since these are often
not consciously registered, they can be non–autonomously internalized as a strong preference or value
towards tobacco. Section 3.1.2 has also shown that, in addiction, the ability to inhibit these processes
through the PFC is significantly reduced. Addiction also results in cognitive dissonance, characterized
by a conflict between an emotional drive to smoke (mediated through the amygdala and the NAc) and
rational, inhibitory thoughts (mediated through the PFC). This is also a conflict between first– and
second–order desires, described in Frankfurt’s hierarchy of desires.
Adapted into Frankfurt’s theory, a first–order desire to smoke (reflected by processes in the amyg-
dala and NAc) overwhelms a second–order desire to not smoke (processes mediated in the PFC). An
addictive action, then, is not considered freely chosen because it is not in accord with the second–
order desire.[143] In addiction it is difficult to act in accord with the second–order desire, because the
first–order desire to smoke is often triggered by subconscious processes, and therefore more difficult to
consciously control with second–order rationalizations. In clinical diagnostic criteria of addiction, this
conflict is characterized by signs of behavioral dissonance.53 It is also illustrated by the widespread
sense of regret—an indicator of cognitive dissonance—among smokers for having started smoking.
Conflict is also reflected by the fact that quit attempts among smokers are common, but usually
unsuccessful (see section 2.1.1).
Put together, these neurobiological changes can make an addiction to tobacco extremely difficult
53These were described in section 2.1.1; for example, unsuccessful attempts to quit or cut down, or continued use
despite knowledge of the harms. Also refer to [22].
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to overcome. In other words, nicotine addiction is not trivial and addictive smoking is not simply a
‘free choice’; it significantly impairs an individual’s ability to avoid or cease using tobacco.
To what extent is autonomy undermined in tobacco addiction?
Addiction can make it extremely difficult to resist tobacco use. This may imply that having an
addiction negates one’s autonomy in this context.54 However, addiction does not make it impossible
to resist tobacco use. It is important to make this distinction, because if having an addiction negates
one’s autonomy, the ability to overcome the addiction using one’s own efforts would be considered non–
existent. Autonomy may then be considered to be below a threshold at which more coercive means,
such as coerced therapy, are ethically justified for the purpose of restoring one’s autonomy. However,
if having an addiction does not negate one’s autonomy, individuals are still considered to have some
ability to overcome their addictions using their own efforts. In this scenario, coerced therapy would
be considered a violation of autonomy. However, less coercive interventions that enhance the ability
to resist tobacco use may still be necessary.
As discussed in section 3.1.2, ‘addiction’ is not a black or white concept; the degree of neurobiolog-
ical change correlates to the severity of the addiction, and this is in turn changeable and variable per
individual. Moreover, section 3.1.3 has shown that neurobiological patterns that typify addiction—and
other disorders—can to some extent be reversed through ‘top–down’ approaches such as neurobehav-
ioral therapy. Thus, it would be inaccurate to conclude that even the most severely addicted smokers
are completely unable to resist smoking (and therefore non–autonomous). However, since the neu-
robiological effects of addiction make smoking more difficult to avoid, it can be concluded that the
autonomy of an addicted smoker—in regards to tobacco use—is diminished somewhat; the degree to
which correlates to the severity of the addiction.
There are several implications to this argument. If smokers are still considered autonomous to
some extent, the TI may argue that smokers themselves are morally culpable for their actions while
the TI is not. However, this argument would be inaccurate, because the neurobiological effects of
nicotine clearly undermine the autonomy of most smokers to a significant degree. The capacity for
resisting tobacco is further diminished by the TI’s marketing activities, particularly their widespread
implantation of tobacco–related cues.55 Therefore it is necessary to protect addicted smokers not just
from tobacco use itself, but also from tobacco–related cues and other autonomy–undermining social
54As in, the mental ability to resist tobacco use.
55As well as the TI’s attempts to misinform, target certain groups for smoking initiation, and deny the harms of
smoking; see discussion in chapter 4.
76
factors.56
What is the nature of addictive decision–making?
Evidence in sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.4 indicates that, in addiction, there is a strong bias towards affect–
driven decisions. Consequently, emotional factors such as values, desires, and relationships are an
important aspect of addictive decision–making. This lends support to a relational model of autonomy
in addiction, in which social conditions—especially those that affect one’s emotional state—can be
autonomy–undermining. It is also an important consideration for tobacco control policies, most of
which are based on a libertarian paternalistic approach which assumes that addicted smokers can
simply exercise a ‘rational decision’ to not smoke in light of more attractive options (see section 2.2.1).
The information presented here suggests that focus should also be put on relational or social factors
that may influence smoking behavior.57
What is the role of the social environment in addictive decision–making?
The social environment plays an important role in triggering and propagating addictions. Sections
3.1.4 and 3.1.5 in particular have argued that stressors in the social environment, or a poor early
attachment experience, can have important neurobiological impacts through the EOS and stress path-
ways that trigger addictive behaviors. Therefore the social environment can be autonomy–enhancing
or autonomy–suppressing, as suggested in relational models of autonomy. Social experiences, such as
emotional stress, can also predispose people to developing addictions, and predispositions appear to
be of particular relevance in early childhood, adolescence, and to socially disadvantaged groups. A
focus on social justice, young children, and adolescents should then be an essential component of the
ethical framework developed in this thesis.58
3.2 Mechanisms of susceptibility
Not all people who ever try an addictive drug develop an addiction; they are actually a minority. In
section 2.1.1, for example, it was mentioned that even for very addictive drugs such as tobacco and
heroin, the conversion to dependency rates are estimated at 32% and 23% respectively. Conversely,
56At this point, it is unclear what these factors are; they are identified and discussed further in section 3.2 and chapter
4.
57At this point, it remains unclear what these factors are; they will be identified and discussed further in section 3.2
and chapter 4.
58How exactly the social environment can enhance or suppress one’s autonomy, and determining how and why policies
should respond, requires a deeper inquiry into relevant mechanisms of susceptibility (discussed in section 3.2) and the
relevant social and relational factors (discussed in chapter 4).
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various non–drug activities not usually considered addictive—such as eating food—can become addic-
tive for some individuals, with neurobiological patterns comparable to those observed in addictions to
prototypical drugs of abuse. Thus, there are mechanisms that predispose some individuals to devel-
oping addictions more than others. People who are particularly vulnerable to addictions to alcohol,
illicit drugs and tobacco are adolescents and groups affected the most by social injustice: certain racial
minorities, people in low socioeconomic strata, and people with comorbid mental illness. For policies
to properly address this issue, it is necessary to answer the following: what makes these groups more
vulnerable, what are the relevant factors involved, and how should policies respond?
It is possible that some people are at a higher genetic risk to developing addictions. This may be
particularly true for some racial minorities. Some Native groups have already been studied to deter-
mine whether their high incidences of alcoholism and other addictions are because of genetic reasons.59
In section 2.2.3, it was also mentioned that genetic markers are being explored for nicotine addiction,
which may form the basis of genetic tests that predict an individual’s susceptibility to nicotine ad-
diction. This raises the question of whether—based on the progress of genetic research so far—these
tests have any potential as a future intervention, or whether a susceptibility to nicotine addiction is
conferred through more complex, environmentally–influenced processes. In other words, mechanisms
of susceptibility could be ‘hard–wired’, for example genetic; but they could also be transient, reversible
and sensitive to environmental influences, such as epigenetic or neurodevelopmental. It is necessary,
then, to look at genetic, epigenetic, and neurodevelopmental mechanisms of susceptibility; particularly
in early childhood, because this is the time when individuals seem to be particularly sensitive to the
effects of stress and other emotional impacts.60
Adolescents are the age group most likely to initiate drug use and develop addiction. Various epi-
demiological surveys61 indicate that the vulnerability to drug use varies across the lifespan: incidences
of problematic drug use and addiction peak in adolescence and early adulthood, but level out later in
life.[252, 253, 254] This has led to the ‘maturing out hypothesis’, which suggests that many addictions
resolve in later adulthood, as a result of successful adaptation into the adult social environment.[255]
A fluctuation of vulnerability to addiction throughout the lifespan, with the most sensitive period
being adolescence and early adulthood, could be a result of biological factors, psychosocial influences,
or the interaction of both. A question raised, then, is what are the neurobiological mechanisms that
59However, it should be noted that this research has been controversial, due to its essentialist assumptions which may
reinforce stereotypes.
60This point was highlighted in sections 3.1.4 and 3.1.5 in terms of EOS function and the effects of stress over the
life–course.
61The Epidemiologic Catchment Area Study, National Epidemiologic Survey on Alcohol and Related Conditions, and
National Comorbidity Survey.
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make adolescents more vulnerable to initiating drug use and addiction, and how should policies take
this into account to protect adolescents from smoking initiation and addiction?
The aim of this section is to discuss mechanisms underlying addiction susceptibility, in order to
provide evidence–based indications on how tobacco control policies should tackle the issues of smoking
initiation among youth and tobacco–related health inequalities related to social disadvantage. Evi-
dence is provided from the viewpoint of three research areas: genetics, epigenetics, and developmental
neurobiology. The discussion on developmental neurobiology is focused on two critical developmental
periods that are strongly implicated in addiction: early childhood (the first two years of life), and
adolescence. These are then linked back to the neurobiological observations described in section 3.1,
in particular the discussions on stress (section 3.1.5) and early attachment experience (section 3.1.4).
The central argument of this section is that a neurobiological susceptibility to addiction is conferred
primarily by social hardship, particularly if this occurs in early childhood. This argument has various
implications, summed up in section 3.2.5.
3.2.1 Genetics
As mentioned in section 2.2.3, there is scientific interest in identifying variants in the genetic sequences
that may predispose an individual to nicotine addiction. This has led to further ideas that genetic
tests could be used to select individuals more highly predisposed to nicotine addiction, who could
then be targeted more in tobacco control policies or for interventions such as the nicotine vaccine.
If scientific research points to a reliable association between certain genetic variants and nicotine
addiction, such interventions have potential. However, if genetic associations are weak and other
mechanisms of susceptibility, related to the social environment, are more relevant, then it is necessary
to pay greater attention to the social determinants that render some individuals more susceptible. It
is necessary, then, to briefly review the progress of genetic research related to nicotine addiction.
General trends
Broadly speaking, there does appear to be a heritable component to addictions. Most data in support
of this notion comes from twin studies, which indicate a moderate heritability of substance use disorders
ranging from 20–50%.[256] In general, addictions seem to be more concordant in monozygotic than
dizygotic twins, and various addictions, most notably alcoholism, tend to run in families. It is then
argued that addictions are a result of partly genetic, and partly environmental factors. The National
Institute for Drug Abuse (NIDA) and DSM–5, for example, state that addictions to tobacco, alcohol
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and illicit drugs have roughly a 50% genetic variance.[22, 257] The search for specific genes, however,
has been more challenging.
In linkage studies, affected families are researched in order to identify genes or loci of interest.
However, researchers have been unable to find a single major locus, or a small number of loci, which
indicates that the genetic factors underlying addiction are likely to be complex, involving a large
number of genes implicated in a wide range of functions, and interacting with environmental and
epigenetic factors. A recent study, for example, identified over 1500 genes linked to addiction; 396
were used to construct a map of genes and gene products in five major molecular pathways implicated
in addiction.[258] Genome–wide association studies (GWAS), that study specific genes of interest in
addicted (case) and non–addicted (control) individuals, have also identified several genes but results
have been difficult to replicate.[259] Still, research has highlighted a few genes involved in relevant
neurological processes that may play a subtle role in one’s reaction to nicotine, thereby increasing the
susceptibility to nicotine addiction.
Genes encoding the nicotinic acetylcholine receptor
Genetic variations in drug receptor subunits may result in structural changes that affect their binding
properties; for example, a low–affinity variant that binds to the drug less efficiently, thus rendering
the individual less sensitive to the drug’s effect. Well–characterized examples in the case of nico-
tine are the genes encoding NAChR subunits that bind to nicotine. There are 12 subunits, α2–10
and β2–4, encoded by CHRNA2–10 and CHRNB2–4 respectively. They combine to form functional
NAChR, of which α4β2–NAChR are the most abundant, and α6–NAChR dominates nicotine control
of dopaminergic neurons.[260]
Various GWAS have researched the relationship between cigarettes smoked per day (CPD)62 and
variants of NAChR subunit genes. Associations to CPD were found within the CHRNA5/A3/B4
cluster.[261] Other NAChR genes of significance include CHRNA6 and CHRNB2. An association
of CHRNA6 with CPD is consistent with its corresponding expression of α6–NAChR subunits in
dopamine–releasing neurons, which makes this subunit particularly relevant to the reward functions
of nicotine.[262] CHRNB2 variants, which encode the β2 subunit, were implicated in nicotine addic-
tions when analyzed together with CHRNA4, since both transcripts combine to form the abundant
α4β2 subunit.[263] Thus, examples of genes encoding various NAChR subunits illustrate that genetic
variations can affect receptor properties, which in turn may have subtle, yet appreciable effects on
62A behavioral indicator of nicotine addiction.
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their binding to nicotine. However, the exact mechanisms behind these are unclear.
Genes involved in behavior
Otherwise, gene variants associated with behavioral control disorders—such as conduct disorder, im-
pulsivity, antisocial personality disorder and addiction—may influence personality traits by producing
different variants of mediators involved in neurological behavioral control pathways. Many associa-
tions have been found in GWAS, but are not yet replicable. A meta–analysis of 46 genetic studies
on personality, for example, found limited evidence and consistency,[264] so associations are likely
to be weak. However, it has been suggested that certain variants in genes involved in the function
of mood–regulating monoamines (such as dopamine, adrenaline, noradrenaline and serotonin) may
render an individual more susceptible to developing behavioral control disorders after a stressful or
traumatic experience. This fits with the observation that stressors in early life increase an individual’s
vulnerability to behavioral problems, but not everyone who suffered childhood trauma develops these
disorders.[265]
Incidences of addiction are higher in some Native populations, such as Native Americans and New
Zealand’s Maori, and so potential genetic predispositions to addictive behaviors have been studied
in these groups. A well–known example is that of MAO–A, an enzyme that breaks down dopamine,
adrenaline, noradrenaline and serotonin. Low–activity variants of its gene, MAOA, have been as-
sociated with aggression, antisocial personality disorders, and alcoholism in ethnic groups such as
Maori.[266] These effects are thought to be of special relevance to males, since MAOA is an X–linked
gene. Among boys maltreated in childhood, for example, those with the low–activity MAOA variant
had higher chances of developing antisocial problems later in life.[267] However, a similar effect can
be observed in females: among sexually abused Native American women, those homozygous for the
low–activity MAOA variant had high rates of alcoholism and antisocial personality disorder. Women
heterozygous for the low–activity variant had intermediate rates of these disorders. However, in
the absence of sexual abuse, there was no connection between behavioral disorders and the MAOA
gene.[268]
Similar examples are demonstrated by the genes for a serotonin transporter (SLC6A4 ), and
for catechol–O–methyl transferase (COMT), an enzyme that breaks down catecholamines such as
dopamine. The product of COMT reduces dopamine levels in the PFC; high–activity variants of
COMT result in a faster breakdown of prefrontal dopamine, which may predispose an individual to
addictions or other behavioral control disorders.[269] The product of SLC6A4 modulates functions in
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the amygdala; low–activity variants result in greater sensitivity to fearful or stressful stimuli. Such
variants are, in turn, associated with anxiety, depression, and alcoholism, and associations are stronger
once previous stress exposures are taken into account.[270] However, drug use initiation in those with
the low–activity variant also seems to be attenuated by community involvement or a supportive family
network.[271]
Environmental influence
Based on the above, it seems that genetic factors are sensitive to environmental influences. Mechanisms
behind gene–environment interactions could be epigenetic, neurostructural, or both. Brain–derived
neurotrophic factor (BDNF), for example, is a highly abundant neurotrophin with important functions
in aiding neural development and plasticity, encoded by the gene Bdnf. BDNF is thus important
for the survival and function of dopaminergic neurons in the midbrain, and is expressed in brain
regions implicated in addictions: the amygdala, striatum, and PFC.[272] The expression of Bdnf is
sensitive to stress exposure and prolonged drug use. These involve epigenetic mechanisms, such as gene
silencing (see section 3.2.3). Since BDNF is important for the formation of neuroplastic projections,
alterations in its expression may affect the neurological structure of reward pathways. Variants in
the genetic sequence of Bdnf have also been associated with nicotine addiction, although this effect
appears to be very subtle.[262] The example of Bdnf therefore illustrates how gene–environment
interactions, on various levels, add further complexity to the genetic variations that contribute to
addiction susceptibility.
Taken together, the phenotypic effects of genetic variations appear to be subtle and/or largely
dependent on gene–environment interactions.[265] Research in genes such as MAOA and SLC6A4
demonstrate that, even for individuals genetically predisposed to addictive behaviors, a supportive
social environment is able to override a genetic ‘disadvantage’. Thus, social factors play an important
role. This particularly applies to socially marginalized groups, among whom a high prevalence of ad-
dictive disorders may lead to (misleading) conclusions that this high prevalence exists as a result of ge-
netic rather than societal factors. Preventive efforts should then focus on identifying socially–triggered
mechanisms of susceptibility.63 Furthermore, as the example of Bdnf illustrates, neurodevelopmen-
tal and epigenetic factors add further complexity, and are both strongly influenced by environmental
factors. Below, these processes are discussed in greater detail.
63Yet, this is not reflected in recent medicalized approaches, such as the development of nicotine vaccines and genetic
tests for nicotine addiction susceptibility. The ethical implications of these strategies, in relation to the evidence described
throughout this section, are discussed further in section 6.4.
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3.2.2 Early neurobiological development
Sections 3.1.4 and 3.1.5 have discussed how stress exposure, particularly in early childhood, can
render individuals more reactive to stress—and therefore addictions—in later life. However, it is
not yet clear from these discussions why this early time period is so crucial, how susceptibility is
conferred, and what policies should do about it. There is a general consensus among the public health
community that adolescence is a period of vulnerability to addiction, and that preventive efforts should
be focused on youth. However, early childhood is also an important—and sometimes overlooked—
developmental period, during which adverse experiences can significantly affect one’s vulnerability to
(tobacco) addiction in later life.
General effects of adverse childhood experiences
The significance of parental influence on mental development throughout childhood was first pointed
out some 45 years ago by Bowlby’s attachment theory.[273] Nowadays, the impacts of early adverse
childhood experiences (ACE) and insecure attachments are well–known: childhood neglect and abuse
reduce cognitive performance, impair social development,[274] and are associated with a 4–fold increase
in personality disorders.[275] ACE are also good predictors of later drug abuse. In California, for
example, it was estimated that ACE increase an individual’s risk of illicit drug use and addiction 7–10
fold, and account for an estimated 55–65% of all illicit drug addictions.[276] Further, ACE are not
uncommon: conservative estimates suggest that, in the United States alone, over 1 million children
are exposed to conditions of abuse or severe neglect, or not raised with the stimulation and presence
of a regular caregiver.[277] Therefore it is crucial to understand how ACE can affect neurobiological
development in ways that predispose individuals to addiction, the relevant implications, and how
policies should deal with these implications.
A substantial body of evidence already exists, and so far provides strong indications that a secure
attachment experience in early childhood is crucial for healthy socioaffective development. This, in
turn, protects children from developing addictions64 in later life. The first two years of life are especially
important, since 80% of human neurobiological development occurs between birth and age two, and
is extremely sensitive to external influence.[278] This section, then, focuses on neurodevelopmental
processes in the first two years of life, how socioaffective experiences can affect these in ways that later
predisposes the individual to addiction, and the ethical implications this has.
64As well as other psychiatric disorders that involve socioaffective dysregulation.
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Early neurodevelopmental processes
At birth, the human brain is a disorganized network of around 100 billion neurons. The brainstem,
responsible for vital functions such as breathing, is already fully developed at this stage and subcortical
regions such as the limbic system are partially developed. However, the cortex—which develops
last—is essentially a cluster of neurons at this point that still need to be myelinated, sent into the
correct location, and form synapses with other neurons (synaptogenesis).65 Synaptogenesis occurs at
an astounding rate in the infant brain: an estimated 1.8 million synapses per second.[211] This is
also a critical time period for synaptic pruning: the destruction of unused neuronal synapses.[279]
Thus, development of the human brain—particularly the cortex—is essentially postnatal, and highly
dependent on environmental stimulation, which bestows it with an exceptional capacity to adapt to
the outside world.
Early socioaffective experiences particularly influence the development of the OFC, a brain region
that plays a key role in addictive neurobiology. For example, as mentioned in section 3.1.2, the OFC
is important for connecting sensory signals to limbic drives, regulating social affect, and inhibiting the
stress response. It undergoes significant growth between the ages 10–18 months, during which it uses
information from the environment to calibrate inner emotional states. This information, as mentioned
in section 3.1.1, is often in the form of subtle or subconscious cues, such as facial expression, pupil
dilation, body language, or tone of voice.[280]
As such, infants are quite adept at sensing ‘hidden’ details about their caregiver’s feeling or attitude,
and will usually respond similarly.66[281] A genuine state of emotional arousal in the caregiver results in
a similar state of arousal in the infant; this type of interaction is considered “attuned”. This differs from
a misattuned interaction, in which the caregiver is proximally separated67 or not physically present. As
such, the infant relies largely on the environment, especially its mother figure, for ‘auxiliary control’ of
its inner affective state.[283] She does this by modulating the infant’s reactions in an attuned manner.
Initially, socioemotional behaviors are externally regulated, but become increasingly self–regulated as
the development of neurological controls, particularly the OFC, becomes more advanced.[284]
65Although this process is not complete until an individual reaches his/her mid 20’s, the most critical time period is
during the first two years of life.
66For example, when infants interact with female experimenters whose pupils are dilated (a sign of emotional arousal),
they are more relaxed than with those whose pupils are constricted: the infants smile more, and appear more at ease—see
[282].
67‘Proximal separation’ refers to an interaction in which the caregiver is physically present, but not emotionally
available to the child.
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The effects of misattuned interaction
The quality of the caregiver–infant interaction affects the infant’s brain chemistry.68 The more often
or intensely an emotional state is created, the more its neuronal pathways are enforced, which in turn
affects functional circuits. Brain EEG scans of infants of mothers with depression, for example, found
that their brains were significantly different to the brains of infants whose mothers were healthy: at
3–6 months age, electrical patterns were similar to those found in chronically depressed adults.[285] In
another study, similar patterns were found in even younger infants (1 month old), and this reflected
differences in their behavior, such as inertia and crying less.[286] Thus, the neurological and behav-
ioral effects of misattuned interactions with the primary caregiver are apparent from a very young
age, and can lead to psychological and behavioral imbalances similar to those observed in physical
separation.[287]
Early social interactions also affect the development of stress pathways.69 As mentioned in section
3.1.5, early stressful experiences can shunt development of the hippocampus and frontal cortex, which
leads to poor inhibition of the HPA stress axis and inner affective states. A poor attachment experience
can also affect the development of the EOS, which in turn impairs its ability to mediate feedback
inhibition over the HPA axis. The importance of these pathways in addiction has been emphasized
in previous sections (sections 3.1.4 and 3.1.5). Hence, stress on the child–parent relationship, even
if the parent is physically present, can predispose the child to addiction. As such, neurobiological
predispositions to addiction may already be present in individuals before drug use is initiated.
In infants, another important trigger for these predispositions is isolation. Social deprivation, from
a young age, results in reduced dopamine levels in mesocortical circuits that connect the VTA to
the PFC,[288] significant reductions of dopaminergic neurons in the VTA, highly abnormal chemical
patterns in monoaminergic innervation of various cortical and subcortical areas,[289] and increased
HPA (stress) activity.[290] Similarly to the brain in addiction (see section 3.1), the brains of Romanian
adoptees who have been exposed to severe neglect have lower volumes of white and grey matter, as
well as increased amygdala volumes,[291] decreased activity in the PFC and hippocampus,[292] and
difficulties in forming emotional attachment to adoptive caregivers.[293] Postnatal maternal separation
also increases a child’s stress reactivity,70 which, in turn, contributes to addiction vulnerability.
68Mechanisms may involve mediators such as BDNF which, as mentioned in section 3.2.1, is a stress–sensitive neu-
rotrophin important for the development and plasticity of neurons.
69More specifically, they modulate the productions of the stress hormone CRF, β–endorphin, and glucocorticoid
receptors in the frontal cortex—see [212].
70More specifically, this is associated with reduced GR expression in the hypothalamus and hippocampus, and regional
changes in CRH receptor expression—see [294, 295].
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Policy implications
Put together, all of the functional and structural neurological abnormalities observed in those who,
during early childhood, experienced abuse, neglect, or proximal separation from their primary care-
giver, closely match the neurobiological features of addiction described in section 3.1. One important
observation is that these can occur when a child and caregiver are only proximally separated.71 In
other words, a parent does not have to be abusive for these neurobiological predispositions to develop;
subjecting the parent to stress or other hardship may be sufficient. At this point, it should be noted
that not all children who are abused, neglected, or proximally separated from their caregiver will
develop a predisposition to addiction. These events, however, increase the likelihood, and there are
neurobiological mechanisms underlying this likelihood.
What does this mean for policies that aim to prevent addictions? As discussed in chapter 2, a
concern in tobacco control is that certain groups of people—typically those at a social disadvantage—
are more predisposed to addiction. It is generally accepted that policies should focus their preventive
efforts on these groups; less obvious, however, is how this should be done. The evidence discussed
throughout this section suggests that social stressors72 that affect the child–caregiver relationship can
influence the neurobiological development of the child in a way that predisposes him/her to addiction
later in life. The implication, then, is that preventive efforts should focus on parents with young
children by, for example, providing support structures that enable parents to provide a better quality
of care to their children.73
3.2.3 Epigenetic processes
Epigenetics consists of the heritable, potentially reversible, and environmentally–sensitive processes
that influence gene expression without altering the DNA sequence. It allows the integration of intrinsic
and environmental signals within the genome, in order to facilitate the individual’s adaptation to
environmental change, and for these integrated signals to be passed on to offspring.
Epigenetic research shows that environmental impacts throughout life—from the prenatal period
into adulthood—affect an individual’s epigenome, and that these epigenomic patterns may be passed
onto offspring. The epigenome responds readily to the effects of drug use (including tobacco use),
and to socioemotional impacts—such as stress, abuse, and neglect—that can predispose to drug use.
71For instance, cases in which a parent is caring for the child but suffers from stress or depression.
72For example, social determinants of health such as a low education level, limited job opportunities, lack of social
support, or a low income.
73This point will be further developed in chapter 5, in light of further evidence—presented in chapter 4—on the social
structures and conditions that are associated with addiction vulnerability.
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Epigenetic findings are well–replicated, with mechanistic details relatively well–characterized in animal
models. However, it is still unclear whether the epigenetic events of addiction in humans are causal, or
merely associative.[256] The aim of this section is to briefly discuss epigenetic mechanisms relevant to
addiction, and how this research relates to other mechanisms of susceptibility and the neurobiological
mechanisms of stress.
Epigenetic mechanisms
Epigenetic modifications occur at the molecular level via three main mechanisms. (1) Histone modi-
fications: DNA is stored around a core of histone proteins. For DNA expression to occur, the DNA
must unwind from the histones to allow access to transcriptional apparatus. Epigenetic processes can
chemically modify histone proteins to affect their structure and binding to DNA. Histone acetyla-
tion opens the histone structure to allow gene transcription, and other modifications, such as histone
methylation, are generally associated with silencing of the gene by closing the histone structure. (2)
Methylation: The direct methylation of cytidine–guanosine DNA nucleotides (CpG islands), usually
located within the gene’s promoter sequence, effectively silences gene expression. (3) Micro–RNA:
Small non–coding RNAs (microRNA) can exert post–transcriptional effects that affect the final gene
product.[296]
The effects of maternal care
In rats, variations in the quality of maternal care affect the offspring’s epigenome and its neuroen-
docrinal response to stress. Offspring that received higher levels of maternal care have an overall lower
stress reactivity.74 These differences emerge in the offsprings’ first week of life (infancy), and persist
into adulthood, but are reversible if, for example, rat pups receiving low quality care are cross–fostered
to a mother giving high quality care.[241]
Similar results have also been reported in humans. Babies exposed to maternal stress or depres-
sion in the third trimester of pregnancy have higher cortisol levels than those who are not. This
is associated with increased methylation of hippocampal GR promoters, which blocks binding of the
transcription factor NGFI–A.[298] Furthermore, a postmortem study in depressed suicide patients also
found hypermethylations at the hippocampal GR promoter, but only in those who had suffered abuse
and neglect. Those who had not experienced abuse or neglect, or who were only suffering from ma-
74More specifically, they have reduced levels of the stress hormones ACTH and CRH, and increased expression of
hippocampal GR, which enhances hippocampal inhibitory feedback on the HPA axis—see [297]. These effects are
associated with epigenomic changes in hippocampal GR DNA: methylation patterns at the GR promoter, and histone
acetylation, are both altered to facilitate binding of the transcription factor NGFI–A to the promoter—see [241].
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jor depression, did not have epigenetic markings in their hippocampus.[299] The epigenetic effects of
stress on hippocampal function and structure are relevant to addiction; as mentioned in section 3.1.1,
cognitive, affectively neutral neuroplasticies in the hippocampus inhibit cue–driven, hot processes in
the amygdala, and hippocampal GR/MR inhibit the HPA stress axis. Thus, epigenetically–driven
impairments of hippocampal function, triggered by stress exposure, may indirectly contribute to the
neurobiological features often observed in addiction.
The effects of drug use and social stressors
There are also a number of epigenetic modifications that are directly linked to drug use. Prolonged
drug use induces epigenetic changes in brain regions involved in reward, such as the NAc. These
occur in various genes whose products are involved in a range of functions, such as neural maturation
and function,75 cell signalling,76 or epigenetic mechanisms.77[256] Otherwise, among others, epigenetic
changes triggered by drug use have been identified in genes encoding the µ–opioid receptor (OPRM1 ),
and precursors of the opioid dynorphin peptide (PDYN ).[256] The MAOA gene, for which variation
in the genetic sequence are linked to aggressive behaviors and substance abuse (see section 3.2.1), is
also subject to epigenetic variations (methylations) within its promoter sequence, and these variations
are associated with alcohol and nicotine dependence in women.[300]
Bdnf provides an example of a gene that is epigenetically regulated, imprinted, and environmen-
tally sensitive. As mentioned in section 3.2.1, its product, BDNF, is a neurotrophin that plays an
important role in the formation of neuroplasticities in reward pathways. Drug use itself can affect Bdnf
expression: cocaine use, for example, increases the expression of BDNF in the NAc, and levels remain
elevated even after withdrawal.[301] This in turn affects drug–seeking behavior: increased levels of
BDNF in the NAc appears to trigger drug–seeking behaviors and relapse.[302] This may reflect en-
forced neuroplasticities, laid down by BDNF, that favour drug–seeking behaviors and the production
of drug–related cues.
Social stressors not necessarily related to drug use can also affect Bdnf expression. In rodents,
stressors such as social defeat decrease hippocampal BDNF expression; this is associated with increased
histone methylations (silencing) at the Bdnf promoter.[303] Social stress and prolonged social isolation
also deacetylate the Bdnf promoter, which corresponds to reduced expressions of BDNF within the
NAc.[304] Similarly, daily exposure to abusive social interactions silences BDNF expression in the PFC,
75For example Cdk5, Bdnf, SNCA, and NGF.
76For example FosB and c–fos.
77For example HDAC–5 (histone deacetylase) and MeCP2 (methyl CpG binding protein).
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through methylation of the Bdnf promoter. These effects appear to be transgenerational, as these
rodents are abusive towards their own offspring, which in turn also show increased methylations of the
Bdnf promoter in their PFC and hippocampus. These effects were not reversible by cross–fostering
the pups to non–abusive mothers.[305] Thus, stress–triggered, imprinted silencing patterns on the
Bdnf gene may limit the brain’s capacity to produce synapses in regions such as the hippocampus
and PFC, that would otherwise inhibit subcortical processes; which further contributes towards the
neurobiological changes often observed in addictions.
Summary
The epigenetic modification of genes implicated in addiction and related neurological functions may
be brought on by prolonged drug use, or prior life events such as early stress exposure. Both of these
can contribute to the neurobiological features of addiction described throughout section 3.1. The
example of Bdnf illustrates how a single gene may be subject to all these processes, and how they
are imprinted to offspring. Thus, epigenetic mechanisms, in addition to genetic processes, provide
another explanation for the familial nature of addiction, and appear to complement the findings and
arguments described in section 3.2.2: that socioaffective experiences in early childhood can have
sustained biological impacts that predispose the individual to addiction in later life, and that policies
should take these into account. Epigenetic research also adds another layer of complexity to genetic
research, because it indicates that a predisposition to addiction may involve genetic processes, but
that they are not necessarily hardwired.
3.2.4 Neurological development in adolescence
As discussed in chapter 2, tobacco use—as well as the use of other psychoactive drugs—is usually
initiated in adolescence, during which it is strongly associated with a faster conversion to dependence
and a higher addiction severity.[306] Early drug use also predicts the use of other drugs; for example,
early smoking that leads to the sequential involvement of alcohol, cannabis, and other illicit drugs.[307]
Adolescence is also a time typically associated with high levels of risk–taking and sensation–seeking
behaviors, and an increased emphasis on peer relationships.[308] It is thought that this has a sur-
vival function, to facilitate family–independent exploration of the environment in preparation for
adulthood.[309] However, this could also encourage adolescents to engage in potentially destructive
peer–related behaviors, such as smoking. Indeed, the most common reasons for smoking initiation are
peer pressure, curiosity and novelty–seeking.[310]
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It is thought, then, that adolescents are neurobiologically vulnerable to developing addiction. Ado-
lescence is also a time when incidences of various psychiatric disorders78 increase;[311] the peak age of
onset for any mental health disorder has been estimated at 14 years, and an estimated 75% of psychi-
atric disorders develop by age 24.[312] Mechanisms of susceptibility in adolescents, as for infants, seem
to be related to the developmental schedule of the brain. Neurodevelopment is not uniform: different
functional structures have their critical growth periods at different times. The PFC is a late–maturing
region, and is not fully developed until individuals are approximately 25 years old.[313] Measures
of prefrontal function79 improve significantly during adolescence and early adulthood, and these im-
provements are accompanied with significant changes in the activity, neuroanatomical structure, and
functions of the PFC.[314] Good prefrontal function is, as discussed in section 3.1.2, important for the
inhibition of addictive drives.
Development of the frontal cortex
During adolescence, the volume of prefrontal grey matter declines,[315] whereas white matter density
increases steadily in the frontal cortex until it reaches its maximum volume when individuals are in
their mid 20’s.[316] This increase in white matter is associated with increases in prefrontal activity
between ages 7–22,[317] and increased myelination of neurons which helps to facilitate and strengthen
neuronal signals.[318] Myelination at this stage seems to be especially important in neurons involved in
the communication between cortical and subcortical brain regions. A further neuroanatomical process
significant in adolescence is the localized pruning of synapses within prefrontal areas.[319, 320, 321]
In other words, adolescence is a time when prefrontal functions are organized, strengthened, and
connected to subcortical structures. Since prefrontal function is the seat of ‘free won’t’, the capacity
to exercise self–control over one’s behaviors is still developing until early adulthood (age 25) is reached.
In adolescence, neurobiological changes in addictive reward circuitry are also observed. In rat
brains, significant pruning of dopamine receptors takes place in the striatum during adolescence.[322]
Adolescent rat brains also show rapid developments in the connections between the ACC80 and the
amygdala, marked by significant fibral growths into the ACC, which suggests that adolescence is a
period during which integration of the affective and inhibitive processes is enhanced.[323] Key to this
integration is also a proper development of the OFC. However, the OFC appears to follow a late
developmental schedule in adolescence, since its activity in adolescents is relatively low, matching
78Such as anxiety, mood disorders, eating disorders, personality disorders, and substance abuse.
79Such as tasks that test skills in complex problem solving, working memory, abstract and logical thinking.
80Rats have no ACC; ‘rat ACC’ refers to the medial PFC, which is the rat equivalent—in terms of function—to the
human ACC.
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that of children more than adults. This is accompanied with exaggerated activity in the NAc,[324]
which together suggests that adolescents have not yet fully developed their prefrontal capacity to veto
affect–driven behaviors, as a result of the relatively slow maturation of the OFC. These observations
are highly relevant to addiction, because efficient connections are needed from subcortical to cortical
regions, particularly the OFC, for the inhibition of affect–driven, impulsive behaviors, and these
connections are typically impaired in addiction.
Effects on behavior
It is thought that the neurofunctional characteristics of adolescent brains contribute to age–specific
adolescent behaviors, and their heightened susceptibility to problematic drug use.[309] Performance
on the Iowa Gambling Task,81 for example, improves significantly with age, which suggests that the
capacity to inhibit risky, irrational behaviors is not complete until adulthood.[325, 326] Outside the
clinical context, adolescents are the age group most likely to engage in behaviors such as dangerous
driving, unprotected sex, and substance abuse.[327] This, to some extent, could be due to psychosocial
factors. However, the above also suggests that adolescent behaviors are influenced by neurobiological
development, in a way that predisposes them to affect–driven behaviors.
Consequently, they are more susceptible to peer pressure, and more likely to experiment with drug
use; and since their cognitive, prefrontal capacities are not fully developed, they are prone to these
behaviors despite having some presumed awareness of the risks.[328, 329] The effects of prolonged
drug use on the prefrontal cortex (described throughout section 3.1) may further impair cognitive
capacity, which could explain, to some extent, why most initiations take place in adolescents and why
most addictions develop before prefrontal development is complete. Therefore adolescents—as well as
young adults under age 25—are especially susceptible to smoking initiation and developing addictions
to tobacco. The implication is that preventive efforts should be focused not just on adolescents, but
also on young adults aged below 25.
The effects of stress
Adolescents may also be more susceptible to the effects of stress,82 due to hormonal fluctuations
that occur during adolescence. While this link is poorly understood, and likely to be complex and
reciprocal,[311] it is possible that sex hormones affect the levels of hormones involved in the stress
81A gambling exercise that tests risk–taking behavior. Most people select cards from the ‘good deck’; exceptions are
people with prefrontal damage, substance abuse problems, or high self–reported levels of risk–taking.
82The effects of stress, in turn, influence addictive neurobiology; see section 3.1.5.
91
response.83 The capacity to cope with stress is also significant for adolescents, and predicts later drug
use.84 As indicated previously (in sections 3.1.5 and 3.2.3), the ability to regulate the stress response
may be compromised if persistently exposed to stress from a young age.85 Studies on adolescent
rats also note that feedback inhibitory systems on the HPA stress axis are not fully developed until
adulthood.[341] Given the important relationship between stress and addiction, a heightened predispo-
sition to stress in adolescence may, among other factors, contribute to the development of addictions.
The implication is that, in order to protect adolescents from smoking initiation and addiction, they
may need extra support in dealing with stressors in their social environment.
Policy implications
There is an important link between adolescent age and a heightened susceptibility to smoking ini-
tiation and developing addiction, that is reflected on both neurobiological and psychosocial levels.
Psychosocially, adolescence is an introduction to the adult world, peer affiliations, and novel stimuli.
Neurobiologically, adolescence is a critical developmental period for the PFC, which means that, as
in addiction, stress– and affect–driven responses are not properly inhibited. It was also mentioned
that the brain, in both adolescence and (adulthood) addiction, is characterized by a lack of connec-
tions between prefrontal and limbic regions, and impaired or under–developed prefrontal function.
These findings support the maturation hypothesis, and partially explain why most onsets of addic-
tions, as well as other psychiatric disorders, occur before neurobiological maturation is completed at
approximately age 25.
What are the implications of these points for tobacco control policies? First, adolescents are not yet
fully autonomous; their prefrontal capacity to exercise an autonomous, informed decision to smoke is
still developing. It is important to allow this capacity to develop properly, since not doing so effectively
undermines the potential of adolescents to become fully autonomous. Interventions that promote
future autonomy by restricting tobacco, then, are not a violation of freedom because adolescents are
not yet fully autonomous. Second, the importance of protecting adolescents from smoking initiation
is already widely recognized by the public health community. Nevertheless, evidence in this section
indicates that people should be protected from smoking initiation (and subsequent addictions) until
83This could explain why some studies have observed sex–specific responses to social stressors. Rat females exposed
to social stress, for example, react more persistently than males, and as a result also develop a heightened sensitivity to
drugs such as nicotine and amphetamine—see [331, 332, 333].
84For example, after peer pressure and novelty–seeking, the most significant predictor of adolescent alcohol use was
found to be the self–perceived level of stress—see [334].
85Six longitudinal studies on alcohol use, for example, followed individuals from birth through to the late 40’s and found
that adversities such as low socioeconomic status, poor family relations, and poor academic performance in childhood
and adolescence predicted adult alcohol use patterns—see [335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340] .
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age 25, when prefrontal development is complete. In other words, there is an argument for extending
current restrictions, such as a minimum age for tobacco sales law (currently 18 years in most places)
to people aged below 25.
Third, given the strong association between ACE and addiction, adolescents from socially disad-
vantaged backgrounds may be dually predisposed to addiction: as a result of age and social hardship.
Such adolescents may require extra support. Fourth, given the relational nature of smoking initiation,
peer–based interventions may be particularly useful in preventing smoking initiation and encouraging
cessation among adolescents and young adults.86
3.2.5 A summary of addiction susceptibility
The social environment is important: all mechanisms of susceptibility discussed throughout this
section—genetics, epigenetics, and neurobiological development—are sensitive to environmental fac-
tors. Variants in genes such as MAOA and SLC6A4 show phenotypic effects only when social factors
such as community support or childhood abuse are taken into account; epigenetic mechanisms are
highly sensitive to conditions such as stress; and neurological development is significantly influenced
by early socioaffective experiences, in particular the quality of the child–caregiver relationship. More-
over, the role of hard–wired genetic factors in conferring a susceptibility to nicotine addiction appears
limited, particularly when weighed up against socially–influenced processes. Thus, interventions such
as the genetic tests for nicotine addiction—introduced in section 2.2.3—are unlikely to have much
potential as a reliable preventive strategy.87
Although not everyone who is exposed to adverse experiences will eventually develop an addiction,
evidence throughout this section has shown that it increases the likelihood, and that there are multiple
biological mechanisms underlying this likelihood. Supporting this view, it is also generally agreed that
social factors—such as socioeconomic status, social relationships, ACE, and the availability of drugs—
play an important role in addiction susceptibility. In the context of tobacco addiction (as well as other
drug addictions), it is generally agreed that the groups most affected by addictions also tend to be
affected by social disadvantage. Furthermore, as mentioned in chapter 2, the importance of addressing
social determinants of health and issues of social injustice has also been recognized in public health
ethics.
The information presented throughout this section builds on these arguments by showing how
social disadvantage can confer a neurobiological vulnerability to addiction by acting on neurobiological
86These points are discussed further in chapter 5.
87An ethical analysis of this intervention is provided in section 6.4.
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circuits involved in the stress response, emotional regulation, and social attachment. This offers an
important clue for policies: the importance of autonomy–promoting social environments and attuned
child–caregiver relationships. It was also shown that this, in part, requires that parents are in a
good state of mental wellbeing. This point, then, is especially relevant to parents with mental illness,
or parents who lack adequate support from family or the community. There are also more severe
scenarios, such as child abuse, that are likely to have more serious impacts on child development. For
tobacco control policies, this means that the interconnections between tobacco use and wider issues,
such as ACE, should be recognized.88 This section, then, adds further strength to the arguments
that autonomy in addiction is relational, since development of the ability to avoid addictive behaviors
partly depends on relational and social factors. State interventions, then, should aim to maximize
positive freedom by creating autonomy–promoting conditions. In other words, relational autonomy,
positive freedom, and social justice are important concepts to be considered in the ethical framework
of this thesis.
This section has also emphasized the importance of protecting adolescents as well as young adults
below age 25 from smoking initiation and addiction. As discussed in section 2.3, measures that
protect the best interests of children—who are not yet fully capable of making sound judgements—are
relatively uncontroversial. However, many adolescents, and certainly most young adults aged 18–25
years, are generally considered capable of exercising rational decisions. Nevertheless, the evidence
presented throughout section 3.2.4 suggests that, at least in the context of tobacco use, this ability
is not yet fully developed; furthermore, it may be diminished if smoking initiation occurs before age
25 as a result of the psychoactive effects of nicotine. There is therefore an argument for extending
current protections for children and young adults aged below 25.
Put together, this section has highlighted some important considerations for the ethical framework
regarding the issue of addiction vulnerability. However, it is still unclear what the social factors or
processes that predispose youth and socially disadvantaged people to addiction are. These factors
are, according to the evidence presented so far, related to issues such as ACE, stress, dysphoria, and
misattuned social relationships. There are social processes that contribute to these problems, and
they are an important target for policies; they should be identified and incorporated into the ethical
framework. In particular, it is unclear what exactly constitutes ‘social disadvantage’: is it related
to economic hardship, or are the underlying issues more complex than that? Why are some racial
88This could be done, for example, by integrating tobacco control efforts into programmes that aim to deal with
ACE, or focusing preventive efforts on groups of children and adolescents who have been affected by ACE or other
hardship—more discussion in chapter 5.
94
groups—such as Natives—more affected by addictions than others, and how should policies address
these issues? It is necessary, then, to elucidate the types of social disadvantage that are associated
with addiction.
There are other factors that have contributed in important ways to the vulnerability of certain
groups. Notably, the TI has targeted socially disadvantaged groups and children in their marketing
efforts, which has contributed to an increased smoking prevalence among these groups. How ‘addiction’
is perceived also affects patterns of tobacco use and tobacco control policies. It is thus necessary to
build on the information presented so far by looking more closely at the social contexts in which
tobacco use and addiction developed, ways in which social perceptions on addiction have influenced




The social context and the tobacco
industry
The aim of this chapter is to look at the wider social and commercial contexts of tobacco use and
addiction: the social contexts in which addictions to tobacco—and addictions more generally—develop;
ways in which social perceptions of addiction can change and influence policies; and the marketing
strategies of the tobacco industry (TI) that have contributed to the current situation. Together, this
information broadens and contextualizes what has been presented so far. For example, it has been
argued in chapters 2 and 3 that tobacco use presents a serious and ongoing public health crisis, is highly
addictive for most, and that addiction significantly impairs one’s ability to avoid using tobacco. Why,
then, is smoking defended by the TI as a ‘freely chosen’ activity, and what are the social contexts
within which the TI has succeeded in propagating this argument? The same point applies to the
idea that smoking relieves stress: this argument persists, although evidence in chapter 3 indicates
otherwise. Further, what are the social factors that make youth and some socially disadvantaged
groups more predisposed to addiction than others, and how has the TI been involved in increasing
their vulnerability?
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.1 looks at the wider social contexts in which
addictions to psychoactive drugs have developed, how this can affect socially disadvantaged groups,
and how this influences the perception and treatment of addictions. Section 4.2 looks at the evolution
of moralistic drug policies and their implications. Sections 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 describe the marketing
and research activities of the TI and how this influences social perceptions, research, and policies on
tobacco. Implications of these discussions are summarized in section 4.6.
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4.1 The social context of addiction
Early drug use
The use of psychoactive drugs is not new; it has a history that is thought to date back at least
8,000 years.[342] Tobacco, marijuana, coca,1 and opium2 were consumed by local settlers in areas
where they were first grown, long before their discovery by Europeans. Back then, drug use was
socially unproblematic, often used in rituals, and perceived as harmless or fashionable.[343] Opium
was introduced to Europe in the form of laudanum, a medicinal tincture, in the 16th century; coca and
marijuana in the 19th century.[344] Tobacco was brought into Europe in the 16th century, although the
modern cigarette was not developed until the late 19th century.[38] Meanwhile, alcohol was already a
popular local brew in many world regions, and consumed as a staple or recreational drug.[343]
Early disease views of addiction
Although drunkenness was common, the term ‘addiction’ was not substance–related and carried no
negative connotation; it simply referred to an intense devotion comparable to voluntary servitude,
such as to the family or religious practice.[34] Perceptions on drug use—particularly alcohol—began
to change, however, in the early 19th century. Frequently inebriated people, termed ‘drunkards’, started
to describe their desire for alcohol as ‘overpowering’ or ‘irresistible’.[345] This raised early questions
of volition regarding the use of alcohol, that are still reflected in modern debates. The prevailing
perception—that ‘drunkards’ simply had an intense affection towards drinking and inebriation—was
challenged by individuals such as the doctor Benjamin Rush. Rush described the phenomenon as an
‘addiction’ to alcohol, that developed gradually and progressively, similarly to many diseases; except
that this disease affected the will.[346]
Although inebriation was viewed as sinful, the overall view on ‘addicts’, at least in the beginning,
was sympathetic. Consequently, they were not coerced into therapy or criminalized; instead, early
drug regulations appeared in the form of ‘temperance movements’.[345] These movements were based
on Rush’s disease conception of alcoholism: that the substance, in some people, caused an ‘addic-
tion’ disease; that abstinence was the solution; and that people should be sympathetic to chronic
inebriates.[346] Temperance movements focused mostly on alcohol, but also other drugs, including
tobacco.[347]
1Precursor of cocaine and its alternative forms, e.g. ‘crack’ cocaine.
2Early form of an opioid drug. More recent opioids include heroin, morphine, and synthetic analogues such as codeine
and methadone.
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Reasons for the paradigm shift
Throughout the 19th century there had been an important paradigm shift: ‘addiction’ changed from
a devotion into a disease, and policy shifted from tolerance to temperance. Several factors may
have contributed to this. Technological developments, for example, had increased the potency and
availability of drugs. In the case of tobacco, two important 19th century developments in the production
process gave birth to the modern cigarette. The first was flue–curing, a drying process that makes
tobacco milder, more acidic, and therefore more inhalable. This in turn allows nicotine to be delivered
deeply into the lungs, which makes cigarettes more addictive. The second was the Bonsack machine,
which allowed the automated production of cigarettes on a mass scale.[39]
Such technological ‘improvements’, along with developments in transportation methods, explain to
some extent why drug availability and consumption increased. However, it does not necessarily explain
why some people started to relate differently to these drugs. Alcohol, for example, was consumed
for centuries before world trade opened up, and has changed little in terms of its pharmacological
properties; yet only became significantly ‘addictive’ around the 19th century. In line with current
social patterns of addictive drug use (its concentration among socially disadvantaged groups), certain
forms of drug use also became associated with distinct groups of people. Changes in social life therefore
offer an important explanation as to why ‘addiction’ became a ‘disease’.
Social transformation
Throughout the 19th century, important social transformations took place as a consequence of the
Industrial Revolution, which, originating in the UK, lasted from the end of the 18th century into the
19th century. The Revolution brought significant improvements in technology–led mass and efficient
manufacturing methods, the establishment of a free market ideology, and rapid, undirected growth
in national material welfare. Land was expropriated on a scale unlike anytime before; labour was
reduced to a market value (hours paid for salary); countrysides were overwhelmingly industrialized
and urbanized, and people from rural communities, seeking work, moved into urban dwellings while
others emigrated abroad.3[348]
It is generally understood that this resulted in the severe dislocation of people’s lives, as cultures
and communities evolved and sometimes annihilated, and social thought predominantly orientated
itself towards more individualistic, materially driven pursuits.[34] However, human beings are inher-
3Although there were other reasons for migrating at that time, it may be reasonably concluded that overseas employ-
ment was one of them.
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ently relational,4 and so our values are largely rooted in social life: protecting one’s social standing
and relationships.[348] The social transformations that resulted from industrialization required people
to become more self–interested, and more self–sufficient, which forced them to detach from traditional
community life and find new ways to cope with mounting social pressures.[34] Thus, it has been argued
that material growth came with inevitable consequences that resulted from a mass–scale destruction
of collective and cultural identities: demoralization, crime, social perversion, and a stronger tendency
towards ‘vice–like’ behaviors such as drunkenness.5[348]
By then it had become clear that, for some people, the relationship to alcohol or other drugs had
changed from a positive pleasure into a dependency. This could have been partly because of changes
in how drug use became labeled and perceived, and partly because of increased social pressures. The
latter has led to ideas that addiction is, more generally, a coping strategy for individuals against
dislocation from their sociocultural origin, one another, and themselves, and primarily the result of a
modern free–market society that is continuously camping its members against one another in a ‘rat
race’ pursuit towards economic progress.[34] This construal of addiction, termed the ‘social dislocation
theory of addiction’, also ties in closely with the self–medication hypothesis of addiction.6
The effects of social dislocation
Predictably, drug use became more problematic among the most dislocated groups, for whom the fail-
ure to establish emotional or financial self–sustenance became too much. Alcoholism, for example, was
associated with the urban poor, while opium addictions were prevalent among Chinese immigrants
in America who were socially marginalized from the mainstream and subjected to harsh working
conditions.[343] Such patterns continue to this day: data from epidemiological surveys[349, 350] and
ethnographic studies[351, 352] repeatedly indicate that drug addictions are concentrated in areas with
severe socioeconomic deprivation, social injustice, crime, and scarce social opportunities. Consistent
observations across various cultures also support this idea. The colonization and dismantling of in-
digenous cultures have led to escalated incidences of aggressive violence and substance abuse among
these communities. Problematic drug use, particularly alcoholism, is a significant issue among, for
example, Native Canadians[353] and New Zealand’s Maori.[354]
4The neurobiological evidence in chapter 3 attests to this; for example, the healthy emotional development of infants
depends largely on attuned relationships with a primary caregiver.
5What constitutes a ‘vice’ is subjective and in part depends on cultural and social factors. In this context, however,
repeated drunkenness—resembling alcoholism—was considered a vice.
6The self–medication hypothesis was introduced in section 3.1.1. It holds that addiction is a coping strategy against
dysphoric or uncomfortable states of mind, brought about by life within a stressful or oppressive environment. It is
discussed and critiqued at length in section 5.1.3.
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One may argue that these effects are not a result of social dislocation, but economic hardship.7
However, there are numerous examples in which economic hardship has not resulted in addictions,
or in which economic revival has been ineffective.[34] The Nushuaua Innu of Canada, for example,
were moved from their shanty town to Natuashish, an attractive, well–funded town carved into the
wilderness, following a national scandal.8 It was thought that an economic revival would correct drug
abuse, violence, and problematic drinking among the Nushuaua Innu, but it did not: problems with
drug and alcohol addiction, unemployment, child abuse, and violence continued, among an estimated
70% of the community.[355, 356] Programmes that foster cultural revival, however, have been more
successful.9 The Canadian Shushwap community of Alkali Lake, for example, had a cultural revival
and sobriety programme that decreased the rates of alcoholism from 90% to 5% within ten years.[357]
Therefore, as in the words of economist Karl Polanyi, it may be argued that:
“. . . almost invariably economic inferiority will make the weaker yield, but the immediate
cause of his undoing is not for that reason economic; it lies in the lethal injury to the
institutions in which his social existence is embodied. The result is loss of self–respect
and standards, whether the unit is a people or a class, whether the process springs from
so–called culture conflict or from a change in the position of a class within the confines of
a society.”(pg.164, [348])
Polanyi’s argument implies two things: that addictions were in part triggered by a loss of self–
respect and standards, and that these were largely a result of social injustice. Put together with
the neurobiological evidence discussed in chapter 3, this suggests that social dislocation is a source
of emotional stress and dysphoria, which can affect neurobiological functions and development in
a way that predisposes individuals to addictions. This may be conferred through changes in the
stress response, emotional development, or neuroplastic changes within dopaminergic reward pathways
or the endorphin–opioid system (EOS). Particularly, individuals raised from an early age in such
environments are more likely to develop addictions as a result of neurodevelopmental predispositions
conferred during early childhood, which explains why addictions tend to persist over generations
within the same social clusters.[34] Hence the social institutions that contribute to stress or other
dysphoria—such as those outlined here—are in part responsible for addictions.10
7It has also been argued that there are genetic reasons behind this, but these claims are most likely inaccurate—see
section 3.2.1.
8A videotape surfaced of six Nushuaua Innu children sniffing gasoline fumes, screaming they wanted to die.
9This by no means implies that tobacco control movements should absolve the TI and instead focus solely on reviving
indigenous cultures. The point is that sociocultural dislocation seems to contribute in important ways to the development
of addiction, and should be one of the issues—along with issues related to TI activity—that should be addressed.
10Other factors, such as the TI, are also responsible—see sections 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5.
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As a consequence of these social changes, a contradiction had evolved: a social attitude that
encouraged the seeking of external pleasures, but only selectively towards morally ‘worthwhile’ or
socially valued pursuits. Thus, the pursuits of money, work, property, and other such commodities
became a way of life, while socially undesirable ‘vices’ became increasingly sinful. This is where
perceptions on addictive drugs departed into increasingly moralized temperance movements, even
though their use was actually propagated by social transformations at that time.
4.2 Moralistic perceptions and policies
Towards the end of the 19th century, the increasing popularity of potentially addictive drugs, including
tobacco, started to represent a social crisis associated with unproductivity, crime, and moral decay,
especially among racial minorities and people in low socioeconomic strata.[38, 358, 359] The paradigm
shifted accordingly: ‘addiction’, formerly a disease, became seen as an immoral and stigmatized choice,
a view now known as the ‘moral choice’ theory of addiction.11 Accordingly, policies shifted from
temperance movements towards prohibition: drug regulations became increasingly punitive towards
and throughout the 20th century, and tended to intensify at a time when there was conflict between
a minority group and the mainstream.[359]
Policy response
Throughout the 20th century, states started regulating and banning the sales of marijuana, cocaine,
heroin, morphine, alcohol, and tobacco. In the case of tobacco, some states had banned tobacco sales to
minors, while others had banned them completely. Cessation clinics opened up, and social movements
opposed smoking in public places.[38] These were sometimes based on human rights rhetoric: the
right of non–smokers to be free from the nuisance of second–hand smoke (SHS).12 [360, 361] However,
tobacco later escaped these regulations.13 Similarly, a ban on alcohol could not be sustained,14 and
so both drugs remain legally available to this day. In contrast, marijuana, cocaine, morphine, heroin,
and many subsequent ‘designer drugs’, such as LSD, MDMA (Ecstasy), and amphetamine, were
11Moral choice theories of addiction assume that addictive behaviors are freely chosen and socially unacceptable; the
appropriate solution, then, is to deter drug use by enforcing the perception that it is immoral. These theories are
discussed and critiqued in greater detail in section 5.1.
12Back then, little was known on the negative health impacts of SHS exposure, and so SHS–related harm referred more
to moral harm. Nowadays, arguments that oppose SHS exposure tend to focus on the adverse health effects caused by
SHS, described in section 2.1.1.
13For reasons related mostly to TI activity, explained in sections 4.3 and 4.4.
14The USA, for example, passed the 18th Amendment in 1920 which banned alcohol sales. However, the result was an
illegal trade in poor quality alcohol, which often resulted in methanol poisoning, and so the law was repealed 12 years
later—see [343].
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prohibited through increasingly strict policies that criminalized drug users and exaggerated facts
about the dangers of drugs.[359]
As of now, most drug policies15 are in line with three international conventions under the United
Nations (UN): the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs;[362] the 1971 Convention on Psy-
chotropic Substances;[363] and the 1988 Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances.[364] Together, they aim to achieve global co–operation in limiting the pro-
duction, trade, and possession of addictive drugs, and preventing the abuse of addictive medicines.
In most countries, possession or trade of drugs covered by the conventions are illegal, and punished
with severe penalties such as lengthy imprisonments, and—in some cases—death penalties. Although
the conventions do not necessarily endorse such heavy sentencing, a strong moralistic echo remains in
their language. For example, the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs states that:
“. . . addiction to narcotic drugs constitutes a serious evil for the individual and is fraught
with social and economic danger to mankind . . . ”(own emphasis, preamble, [362])
This is a stark contrast to the language used in the World Health Organization Framework Con-
vention for Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC) treaty, which reflects human rights and public health
principles (see section 2.2.1). This most likely reflects the moralistic views on addiction that prevailed
at the time. This portrayal has repeatedly been disputed by critics of the stigmatization and punish-
ment of drug users, critics of a “War on Drugs”,16 and proponents of a more sympathetic treatment
of addicted individuals based on harm reduction, medical therapy, and/or social reform.
Issues with moralistic policies
There are good grounds for criticizing punitive anti–drug policies: there is little evidence that they
work, yet plenty of evidence that they bring significant negative impacts onto society and the lives
of illicit drug users.17 Most notably, punitive policies are often stigmatizing to addicted drug users,
which results in their marginalization from society and treatment services. Stigma also tends to put
guilt and stress on addicted individuals; these negative emotional states are, in turn, likely to worsen
the addiction. Arguments in chapter 3 strongly supports this idea, since neurobiological evidence
15For most prototypical drugs of abuse except alcohol and tobacco.
16The “War on Drugs” is an anti–drug campaign that started in the USA but has since spread to other countries.
Its aim is to suppress illegal drug trade and use, and comprises strict prohibitions on drug use, traffic and production,
military intervention, the incarceration of drug users and traffickers, and media campaigns focused on discouraging drug
use. One famous example is a 1980’s campaign in which drug users were advised to “Just Say No” to drugs.
17A full critique of punitive approaches to drug policy, such as the War on Drugs, is beyond the scope of this thesis—see
[31].
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indicates that stress and other dysphoric states of mind are important triggers for the onset or relapse
of addictive drug use. In other words, a moralistic policy that stigmatizes addicted drug users is
like to be counterproductive; this is an important point that should be considered in tobacco control
policies.18
Therefore the view that drug use is a “serious evil” is not an appropriate ethical basis for policy,
which should be based on public health principles, such as promoting the social conditions and options
that support a healthy lifestyle. Nevertheless, punitive anti–drug policies continue to dominate in
many countries, and the moral choice theory of addiction remains a highly criticized, though not–yet–
dormant description of addiction. Tobacco addiction, however, has managed to escape this portrayal;19
in large part as a result of the marketing activities of the TI.
4.3 Marketing strategies of the tobacco industry
Although tobacco was one of the drugs targeted by temperance movements and early prohibitions,
it escaped legislation and departed from most other addictive drugs to become a socially accepted,
legal product.20 This is not because tobacco is significantly less harmful than these drugs;21 this was
mostly a result of the persistent marketing tactics of the TI that took place within a modern culture
that was increasingly embracing consumerism, freedom, and materialistic pleasure.22
Early tobacco promotions
At the start of the 20th century, the USA’s TI, which is where most modern TI has its origin, was
reorganized into an oligopoly that would eventually consist of five major stakeholders: Philip Morris,
the American Tobacco Company, R.J. Reynolds, Liggett & Myers, and Lorillard. At this point,
cigarettes could be produced on a mass scale, and were already quite addictive because of the flue–
curing process.23 The companies, vying for market share, used aggressive promotional strategies for
their cigarette brands that were usually targeted at non–smokers, particularly youth, women, and the
18This is particularly relevant for measures that aim to denormalize tobacco, since they can stigmatize smokers. An
ethical analysis of this approach is provided in section 6.1.
19For the most part; although this has not yet happened to a similar scale with tobacco, it is notable that the
stigmatization of smokers, particularly those in socially disadvantaged groups, is becoming a problem in recent attempts
to denormalize tobacco. See section 6.1 for further discussion.
20This initially took place in developed regions such as North America and Western Europe; however, a similar pattern
of spread has now occurred in developing countries, particularly those in Asia.
21As argued in section 2.1.2, the harms of tobacco compared to other drugs (including illicit drugs such as heroin and
cocaine), in terms of chronic harm, addictiveness, and social costs related to healthcare expenditure, are significant.
22It was also, in part, because data showing the causal link between smoking and chronic diseases was not yet widely
available. However, as argued below, the TI was also largely responsible for this.
23A process that makes tobacco more inhalable and therefore more addictive—see section 4.1.
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military.24[38]
Consequently, during World War I (1914–1918), there was a marked increase in tobacco business.
Cigarettes were supplied to men drafted into the military, and became increasingly popular as their
pharmacological effect25 gave a temporary relief from the stresses of the War. As 19th century sensibil-
ities became increasingly sympathetic to the hardship of soldiers, cigarettes became viewed as a source
of comfort, and to regulate their use was increasingly viewed as petty and harsh.[38] As illustrated by
a 1919 opinion piece:
“As for the poor fellows lying mangled in shell holes or in field and evacuation hospitals,
with life slowly ebbing away from a body soon to become dreamless dust—who would be
heartless enough to “prohibit” this last and only solace?”[365]
The pressures propagated by social transformations, that had started in the previous century
(see section 4.1) and continued into the 20th century, may have also made the soothing properties of
nicotine in cigarettes especially popular. This was noted as early as 1889:
“. . . there is an ever increasing subjection to the influence of this narcotic, whose sooth-
ing powers are requisitioned to counteract the evil effects of the worry, overpressure and
exhaustion which characterize the age in which we live.”[366]
The TI, aware of this, promoted cigarettes as a viable source of stress relief. As a higher smoking
prevalence was noticed among people with comorbid mental illness and the socially marginalized, the
TI started targeting the homeless, the mentally ill, and war veterans who had used cigarettes during
their service.26 The TI’s reasons for targeting these groups was because they were considered more
‘impressionable’;[367] more openly, however, they propagated the ideas that mentally ill or socially
marginalized people benefit from using cigarettes as a form of self–medication, that they are unable
or unwilling to quit, and that quitting smoking is a low priority for them. Hence it is plausible
that the TI are—to some extent—responsible for propagating tobacco–related health inequalities that
result from social injustice, and for spreading misinformation regarding the ostensible stress–relieving
effects of smoking. Even though research[368]—including the evidence presented in chapter 3—proves
24The reason these groups were targeted is because, at that time, they were considered more vulnerable. People in
the military were often exposed to highly stressful circumstances, while women were starting to become more liberated.
Accordingly, cigarettes could be marketed as symbols of relaxation and female liberation. Youth were—and still are—
targeted because they are more prone to developing addictions.
25Through the reinforcing properties of nicotine—see section 3.1 for a more detailed description.
26The TI would target these groups by, for example, supplying free cigarettes and making claims that smoking helps
to relieve stress—see [367].
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otherwise, and people are generally rated as more highly stressed when they smoke,[369] stress relief
is still commonly cited as a reason for smoking.
Consequently, military troops and aid workers returned from the War, addicted to cigarettes. There
was little knowledge on the long–term harms of smoking, and tobacco did not cause intoxication, so it
was increasingly viewed as a harmless pastime. More and more people took it up, and those that did
remained loyal clientele to the TI (mostly because of nicotine addiction). A similar pattern occurred
during World War II (1939–1945); most likely because of intensified marketing activities by the TI
during this time, and the stresses caused by the War.[39]
Smoking normalization
As cigarettes became increasingly popular, widespread, and more intensively marketed by tobacco
companies, they started to symbolize ‘modern’ values such as consumerist freedom and pleasure amidst
the stresses of everyday life. Women, as they gained more independence, were heavily targeted by
tobacco promotions. Consequently, smoking also became a symbol of feminist independence, glamour,
and sex appeal.
Largely because of the normalization27 efforts by the TI, smoking had become ubiquitous in the
developed world by the 1930’s. Consumption had risen enormously: in the USA, for example, it
had increased from an annual 50 cigarettes per adult (1880) to almost 1,000 in 1930,[38] and by 1964,
42% of American adults were smokers.[1] Cigarettes symbolized leisure, sociability, attractiveness, and
freedom, while brand choice became an assertion of individuality and social status. This symbolism
is still echoed in ‘liberal theories of addiction’.28 Cigarettes were intensively promoted on TV, on
billboards, in printed media, and in sports events. Movie placements were also common: film stars
such as Sylvester Stallone, Clint Eastwood and Sean Connery were paid to smoke in movies,[39]
and in 1987–1988 alone, Philip Morris provided free tobacco–related props to 56 movies.[370] Such
advertising was, and remains, extremely effective; epidemiologists have suggested that around half of
smoking initiations are because of movie placements.[371] Hence the TI have played a major role in
the normative shaping of smoking as a social activity, which in turn has led into a major public health
crisis.29
27‘Normalization’ in this context refers to smoking normalization, the process by which smoking becomes perceived as
a normal and socially accepted activity.
28Liberal theories of addiction assume that addictive behaviors are freely chosen; hence they are similar in this sense
to non–addictive behaviors, and should not be considered socially unacceptable on the basis that they are ‘addictive’.
These theories are critiqued in section 5.1.1.
29Normalization efforts by the TI are currently minimized by measures that restrict tobacco advertising, promotions,
and sponsorships (TAPS), or that denormalize smoking (e.g. smokefree laws). These approaches, which in part aim to
change the social connotations of smoking, are discussed further in section 6.1.
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Tobacco promotions to children
Furthermore, there is equivocal evidence from internal TI documents,30 academic studies, and the TI’s
marketing campaigns that the TI was promoting cigarettes to children as young as 13 years old.[372]
Internal documents are littered with memos indicating these intentions. For example, in a 1957 TI
memo:
“Hitting the youth can be more efficient even though the cost to reach them is higher,
because they are willing to experiment, they have more influence over others in their age
group than they will later in life, and they are far more loyal to their starting brand.”(pg.77,
[373])
The TI was also aware, from at least the late 1960’s, that smoking represents a rite of passage into
adulthood which is then sustained through nicotine addiction.31 A 1969 memo from Philip Morris is
illustrative:
“A cigarette for the beginner is a symbolic act. I am no longer my mother’s child, I’m
tough, I am an adventurer . . . As the force from the psychological symbolism subsides, the
pharmacological effect takes over to sustain the habit.”(pg.3–4, [374])
In the 1980’s, R.J. Reynolds launched a campaign for its Camel cigarette brand, featuring a cartoon
camel character named Joe Camel.[375] This was clearly a children’s campaign, and a highly successful
one at that; a 1991 US study found that Joe Camel had reached 30% of children as young as three
years old, and that most children (91%) aged six recognized Joe Camel as much as they recognized
Mickey Mouse, and associated Joe Camel with cigarettes.[376] Meanwhile, R.J. Reynolds publicly
claimed that:
“We don’t want young people to smoke. And we’re running ads aimed specifically at young
people advising them that we think smoking is strictly for adults . . . Kids just don’t pay
attention to cigarette ads, and that’s exactly as it should be.”[377]
However, it is clear that these TI–sponsored ‘anti–smoking campaigns’, by telling teenagers that
“smoking is for adults”, were actually reinforcing smoking as a symbol of adulthood, and were therefore
30In 1998, a lawsuit against the TI forced the release of over 40 million previously confidential industry documents
onto the internet. They are now available for all to see at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/. These, along with an excellent
literature on the subject,[38, 39, 373, 375, 370, 378] have successfully exposed the clandestine and corrupt activities of
the TI over the last eight decades.
31This rite of passage effect provides a justification for the tobacco free generation (TFG) proposal. More discussion
on this approach in section 6.2.
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an indirect advertising strategy to encourage youth smoking.[375] Sports sponsorships were also a
popular and highly effective marketing strategy, that particularly influenced children, even though
the TI openly claimed that such sponsorships were targeted to adult smokers.[379, 380] The ethical
implication that is in turn presented is that children need to be especially protected from tobacco
use and the deceptive marketing practices of the TI. This issue is ongoing and important, since—as
discussed in section 2.1.1—smoking initiation is limited almost exclusively to children, and many of
these initiations are in response to peer pressure, TI activity, and the positive social connotations
associated with smoking.32
Ongoing challenges
As a result of these promotional activities, the TI has gained an enormous amount of financial and
political power. Nowadays, global TI revenue is estimated at half a trillion US dollars annually,33 which
is similar in size to the gross domestic product of Poland, Sweden, Venezuela, or Saudi Arabia.[8] The
implication is that it is very difficult to overcome TI–funded resistance to effective tobacco control
policies. Over the last six decades, as evidence surfaced about the negative health effects of smoking,
public health efforts have attempted to reduce smoking prevalence, regulate tobacco sales, and restrict
the influence of the TI. However, the TI has relentlessly fought these efforts, often through covert
tactics, such as refuting scientific evidence demonstrating the harms of tobacco, influencing scientific
research, and falsely appealing to notions of freedom and human rights in public discourse.
In what follows (sections 4.4 and 4.5), some of the covert ‘scientific’ activities of the TI are de-
scribed, and ways in which these activities continue to create ethical considerations for the development
of tobacco control policies.
4.4 Tobacco industry–funded science and debate
The TI has been funding scientific research since 1953: first through the Tobacco Industry Research
Council, later the Council for Tobacco Research and Center for Indoor Air Research,[381] and in
more recent times through more indirect means, such as universities,[382] or independent research
organizations such as the non-profit Life Sciences Research Office or the Institute for Science and
Health. While such institutions have declared independence from TI bias, their panel members tend
32The importance of protecting children is increasingly recognized in more recent policy approaches, such as tobacco
harm reduction, tobacco denormalization strategies, or the TFG proposal. Implications of these strategies are discussed
in chapter 6.
33These sales are coming from virtually all countries and regions in the world; however, notable contributors include
China, Russia, and Eastern Europe.
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to be funded directly by the TI or are selected and approved by the TI, thus creating a conflict of
interest.[383] TI–funded research was ostensibly set up in order to “cooperate closely with those whose
task it is to safeguard the public health”.[384] Yet, it was—and remains—essentially part of a public
relations strategy that ultimately aims to protect the TI’s financial and political interests.
Early TI–independent evidence of the association between cigarette smoking and lung cancer sur-
faced in the 1950’s.[385] The TI publicly denied this evidence,[384] while secretly accepting it;[39]
meanwhile, the TI’s own research demonstrated that cigarettes cause lung cancer, other chronic dis-
eases, and addiction.[375] These results were suppressed in favour of more benign findings, and did not
surface until the 1990’s as a result of legal proceedings.[39] From the 1970’s, the TI also understood the
health problems posed on non–smokers by SHS.[370] However, as independent evidence accumulated
that SHS was harmful and causal of lung cancer in non–smokers,[386, 387] the TI more openly denied
this and looked for ways to protect its reputation.
A ‘safe cigarette’
In the 1950’s, the TI began the search for a ‘safe cigarette’ that would deliver low tar (carcinogen)
levels, but a high nicotine level to sustain addiction (and therefore tobacco sales). Such a cigarette
is technically impossible to develop; so instead, the TI sought ways in which cigarette design could
be altered to give an illusion of safety. Inhalation was made easier by adding bronchial dilators and
creating menthol cigarette varieties. Ammonia was added to freebase nicotine, thus creating a stronger
nicotine ‘hit’ at lower concentrations.[39] Filters and ventilation holes were added, ostensibly to lower
the amount of harmful constituents inhaled, and tar and nicotine levels were reduced in so–called
‘light’ cigarettes. However, the net result was that smokers compensated by covering the ventilation
holes,[388] and inhaling harder to obtain more nicotine. This forces carcinogenic particles into deeper
parts of the lung; the cancers that result are more difficult to detect and treat.[39]
In other words, due to the TI’s ill–founded efforts to reassure smokers, cigarettes have become, if
anything, deadlier than before. Lung cancer risk has actually risen for smokers—tenfold in men, and
double in women—between 1959 and 2010.[1] The ethical implication is that a lack of transparency
and regulation on the design of tobacco products has intensified the public health problem. The TI
understood all along that ‘safe cigarette’ developments were futile; however, the goal was simply to
increase delusory confidence in its products. As a 1971 industry memo illustrates:
“The question as to whether such cigarettes are really safer does not matter . . . even our
Health people wonder whether low tar and nicotine cigarettes are a good idea.”[389]
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In a more recent context, but in a similar fashion, the TI has started developing a number of
‘alternative’ products to cigarettes, most notably electronic nicotine delivery systems (ENDS). Based
on the negative experience with ‘safe cigarettes’, many tobacco control advocates are concerned that
ENDS will weaken effective tobacco control policies or even worsen the public health situation, for the
same reasons as before: a lack of transparency, insufficient regulation on design, and the ill intentions
of the TI.34
Confounding variables
Otherwise, TI–funded scientific research was primarily focused on ‘confounding variables’, such as
diet, genetic factors, and stress, that could undermine research showing a link between smoking
and addiction or chronic disease. Numerous “Special Projects” were set up, in which scientists and
academics were recruited to publish TI–friendly research, stimulate pro–tobacco debates, protect the
TI in litigations, and promote the ostensible benefits of tobacco; all in ways that showed minimal TI
involvement. As such, recipients of TI funding were instructed not to disclose that their research was
mainly for litigation purposes, and payments were often made indirectly so that academics could avoid
disclosing their involvement with the TI.[390]
The TI was aware, for example, that nicotine addiction could be more strongly sustained through
stress or discomfort,[391] and so the TI recruited Hans Selye, a prominent physiologist, to promote
cigarettes as a suitable source of stress relief. Selye, during his career, wrote 1700 articles, 39 books,
was nominated for the Nobel Prize 10 times, and became renowned as the ‘father’ of stress research.
However, his work was also used in lawsuits against the TI, and to argue against the causal link
between smoking and chronic diseases. Essentially, the theory he helped to promote was that stress
causes chronic disease, and smoking is a suitable self–medication against stress (and therefore risk
of chronic disease). Selye’s research was also used to trivialize the addictiveness of nicotine, arguing
instead that smoking is sustained through stress.[392]
The evidence presented in chapter 3 shows that, indeed, there is an important neurobiological
connection between smoking and stress. This is also reflected in trends that show an increased smoking
prevalence during times of war and other social hardship (see section 4.3). However, research on this
connection has been misinterpreted by the TI, Selye’s research, and the common (mis)conception that
smoking is an effective source of stress relief. As chapter 3 shows, it is not; smoking can provide
a temporary stress relief during intoxication, but otherwise actually raises overall stress levels. In
34However, they may also forward public health goals by providing a less harmful alternative to those who are unable
or unwilling to quit using nicotine products—ethical discussion is provided in section 6.3.
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other words, people often smoke in an attempt to relieve stress; but the idea that smoking is an
effective means of doing so is a common misconception that has been propagated by the TI and its
beneficiaries. Policies, then, should aim to address this misconception, and other misinterpreted lines
of evidence—such as genetic research35—that may be used to absolve the TI.
‘Free choice’ arguments
Another common argument propagated by the TI is that smoking is a pleasurable, freely chosen
activity and is therefore an exercise of liberty. The TI, however, has been aware of the addictiveness
of nicotine since at least the 1970’s. The TI was also aware that it could undermine the argument
that smoking is a ‘free choice’. As illustrated in a 1973 TI memo:
“To some extent the argument revolving around “free choice” is being negated on the
grounds of addiction. The threat is that this argument will increase significantly and lead
to further restrictions on product specifications and greater danger in litigation.”[393]
To a large extent, the TI was correct; neurobiological evidence in section 3.1 demonstrates that
addiction significantly undermines autonomy, thus making it more difficult for tobacco–addicted in-
dividuals to avoid using tobacco. In other words, the TI’s ‘free choice’ argument does not hold.
Consequently, there are actually good grounds for stricter regulations on tobacco, based on its addic-
tiveness.36
To circumvent these, the TI paid academics to write about tobacco in ways that made it look
comparable to other legal substances such as tea, coffee, chocolate, and alcohol, in order to trivialize the
addictiveness and health risks of tobacco, and to emphasize cigarette smoking as a claim to ‘freedom’
or as enhancing quality (as opposed to quantity)37 of life.[169] Attempts to regulate cigarette smoking
for the purpose of protecting public health were then painted as an unreasonable intrusion on personal
liberty, or a slippery slope38 towards banning tea, coffee, chocolate, and alcohol.[170] This reversed the
argument: tobacco, instead of being correctly viewed as an addictive, autonomy–undermining product,
was construed as a consumer choice. The concept of ‘freedom’ was thereby narrowed,39 as pro–liberty
35Further discussion in section 4.5.
36These are discussed in light of ethical concepts and theories in chapter 5.
37In the beginning, the TI did not even publicly acknowledge that smoking reduces the quantity of life. However,
as evidence for the causal link between smoking and lung cancer became more conclusive, the TI started to rely more
on arguments that smoking improves the quality of life by enhancing pleasure and relaxation. However, these claims
are—according to the neurobiological evidence presented in chapter 3—also weak.
38‘Slippery slope’ refers to the argument that the rationale behind regulating tobacco will result in similar regulations
for other unhealthy products. However, this argument holds little merit—further discussion in chapter 5.
39In section 2.3, two types of freedom were described: positive and negative. The narrowing of the concept of ‘freedom’
by the TI was into its negative sense.
111
arguments were used to argue for a minimal state, rather than for interventions that would protect or
promote autonomy. Consequently, most pro–liberty arguments in the context of tobacco tend to be
associated with minimal tobacco restrictions, even though—due to the addictiveness of tobacco—this
is inaccurate; having an option to smoke actually limits freedom if it results in an addiction, and for
most smokers this is indeed the case.
Pro–tobacco human rights arguments
As discussed in section 2.3.4, the TI has also applied liberty claims into human rights debates in order
to promote a ‘right to smoke’. The TI became especially interested in human rights arguments in the
1970’s, when it became clear that SHS was posing a serious health threat to non–smokers. Knowing
that this could result in smoking restrictions in public places, the TI set up a number of smokers’
rights groups in order to oppose such restrictions.[375] While these groups were argued to promote
‘freedom of choice’, they were in fact, in the words of British American Tobacco:
“a more direct public relations/political campaign . . . primarily based on protecting the
rights of smokers.”[394]
Yet it seems that these rights, rather than being applied universally, were in fact intended for
subsets of people to whom cigarettes could be more easily marketed. In the words of a R.J. Reynolds
executive:
“We just reserve the right to smoke for the young, the poor, the black and the stupid.”[395]
In other words, TI–funded human rights arguments were, broadly speaking, a framing tool to
build support for pro–tobacco social movements that would resist effective tobacco control policies.
It is unlikely that these arguments have any theoretical rigour, since they are essentially based on
the conjecture that smoking is a freely chosen activity that can be translated into a liberty right.
However, as argued above (and in chapter 3), addictive smoking is not freely chosen, and therefore not
an exercise of liberty; even if it were, it is doubtful—given the serious and widespread health impacts
associated with smoking—that it could be translated into a liberty right.40
40Further discussion on these points is provided in section 5.2.3.
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4.5 Tobacco industry–funded genetic research
The TI has, in recent years, also turned its attention to genetic research. Scientific interest in the
genetics of (tobacco) addiction has—as discussed in sections 2.2.3 and 3.2.1—occurred in a context of
improved scientific research methods such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), positron
emission tomography (PET), and genetic sequencing. However, it was also argued—in section 3.2.1—
that, due to the limited evidence that supports the role of genetic factors in (tobacco) addiction, it is
unlikely that genetic factors have a significant role in predicting susceptibility, and that genetic tests
for nicotine addiction are unlikely to have much potential as a preventive tool. However, the TI has
been investing significantly in such research, which—as with other TI–funded research—is ethically
problematic.
Tobacco industry investment in genetic research
A significant proportion, if not the majority of recent TI–funded work, is focused on genetics. Be-
tween 1990 and 1995, for example, 52% of British American Tobacco’s research budget was directed
towards genetic research, most of which focused on genetic susceptibilities to lung cancer, pharmaco-
genetics, and behavioral (addiction) genetics.[396] Other tobacco companies, such as Philip Morris,
have sponsored universities such as Virginia Commonwealth University to carry out work related to
pharmacogenetics and behavioral genetics.[39] As with most other TI–funded work, TI involvement in
this research has rarely been disclosed, and results have been subject to a strong interpretation bias,
as contrasting evidence (showing no genetic involvement) is trivialized or ignored, and results showing
the significance of a genetic factor are exaggerated, unrepresentative, or—in some cases—false.[396]
Implications of tobacco industry–funded genetic research
Why should the TI have such a keen interest in showing the relevance of genetic factors in lung
cancer or addiction? As discussed in section 4.4, the TI has been involved for decades in researching
‘confounding variables’ that may distort evidence demonstrating a link between smoking and addiction
or chronic disease.41 Similarly, genetic factors may be used to obscure the facts, by arguing that
genetics play a more important role in triggering tobacco addiction than other factors, such as the
social environment, TI marketing activities, or the nicotine in tobacco. Subsequently, focus could be
shifted from these factors onto a set of ‘susceptible individuals’, to whom prevention and treatment
41They have explored this previously in, for example, the context of stress—see section 4.4.
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strategies are targeted. Meanwhile, those at a lower risk would be left alone.42 These intents are well
illustrated in a 1996 memo from a public relations firm to Philip Morris:
“A simple test might eventually be devised to tell a smoker whether or not he is at risk.
This would put the burden of any consequence from smoking on the individual, and would
clear the way for the non–susceptible population to smoke with a clear conscience.”[397]
Moreover, genetic research could protect the TI in litigations, by arguing that nicotine addiction
is ‘genetic’, and so only a minority of smokers are ‘addicted’ while the rest smoke out of choice.
Similarly, the TI may argue that smokers who developed chronic diseases, such as lung cancer, did
so because of genetic reasons. Genetic research could also be fed into popular media, to create the
perception that smoking–related diseases are genetic vulnerabilities rather than caused by smoking
tobacco per se, and solutions to these diseases are rooted in genetic rather than public health–based
interventions. TI–funded academics have already made claims in popular media that genetic tests
will eventually become available to smokers, to determine those who will develop lung cancer from
those who will not.[398] This, in turn, may compromise the success of (or compliance to) otherwise
effective tobacco control policies that are based on reducing the overall consumption and availability
of tobacco.43 Thus it is important for policies to correct any misperceptions that a susceptibility to
nicotine addiction is ‘genetic’; focus should be kept on more complex social and relational factors that
confer susceptibility,44 and on measures that restrict the overall availability and use of tobacco.
The medicalization of addiction
Genetic research on nicotine addiction—which may be funded by the TI—also contributes to the ge-
neticization of addiction, and medicalized views such as ‘brain disease’ theories of addiction.[27] In such
conceptualizations, caution should be taken not to exclude social determinants that have important
influences on addictive behaviors.45 Nevertheless, brain disease theories have gained popularity in re-
cent years, as evidenced by their adaptation into recent clinical definitions of addiction. The National
42However, it is evident from the discussions in section 3.2.1 that it would be misleading to conclude that a susceptibility
to nicotine addiction is genetic, because there are other, socially–influenced processes involved that policies should focus
on.
43I have also co–discussed this point in a recent paper. It was argued that TI–funded genetic research is not in the
public interests; therefore it should not be permitted access to public resources—such as biobanks—that are secured for
the public interest. See [399].
44These factors were discussed at length in section 3.2, and in terms of social processes in section 4.1.
45Brain disease theories of addiction argue that addictive drugs ‘hijack’ the brain’s dopamine circuitry, which results
in a cue–directed, predominantly automated bias towards drug–seeking behavior, and loss of behavioral control which
impairs the drug user’s ability to resist drugs. In section 3.1, it was argued that this presents too simplistic an account
of addiction. Brain disease theories of addiction are discussed and critiqued at length in section 5.1.2.
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Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), for example, states that: “addiction is a chronic, often relapsing
brain disease that causes compulsive drug seeking and use.”[257] Similarly, the American Society for
Addiction Medicine (ASAM) defines addiction as: “a primary, chronic, neurobiological disease, with
genetic, psychosocial, and environmental factors influencing its development and manifestations.”[400]
It was also mentioned in section 3.2.1 that, according to NIDA and DSM–5, roughly 50% of suscepti-
bility to addiction is attributable to genetics. NIDA, for example, has stated that:
“A person’s genetic makeup plays an important role in his or her addiction vulnerability
and, possibly, in the decision to take drugs in the first place. Research shows that approx-
imately 50 percent of the predisposition to addiction can be attributed to genetics.”[401]
The implications of these definitions, as well as a geneticized approach to selecting susceptible
individuals, is that they neglect the wider social context,46 or may undermine effective policies based
on a psychosocial approach.47 These definitions may also influence how addictions are perceived,
prevented, and treated.48 The idea that neurological processes determine addictive behaviors could
support neuro–essentialism: the view that human behaviors, thoughts, and emotions are essentially
a result of neurological activity. The belief that neurological processes are ‘hijacked’ by drugs has
led to arguments that addicted individuals are not autonomous. However, the neurobiological evi-
dence discussed throughout chapter 3 shows that these views are inaccurate. A heavily medicalized
or neuro–essentialist approach, such as that advocated by some brain disease theorists, also tends
to support genetic determinism—the view that human health and behavior are predetermined by an
individual’s genetics—and a genetic–based approach to predicting and preventing addiction.[21] How-
ever, as argued, this would not only be inaccurate, but it would also give scope for the TI to absolve
itself from its marketing and research practices. Thus it is important for policies to avoid a too heavy
medicalized or geneticized view of (tobacco) addiction, and to maintain focus on the research and
implementation of psychosocial approaches to treating and preventing addiction.49
46Such as the destruction of the social and cultural identities of some indigenous groups, discussed in section 4.1.
47A psychosocial approach involves identifying and addressing the social factors that propagate addictions e.g. poor
family dynamics, employment status, ACE, social opportunities, and social welfare structures.
48As the discussions above show, this has also been the case with other theories of addiction: moral choice theories,
liberal theories, and the self–medication hypothesis of addiction.
49This does not necessarily imply that all medicalized interventions should be outruled; some interventions, such as
the nicotine vaccine, may have potential within a psychosocial treatment approach—see discussion in section 6.4.
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4.6 Summary
The effects of social hardship
This chapter has built on arguments made in preceding chapters by illustrating the social processes
that policies should pay attention to. In chapter 2 it was mentioned that socially disadvantaged groups
such as racial minorities, people in low socioeconomic strata, and the mentally ill tend to suffer more
from addiction, while chapter 3 showed the neurobiological relationship between stress/dysphoria and
addiction. This chapter, by providing a sociohistorical context of (tobacco) addiction, has discussed
the types of social disadvantage that underlie addiction and ways in which these have been exploited
by the TI.
In general, it is hardship of a social or relational—rather than economic—nature that results in
a loss of self–respect and standards; this contributes to the stress, dysphoria, and other negative
states of mind that trigger and sustain addictions.50 The implication for policies, then, is that focus
should be shifted onto the social processes that contribute to this hardship, and support should be
provided to those most affected. Principles such as relational autonomy, relational solidarity, and
social justice51 are important in this respect, as their emphasis is on a relational approach to public
health: understanding the importance of relationships and the community in promoting good health.
More specifically, it was argued that indigenous groups have been severely dislocated from their
societies and cultural identities as a result of colonization or other social change. Reinstating or recog-
nizing these and building better support networks for indigenous groups is therefore a necessary com-
ponent of policies that aim to minimize addiction (including tobacco addiction) among these groups.
A similar principle applies to other marginalized groups who have been exposed to social hardship and
who, similarly, have responded with high incidences of addiction. It was also argued that moralistic
approaches to addiction are ineffective; people should be supported—not socially pressurized—into
non–addiction. This should be done using a relational approach, by appealing to support from the
community and important relationships such as family, friends, or a partner.
The relationship between social context, addiction theory, and policy
It is also clear that there is an important relationship between social context, how people relate to
the use of a psychoactive substance, and how this is perceived by society. Social perceptions in turn
50Economic hardship may contribute to these. However, it is not the necessary and only factor which explains why not
all groups living in poverty suffer disproportionately from addictions, though many socioeconomically deprived groups
tend to have higher incidences of illicit drug use, alcoholism, and smoking.
51These principles were introduced in section 2.3.3; for a definition of these principles, see page 51.
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influence policies; this, in turn, reflects the importance of having an appropriate conceptual basis on
which to build a policy. For instance, when an important social transformation occurs—such as the
dismantling of a culture—pressure is put on affected individuals, which increases the tendency to relate
differently to the use of a psychoactive drug. This special relationship to drug use—‘addiction’—may
be perceived by a society in various ways. If perceived as a self–medication or a disease of the will,
the result is a relatively sympathetic approach: the former focused on psychosocial intervention, and
the latter on medical treatment. If perceived as a social pest, the result is a moralized approach and
the further marginalization of addicted drug users. If perceived as a pleasurable pursuit in line with
modern, consumerist values, there is a tendency to justify the use of certain drugs for the purpose of
‘recreation’.
Normative perceptions of addiction more generally have also undergone various shifts. The earliest
views on addiction described in section 4.1—that addiction is a devotion to a pursuit, and is not socially
problematic—is similar to the more recent ‘liberal’ theories of addiction, in which addictive drug use
is described as a pursuit of pleasure. In this view, addictive behaviors are not compulsive, and should
not be stigmatized, since they are comparable to other pleasurable, freely chosen activities such as
eating chocolate. Regulations are then considered as unethical intrusions on freedom and liberty
rights. Although there is an element of pleasure in many addictions, liberal theories of addiction do
not capture other important elements of the disorder (such as its effects on autonomy, described in
chapter 3); the implication is that effective policies are undermined, addictions remain untreated, and
the wider issues ignored.
Ideas that followed in early temperance movements—Rush’s disease conception—are echoed in
more recent ‘brain disease’ theories of addiction. Both views tend to describe addictive behaviors
as arising not from character weakness but from a disease that affects the will, and so they tend to
promote a sense of sympathy towards addicted drug users. The main difference between these theo-
ries is that modern brain disease theories draw on neurobiological and genetic research, and advocate
for the treatment of addictions using medical therapies (rather than abstinence alone). Otherwise,
‘moral choice’ theories of addiction, that have dominated drug policies throughout the 20th century
and beyond, tend to put a moral judgement on addictive behavior, which has led to a largely unsym-
pathetic, abstinence–based treatment of addictions. While neither of these theories have dominated
conceptions of tobacco addiction since the 1920’s, hints of them are starting to appear in tobacco con-
trol policies. Smoking cessation therapy, for example, is based largely on a medicalized approach;52
52Cessation therapies recommended in current policy frameworks—such as the WHO FCTC—include medicines such
as varenicline, bupropion, and approved nicotine replacement therapies (NRT)—see section 2.2.1.
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further medicalization may endorse strategies such as nicotine vaccines or genetic tests. There are also
moralistic undertones in recent ideas to denormalize tobacco.53 However, this approach may backfire
given the negative experiences with moralistic policies for illicit drugs outlined in section 4.2. Hence
focus should be maintained on a psychosocial approach as opposed to one heavily orientated towards
a moral choice or brain disease theory of addiction.54
Other theories of addiction mentioned (social dislocation theory and the self–medication hypothe-
sis) are also relevant to tobacco addiction. Since addictive smoking is a means of coping with dysphoria,
stress, or social dislocation, social circumstances have an important role in increasing an individual’s
susceptibility to developing addictions. The implication, then, is that solutions to preventing and treat-
ing tobacco addictions should be rooted in social change. However, the TI has used self–medication
hypotheses to justify smoking among mentally ill and homeless populations, and so care should be
taken to not use these theories as a means to justify smoking or to negate promoting social change.
Correct interpretation of the evidence, however, may actually forward public health goals.
Influence of the tobacco industry
The TI has had a major influence in shaping the current situation by playing on social contexts,55
influencing social perceptions,56 and changing how people relate to tobacco use.57 The TI, by keeping
its strategies as opaque as possible, has been able to influence public discourse, research, and the
acceptance of tobacco control policies. It also influenced ethical debates on tobacco, by portraying
smoking as an exercise of freedom and liberty rights, and tobacco regulations as undermining these.
Consequently, the TI is in large part responsible for the current public health situation described
in section 2.1: a vast number of tobacco–related diseases and mortalities, difficulties in overcoming
nicotine addiction, and problems associated with SHS exposure. Furthermore, because the TI took
advantage of the impressionability of specific groups (such as youth, people with comorbid mental
illness, and racial minorities), the TI is also largely responsible for tobacco–related health inequalities,
and the fact that smoking initiation occurs primarily among children. Thus, the TI has had a powerful
role not just in increasing smoking prevalence, but also in shaping how tobacco addiction has been
perceived, researched, prevented, and treated over the years.
53Tobacco denormalizing strategies were introduced in section 2.2.3; there are concerns that they lead to the stigma-
tization and social marginalization of smokers. These concerns are discussed further in section 6.1.
54I have also emphasized this point in [402]. It was argued that moral choice and brain disease theories of addiction
are inaccurate and ethically problematic descriptions of addiction, and so a psychosocial theory should be adopted.
55For example, by promoting cigarettes during times of hardship such as World War I.
56For example, by obfuscating evidence that cigarettes are harmful, propagating the misconceptions that habitual
smoking relieves stress or is freely chosen, or by normalizing smoking.
57For example, by increasing the addictive potential of cigarettes.
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This creates a number of implications for tobacco control policies. As mentioned in chapter 2, the
TI has an enormous amount of economic and political power which makes it a powerful adversary
to tobacco control efforts. Although it is practically difficult58 to dismantle the TI, it is possible to
regulate and expose the TI’s marketing and research activities. The regulation of TI activities already
forms an important part of policy frameworks such as the WHO FCTC. This includes measures such as
the banning of all direct and indirect TAPS and the establishment of procedures to ensure that policy
decisions are kept free from the domination of vested interests.[6] In recognizing the fundamental
incompatibility between the interests of health research and the interests of the TI, some research
institutes—such as NIDA and various universities—have restricted or banned TI–funded research.[399]
Therefore more can and should be done in regulating TI activity. States should ensure that bans on all
TAPS and policies to prevent TI lobbying in government and other policy–making sectors are better
implemented. There should also be stricter regulations on TI involvement in academia and research.
This may entail the banning of all research funded directly or indirectly by the TI, or at least very
stringent guidelines on the disclosure, publication, and public dissemination of research funded directly
or indirectly by the TI.
Due to the covert nature of the TI’s tactics, these regulations alone may not offer sufficient protec-
tion from TI activity. It is also important, then, to make policymakers, health researchers, academics,
and the general public more aware of the TI’s surreptitious activities so that they can be better pre-
pared to counteract them. This idea builds on from the principle of transparency,59 which refers to
how policy decisions are made: free from the domination of specific interests, and in a clear, account-
able manner. This principle should be built on to promote clear and accountable decision–making not
only by keeping policymakers’ decisions transparent, but also by establishing health communication
and education initiatives that go further in promoting awareness of the TI’s marketing and research
activities.
As such, there should be education programmes to expose the TI’s covert research tactics and to
correct misperceptions such as the ideas that smoking is an effective means to relieve stress, that ad-
dictive smoking is freely chosen, that predisposition to nicotine addiction is genetic, or that smoking
is an exercise of freedom and liberty rights. In targeting the general public, these education pro-
grammes should particularly focus on socially disadvantaged groups, who are targeted the most for
misinformation by the TI. It is also important to track and expose the TI’s involvement in research
58Or impossible—practical and economic analyses are beyond the scope of this thesis.
59This principle was introduced in section 2.3.3, and defined on page 50.
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developments such as nicotine vaccines, genetic tests, and cigarette alternatives,60 to make academics
and health researchers aware of how their work may be (mis)used by the TI, and to anticipate ways
in which the TI may use new information to counter effective tobacco control policies or to absolve
itself in legislations. It is also important to reverse the normalization efforts the TI has made over the
decades by normalizing non–smoking. These efforts should be targeted particularly to children, given
their vulnerability to TI marketing. In other words, dealing with challenges related to TI activity not
only requires regulating TI activity and keeping policy decisions transparent, but also exposing the
TI’s marketing and research strategies and tackling the social dimensions over which the TI has had
a strong influence in previous decades.
60Especially ENDS—see section 6.3.
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Chapter 5
An ethical framework for tobacco
control policy
The central aim of this thesis is to develop an ethical framework for tobacco control policy. As
argued in chapter 2, there are a number of ethical implications that may arise as a result of tobacco
control policies, including more recent strategies such as the tobacco–free generation (TFG) proposal,
tobacco harm reduction, tobacco denormalization, nicotine vaccines, and genetic tests. Addressing
these implications requires an ethical framework that is context–sensitive and that takes into account
relevant features of addiction. Preceding chapters have highlighted important features that should be
considered in the framework.
Arguments so far
Chapter 2 argued that the public health impacts of tobacco use are sufficiently serious to warrant
intervention. Thus, the goals of measures that aim to minimize overall smoking prevalence, protect
others from exposure to second–hand smoke (SHS), protect children from initiation, minimize tobacco–
related health inequalities, and help people overcome their addictions to tobacco are ethically justified.
These goals, then, should be incorporated into the ethical framework. The last two are related to ad-
diction; chapter 2 argued that this is a serious problem in the context of tobacco, since addiction
affects the majority of smokers, can seriously impair the ability to quit, and has a disproportionate
effect on socially disadvantaged people. It was also argued that it is important to have an accurate
conceptual account of addiction, because how addiction is conceptualized can have important—and
ethically problematic—results on how addiction is prevented and treated. For instance, if addicted in-
dividuals are considered non–autonomous, they may be subjected to coerced therapy; if their addictive
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behaviors are considered freely chosen, a laissez–faire policy or moralistic approach may result.
It was argued in chapter 3 that addiction is autonomy–undermining, in the sense that it can
seriously impair the ability to avoid using tobacco through neurobiological changes that occur in
dopaminergic pathways, the prefrontal cortex (PFC), and the endorphin–opioid system (EOS). Ad-
dictive behaviors are often motivated by emotional processes, and so emotional factors such as values,
desires, and relationships are an important aspect of addictive decision–making. They may also be
motivated by ideas that smoking relieves stress or is pleasurable; however, these do not contribute
to mental wellbeing due to homeostatic adaptations in dopaminergic reward pathways and the EOS.
Hence the argument that smoking is a source of pleasure or stress relief is a common misconception
that policies should aim to correct, and restrictions should not be offset based on these ‘benefits’. One
may argue, then, that some smokers prefer a transient sense of pleasure or relaxation, even if they are
aware it contributes to overall stress and dysphoria. However, chapter 3 argued that these preferences
are internalized through a non–autonomous process,1 and are often a source of cognitive dissonance.
Nevertheless, it is possible in addiction to resist tobacco use and to reverse neurobiological changes
by training the capacity for self–control and self–awareness. A supportive social environment can
bring out this capacity. An environment in which tobacco–related cues—such as tobacco industry
(TI) marketing (tobacco advertising, promotions, and sponsorships—TAPS) and smoking in public
places—are minimized reduces the triggering of cravings and relapse through dopaminergic reward
pathways, and can make it easier for smokers to quit. Stress is another important social trigger for
addiction through its effects on the EOS and dopaminergic pathways; minimizing the social factors
that trigger stress, and promoting supportive social relationships, are other ways in which addiction
and relapse can be prevented. The social environment is therefore autonomy–promoting or autonomy–
undermining; this in turn reflects the fact that autonomy in addiction is relational, and that society,
the TI, and the state have a responsibility to provide autonomy–promoting conditions.
Chapter 3 also looked at mechanisms of susceptibility. Genetic factors play a relatively minor role
in conferring a susceptibility to addiction; the social and relational environment, particularly in early
childhood, has more important effects. More specifically, it was argued that proper development of
neurobiological functions, particularly the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), requires an attuned interaction
between infants and their primary caregiver; an insecure attachment experience can disrupt this
development, which can predispose the child to developing an addiction later in life.
1Through a process termed ‘internalized preference formation’, introduced in section 2.3. It often involves the con-
ditioning of subconscious tobacco–related cues through dopaminergic reward pathways that, upon exposure, can trigger
strong cravings for tobacco use.
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This in turn reflects the importance of social support systems aimed at parents with young children,
especially parents living with a mental illness or in stressful circumstances. In chapter 4, it was argued
that the social factors that contribute to these circumstances involve social dislocation, the oppression
of groups (such as indigenous people), stress, and a loss of self–respect and standards that may or may
not be accompanied by economic hardship. Further, individuals are more likely to develop addiction
not only in adolescence, but also in early adulthood before age 25; hence there is a case for protecting
young adults below age 25 from smoking initiation. Such protection should be targeted to young
people in socially disadvantaged groups, who—as argued above—are most vulnerable to developing
addiction.
Chapter 4, in highlighting the marketing and research activities of the TI, also argued that there
should be more regulation on TI activity and exposure of its covert marketing strategies, involvement
in scientific research, and targeting of vulnerable groups. Many of the TI’s covert tactics have become
known in recent years thanks to the online availability of internal industry documents since the late
1990’s; however, these tactics are not always communicated to the public and other stakeholders (e.g.
policymakers, academics) in media or education campaigns.
Further, as discussed in section 4.5, the TI is—more recently—looking for even more opaque
ways in which to be involved in newer developments, and so these issues are particularly relevant
to interventions such as genetics, vaccines, and tobacco harm reduction. Policies should also work
to protect vulnerable groups from TI marketing, reverse the TI’s efforts to normalize and glamorize
smoking, and correct misleading arguments often used to support smoking in pro–tobacco debates:
notably that smoking is an effective means to relieve stress, that predisposition to nicotine addiction
is genetic, and that smoking is an exercise of freedom and liberty rights.
What should an ethical framework protect?
Following from these arguments, what should an ethical framework for tobacco control policy pro-
tect? A number of ethical concepts and theories were highlighted in chapter 2; these were generally
aimed at preserving freedom and/or health. The ethical framework of this thesis, then, should aim to
protect health. Given the autonomy–undermining effects of addiction, it should also promote positive
freedom: freedom created by state interventions that protect or promote autonomy. This should not
involve the coercive treatment of addictions, since addiction does not negate autonomy. Autonomy
in addiction is relational, so the framework should emphasize the importance of autonomy–promoting
social conditions and social support systems in promoting autonomy in addiction. Further, opportuni-
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ties for developing autonomy are not spread equally, and tend to be linked to social injustice, so social
justice should comprise an important aspect of the framework. In other words, a relational approach
to tobacco control—with relational autonomy as a central consideration—should be advocated by the
ethical framework of this thesis.
These ideas apply primarily to the context of addiction, but as mentioned in chapter 2, not all
smokers are addicted to tobacco. One may argue, then, that a regulatory framework based on negative
freedom—minimal state interference—should be used to address non–addictive tobacco use. However,
this approach is problematic for various reasons.
First, people who are non–addicted can still develop addiction, particularly in response to stress. It
is then necessary to also provide autonomy–promoting social conditions in the prevention of addiction.
Second, people below age 25 are—due to ongoing neurodevelopment until that age—vulnerable to
smoking initiation and addiction, which means it is necessary to protect this group from smoking
initiation. Third, tobacco use—addictive or not—directly affects the health of others, which justifies
restrictions on the basis of the harm principle. Fourth, people who are not addicted to tobacco may
initiate and continue smoking as a result of misinformation propagated by the TI.
Therefore the ethical framework of this thesis should, while focusing on relational autonomy (see
above), also continue to build on current measures such as those advocated for in the World Health
Organization’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC). This includes measures
that protect others from SHS, and that protect young people—including those below age 25—from
smoking initiation. There should also be measures that, in line with WHO FCTC, discourage smoking
and encourage cessation among non–addicted smokers, and that restrict the marketing activities of
the TI.
Aims and structure
The aim of this chapter is to develop these points into an ethical framework for tobacco control policy.
Section 5.1 starts by building a conceptual foundation for the framework: an account of the relevant
features of addiction that should influence tobacco control policies. Section 5.2 develops this into an
ethical framework for tobacco control policy by returning to the ethical concepts and theories that
were introduced in chapter 2: liberal theory, public health ethics, and human rights.
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5.1 Conceptual foundation: Towards a definition of ‘addiction’
The question of “what is addiction?” is an important one: as argued in chapter 4, policies tend
to be affected in significant and often ethically problematic ways by their conceptual foundation.
Four theories of addiction were introduced in chapter 4: moral choice theories, liberal theories, brain
disease theories, and the self–medication hypothesis. All four theories are influential and relevant in
the context of tobacco, yet they are potentially problematic in the policies they advocate. They are
analyzed in this section in light of the evidence presented in preceding chapters.2 Relevant aspects
are then used to build a conceptual foundation for the ethical framework of this thesis.
5.1.1 Liberal theories of addiction
Liberal theories of addiction make the following claims: (1) addictive behavior is action that is freely
chosen, and not different in this sense to non–addictive behavior; (2) drug addictions are essentially
large appetitive desires similar to appetites for natural behaviors such as eating or sex; (3) there is
an element of pleasure (and pain) in all chosen behaviors, including those that may be interpreted as
‘addictive’.
Underlying philosophy and implications
Liberal theories of addiction are supported by philosophers such as Foddy and Savulescu.[32] They
argue that these theories are similar to moral choice theories of addiction, in that both interpret
addictive actions as freely chosen. However, liberal theories of addiction—in contrast to moral choice
theories—consider addictive behaviors as morally acceptable to the extent that they do not harm
others,3 and are thus rooted in liberal ideology. Addictive behaviors—that are simply a way of acting
that might be perceived as an addictive–like state—are actually freely chosen, and should be permitted.
However, one tension with this argument is that it presumes that addictive behaviors are freely chosen;
yet, neurobiological evidence in section 3.1 indicates that they are not. ‘Freedom’ in this context is
mistakenly narrowed into its negative sense: the freedom created by minimal interference. However,
a necessary precondition for positive freedom—autonomy—does not fully pre–exist in addiction, and
needs to be created by state interventions that promote autonomy. This important point is missing
2It has already been argued that moralistic approaches to drug policy are unethical, due to the problems that have
resulted in the context of illicit drug use—see section 4.2. They are also considered inappropriate, because of their
stigmatizing effect on addicted drug users which is likely to worsen addictions. Therefore moral choice theories of
addiction are not analyzed at depth in this section, although a reference to them is made in section 5.1.5.
3‘Harm to others’ in this case excludes ‘moral harm’, which was defined in section 2.3.2 as actions that disagree with
others’ moral values but are otherwise harmless.
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in liberal theories of addiction.
Historically, liberal theories of addiction match the earliest observations of addiction, when drug
use was considered socially unproblematic and was mostly for ritualistic or recreational purposes. More
recently, the TI has also used this theory to describe smoking as a pleasurable pastime comparable
to consuming chocolate or alcohol.4 Smokers are then depicted as individuals who freely choose to
smoke, whether to improve their cognitive performance, to relax, or to enjoy the taste; and to regulate
this pleasure would be unethical.5[169, 170] Thus, accepting a liberal theory of addiction could endorse
a laissez–faire policy that, like other unhealthy lifestyle behaviors, does not restrict smoking on the
basis that it is ‘addictive’.6 Restriction, then, would have to be justified within a liberal framework
such as Mill’s harm principle. Furthermore, based on the assumption that addictive smoking is freely
chosen, restriction is—in theory—effectively achieved via encouragement or discouragement measures
such as incentives and disincentives.7 However, before this paradigm is accepted, it is first necessary to
ask: to what extent is addiction a large, appetitive desire that is, like many non–addictive behaviors,
pleasurable and freely chosen?
Addiction: A freely chosen pleasure?
According to the neurological observations described in chapter 3, liberal theories of addiction do, to
some extent, match the description. All addictive drugs and rewarding activities increase neurological
activity within dopaminergic reward pathways and the EOS, in both addiction and non–addiction, to
elicit sensations of reward, pleasure, and relaxation. To this extent, all addictive drugs and naturally
rewarding behaviors can be pleasurable and can elicit an appetite. However, the degree to which this
occurs varies considerably; addictive drugs hit these circuits at a far higher magnitude,8 and tobacco—
which is inhaled and contains additives to enhance the nicotine ‘hit’—does this within seconds. Such
hyperactivation can, in turn, contribute to long–term neurobiological changes. From section 3.1, it is
clear that tobacco use is often associated with these long–term changes; they affect brain circuits and
4The use of chocolate and alcohol also has health implications, although both substances are far less addictive than
tobacco and the chronic health burden that results from their use is arguably less.
5However, these ideas are inconsistent with more recent research activities of the TI such as the development of genetic
tests and electronic nicotine delivery systems (ENDS), since these suggest that addiction has impacts on behavior that
warrant medical intervention. Despite this, the TI typically remains silent on the potentially autonomy–undermining
effects of addiction, and continues to advocate for a ‘free choice’ argument.
6A theory of addiction that assumes addiction is a free choice could also endorse an approach that holds addicted
individuals as morally accountable for their actions, and punishes or stigmatizes them accordingly if the behavior is
considered to be morally repugnant in accordance with social norms. However, as argued in section 4.2, this approach
has been counterproductive and is considered unethical in this thesis—see section 5.1.5 for further discussion.
7This approach is based on libertarian paternalism, in which healthy behavior is encouraged, while unhealthy options
are still permitted. See the discussion in section 2.3.3.
8As argued in section 3.1, natural rewards such as food can increase dopamine levels by 50%, whereas the most
addictive drugs can increase them by 1200%; a difference of 24–fold.
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regions in ways that can impair behavioral and emotional control along with many other functions.
These patterns can, in turn, impair the individual’s autonomy, and do not tend to exist in individuals
taking the same drug but in a non–addictive manner.
Therefore liberal theories of addiction are correct to the extent that they can describe non–addictive
drug use: cases in which the long–term neurobiological changes that typify addiction have not (yet)
formed, and individuals describe their drug–taking as ‘casual’. In times when drug use was socially
unproblematic and mostly for ritualistic or recreational purposes, a liberal theory of addiction was
probably the most fitting description. In the modern context, however, it can only account for casual
drug users and not those who are ‘addicted’: as in, displaying behavioral signs of cognitive dissonance,
cravings, and other symptoms.9 ‘Liberal theories of addiction’ are therefore more accurately ‘liberal
theories of casual drug use’. Furthermore, although addictive behaviors are to some extent large
appetitive desires that elicit an element of pleasure, the claim that they are ‘freely chosen’ does not
stand, since there are other complex features in addiction affecting autonomy in addiction that are
better captured in other theories.10
Implications for tobacco control policy
The above suggests that, in order to accept a liberal theory of addiction as a conceptual basis for
tobacco control policies, casual smokers would have to comprise a vast majority of smokers. However,
as argued in section 2.1.1, the majority of smokers are—to some extent—addicted to tobacco, so most
smokers’ relationship to tobacco use would not be accounted for under a liberal theory of addiction.
This has some implications for tobacco control policies. First, policies based on providing information
or weakly discouraging smoking are more likely to work on casual or weakly addicted smokers, but not
more severe cases.11 Indeed, in places where policies have taken this approach, this appears to be the
case and has led to the ‘hardening hypothesis’: the idea that, when smoking prevalence in a population
decreases, the smokers that remain are on average more severely addicted. Thus, another conceptual
framework—that goes beyond liberal theories of addiction—is necessary, especially to account for more
severe addictions.
Second, the assessment of a ‘slippery slope’ argument in tobacco12 should take into account the
9These symptoms, which form the diagnostic criteria for ‘tobacco use disorder’ in the 5th Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM–5), were outlined in section 2.1.1.
10Such as brain disease theories or the self–medication hypothesis—refer to sections 5.1.2 and 5.1.3 respectively.
11As argued in chapter 3, neurological changes in areas such as the prefrontal cortex, dopaminergic reward pathways,
and EOS can significantly impair the ability to avoid using tobacco, and so addiction is autonomy–undermining.
12Slippery slope arguments are based on the idea that, if tobacco use is restricted, the use of other unhealthy
substances—such as coffee, sugar, and alcohol—will also be restricted on the same grounds.
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proportion of users who are addicted, and the addictiveness13 of the product. For example, it is often
argued—usually by the TI—that restricting tobacco use would also justify similar restrictions on
other unhealthy products such as alcohol. However, the proportion of alcohol users who are addicted
is notably lower: as mentioned in section 2.1.1, a minority of alcohol users (2–9%) are addicted,
whereas for tobacco, addicted users comprise the majority. While a liberal theory of drug use could
account for the majority of alcohol users, it can only account for a small minority of tobacco users
and so the slippery slope argument does not hold.
5.1.2 Brain disease theories of addiction
Brain disease theories of addiction make the following claims: (1) addictive behaviors result from
maladaptive neurobiological functions; (2) prolonged drug use is the cause of these neurobiological
malfunctions; (3) at first drug use is voluntary, after which neurological processes take over; (4)
predispositions to addiction are conferred in part by genetics, and in part by environmental factors;
(5) there is a strong scientific evidence basis for all of these claims.
Underlying philosophy and implications
Brain disease theories, as discussed in chapter 4, evolved from early disease conceptions of addiction
and as a result of advances in neuroscientific research methods. They also form the basis of most
modern clinical definitions of addiction.14
The acceptance of a brain disease theory of addiction would, due its heavily medicalized focus, have
a number of implications. First, prevention and treatment paradigms may shift into a more medicalized
or geneticized approach which neglects psychosocial interventions; yet a psychosocial approach is
crucial in helping people overcome their addictions, and—based on the evidence in chapter 3—genetic
factors play a minor role in addiction susceptibility. Second, medical and genetic approaches could
be misused by vested interests such as the direct–to–consumer (DTC) genetic testing industry or the
TI, which is likely to be ethically problematic.15 Third, the assumption that neurological processes
‘take over’ may lead to ideas that addicted individuals are not autonomous. Fourth, assuming that
13This may be measured by pharmacological properties, such as the mode of administration, or behavioral criteria
such as the conversion to dependency rate. For tobacco, as argued in section 2.1, ‘addictiveness’ in this respect is very
high even in relation to many illicit drugs, because of its administration mode (inhalation), design (i.e. additives in
cigarettes that freebase nicotine and enhance its absorption), and high conversion to dependency rate.
14The literature which discusses brain disease theories as a conceptual basis of addiction is very rich and crosses many
aspects of decision theory, philosophy, the social sciences, behavioral psychology, and neuroeconomics. A full discussion
of this is beyond scope; see [27, 28, 88, 205, 206, 403, 404, 405].
15Ethical implications that arise from TI activity in this context were discussed in sections 4.4 and 4.5; further
discussion of this point is provided in section 6.4.
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prolonged drug use is causal of addiction, paradigms could shift to ‘blaming the drug’, a sense of
sympathy towards addicted individuals, and moral absolution of their actions.[406] It would also
result in policies that restrict the availability of drugs as much as possible. Thus it is necessary to
review brain disease theories in light of the evidence presented throughout chapter 3, to determine the
extent to which they correctly describe tobacco addiction.
Addiction: A brain disease?
From chapter 3, it is clear that there are distinct neurobiological features that typify16 addiction.
Neurostructural and neurofunctional changes in dopaminergic pathways, the EOS, and the PFC affect
thoughts, emotions, and behaviors and often persist even years after abstinence. Outside intoxication,
activity in dopaminergic reward pathways and the EOS is reduced which can lead to compensatory
drug–seeking behavior. The ability to resist drug–taking is also hampered through multiple mecha-
nisms. The ability of the PFC to inhibit behaviors is reduced, and attention shifts towards emotional
stimuli.17 These processes are, as brain disease theorists suggest,[194] often triggered by exposure
to drug–related cues. Addictive behaviors can also result in automated, habitual patterns through
dopaminergic plasticities in the dorsal striatum. These habits are often beyond conscious awareness
and, consequently, can be difficult to control. All of these changes may also occur in non–drug addic-
tions, and so there are characteristic neurobiological features, in many drug and non–drug addictions,
that are in turn reflected in addictive behaviors.18 However, these behaviors are not necessarily invol-
untary, and the neurobiological features are not necessarily independent of psychosocial processes or
caused by drug use per se.
All of these neurobiological changes can make it very difficult in addiction to avoid seeking or
using a drug. Despite this, section 3.1.3 argued that it is possible to overcome these through top–
down behavioral control, in which the individual’s voluntary thoughts and behaviors are applied in
order to reverse neurobiological changes. However, it was also argued that social factors are important
in helping individuals to successfully exercise this top–down control.19 This may entail, for example,
minimizing drug–related cues in the social environment, providing emotional support, or providing
16As discussed throughout chapter 3, these neurobiological features contribute to addictive behaviors, but are not
necessarily the sole cause. However, they are strongly associated with addictive behaviors, and can be said to ‘typify’
neurobiological changes often observed in addiction.
17This occurs as ‘hot’ (affect–driven) processes become less responsive to ‘cool’ (inhibitory) processes. This also
matches ideas from brain disease theorists who describe addiction as involving “neural hijack” (see [28]) or a struggle
between “rational” and “irrational” selves (see [403]).
18These behaviors often reflect cognitive dissonance, and are used to diagnose addiction.
19This does not necessarily imply that addicted individuals are incapable of overcoming an addiction without the
appropriate social circumstances; the point is that a supportive social environment enhances this capacity.
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therapies that teach individuals how to control their addiction. The burden in remaining abstinent,
then, should not be completely on the individual; the state and the community both have roles
in facilitating individual’s efforts in overcoming their addictions. Thus brain disease theories are
correct to the extent that addiction is an autonomy–undermining condition, although this comes in
degrees, is potentially reversible, and is dependent to some extent on the social environment. In other
words, addicted individuals cannot be considered non–autonomous on the basis that addiction has
neurological manifestations.
Since all drugs of abuse contribute, to some extent, to neurobiological pathologies in addiction,
brain disease theorists have argued that drug use is the cause of these features. However, chapter
3 has shown that—while prolonged drug use contributes to these—they can also be triggered by
stress exposure or emotional traumas that occurred prior to the initiation of drug use. These events
can predispose individuals to developing addictions in later life, particularly if they occurred during
sensitive developmental periods such as early childhood. This leads into the next point, regarding
the question of susceptibility: is a predisposition to addiction conferred in large part by genetic
make–up? Section 3.2.1 suggests not: although genetics play a subtle role, there is no ‘addiction
gene’, and genetic factors only become relevant when environmental factors, such as childhood abuse,
are taken into account.20 Hard–wired genetic mechanisms are also further complicated—along with
environmental factors—by epigenetic and neurodevelopmental mechanisms, and so the brain disease
theory’s claim that susceptibility is conferred 50% through genetic21 factors is, most likely, inaccurate.
Implications for tobacco control policy
The above arguments have several implications for tobacco control policies. First, psychosocial ap-
proaches should not be abandoned in favour of a medicalized or geneticized approach on the basis
that tobacco addiction has neurobiological or genetic manifestations. Second, it is incorrect to blame
tobacco as the sole cause of tobacco addictions, or to morally absolve addictive behaviors on this
basis, even if having tobacco widely available makes it more difficult for addicted smokers to avoid
using or buying tobacco. Policies should, however, aim to minimize the exposure of addicted smok-
ers to tobacco or tobacco–related cues by reducing the availability of tobacco, restricting TAPS, and
restricting smoking in public places. Third, an addiction undermines autonomy to a variable degree,
but does not negate it; hence it is incorrect to argue that addicted smokers are completely incapable
of avoiding tobacco use.
20This is also an important point in the discussion on genetic tests for nicotine addiction susceptibility in section 6.4.
21In this instance, ‘genetic’ refers to the hard–wired genetic sequence.
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Thus, brain disease theories of addiction are useful in that they highlight some important neuro-
biological features of addiction using an evidence–based approach, and in this sense they go beyond
liberal theories of addiction. However, their most vital flaw is that they dichotomize neurobiologi-
cal/genetic processes from environmental factors and assume that addictions are caused by drug use,
even though chapter 3 shows that neurobiological, genetic, and social processes are closely intertwined,
and social processes—as well as drug use—contribute to addictive neurobiology and behavior. The
gaps that remain in brain disease theories, however, may be bridged by looking at the self–medication
hypothesis of addiction.
5.1.3 The self–medication hypothesis of addiction
The self–medication hypothesis of addiction, introduced in section 4.1, makes the following claims:
(1) social pressures or a mental illness bring about negative states of mind; (2) some individuals will
try to self–medicate against these negative states of mind22 as a coping strategy; (3) addictive drug
use is one such strategy.[33]
Underlying philosophy and implications
The self–medication hypothesis goes beyond liberal theories and brain disease theories of addiction,
in that it highlights the importance of the social factors that trigger addictions and acknowledges the
connection between neurobiological and psychosocial aspects of addiction.
More broadly, but along a similar vein, addictive behaviors have been described as an escape from
negative affect,[185, 204] and a social disease.[34, 407] Alexander, for example, has argued that addic-
tion is a coping strategy against the negative affective states elicited when individuals are dislocated
from their sociocultural origin, one another, or themselves.[34] Thus, society plays an important role
in the propagation of addictions. Peele, for example, has argued that society actually encourages
self–medication (and therefore addiction), since it continuously encourages its members to seek relief
from outside sources:
“We are taught—in many cases by the institutions themselves—that we need school, need
marriage, need a steady job, need medicines. What we really need is to be whole in
ourselves, to take charge of our own health and education and emotional development.
We need to be confident that we can cope with, learn from, and enjoy the people and
22One may also argue that self–medication, in this sense, is also an attempt to enhance agency in the short–term:
as in, to temporarily achieve a sense of self–control. This sense of self–control may come as part of the (temporary)
positive states of mind triggered by drug intoxication.
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things that make up our environment. Because that wholeness is so hard for us to achieve,
addiction is not, as we like to think, an aberration from our way of life. Addiction is our
way of life.”(pg 181, [408])
The implication of these theories is that autonomy in addiction is generally viewed as being largely
dependent on social conditions. Self–medication hypotheses also advocate for a stronger psychosocial
focus in the treatment and prevention of addictions, and a more sympathetic view towards drug–
addicted individuals along the social margin. Some writers, such as Alexander, have argued that some
level of drug use is necessary for severely addicted individuals in order to sustain a normal, productive
life, and to demand complete abstinence would be inhumane.[34] The TI has taken this argument a
step further to promote smoking as an appropriate self–medication against the stresses of everyday
life or mental illness;23 the implication is that this endorses a laissez–faire policy, since restrictions are
then considered inhumane.[170] This view, however, also assumes that addictive drug use ameliorates
the negative states of mind the user is trying to escape. Therefore, it is necessary to assess—in light of
the neurobiological evidence presented throughout chapter 3—the extent to which addictive drug use
effectively mitigates negative states of mind, and the extent to which addiction is triggered by social
factors.
Addiction: A coping strategy?
In section 3.1, it was shown that physical tolerance mechanisms in addiction reduce overall activity
within dopaminergic reward pathways and the EOS, which—outside intoxication—can result in a
baseline state in which the individual feels more unmotivated, dysphoric, and stressed. This can
result in drug use as a compensatory behavior. However, it was also shown that this compensation is
temporary; outside intoxication, drug use actually contributes to these tolerance mechanisms and the
negative states of mind the individual is trying to avoid. This explains, in part, why addicted smokers
actually experience higher levels of stress and depression on average when they smoke: because the
negative affect that accumulates in between intoxications raises the overall stress level.[236] Thus,
addictive smoking is a self–medication, albeit a highly counterproductive one. The implication is
that, contrary to the TI’s claims, smoking—especially for addicted smokers—does not contribute to
the overall wellbeing of individuals, and should not be subject to a laissez–faire policy on the grounds
that this would be more ‘humane’.
Chapter 3, in line with the self–medication hypothesis, also highlighted the importance of stress
23For further discussion, refer to section 4.3.
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in addiction. Stress is an important trigger for sustaining addiction and relapse, because of its close
interactions with the EOS and dopaminergic reward pathways. Both stress and prolonged drug use
contribute to dysphoria, emotional pain, and a diminished capacity for emotional attachment; these
in turn contribute to prolonged drug use. The implication is that people are more susceptible to
developing an addiction or relapsing into drug use while going through periods of emotional pain or
stress. Even rats trained to take morphine[409, 410] or cocaine[411] show more addictive behaviors
when socially oppressed. Housed in standard laboratory cages, rats predictably administer high levels
of their drug. However, rats moved into an “environmentally enriched” condition—a more attractive,
larger space, with toys and other rats (informally called “Rat Park”)—self–administer significantly
lower amounts of drug, or no drug at all, even if the drug is provided in a tasty sugar solution.[409,
410, 411] Thus, it appears that in both humans and rat models, the effects of social oppression play
a significant role in triggering addictive drug use.
As sections 3.1.5 and 3.2 show, stressful or negative events across the life–course can also predispose
an individual to addictions, particularly if these events take place during a sensitive neurobiological
development period such as early childhood. Since exposure to negative affect also influences devel-
opment of the PFC, and damage to the PFC is a predictor of addiction severity, exposure to negative
affect can influence not only whether an individual develops an addiction, but also the severity of
that addiction. The extent of the damage caused—and therefore the extent to which an individ-
ual is predisposed to (severe) addiction—depends partly on when negative experiences took place
(i.e. predisposition is higher if they occurred during an important developmental phase), the severity
of the experience, social support structures, and many other complex factors. Thus, social factors
can strongly increase the likelihood that an individual will develop an addiction, and there are clear
neurobiological mechanisms underlying this likelihood.
An implication of the above arguments is that people are more predisposed to addictions when
they are affected by social hardship. Accordingly, smoking is typically clustered among people from
low socioeconomic strata, the socially marginalized, and people with comorbid mental illness, as well
as racial minority groups strongly affected by social dislocation. The underlying reasons for this are
not only economic, but—as argued in chapter 4—more accurately related to the destruction of social
and cultural identities. Thus, it is noteworthy that there are psychosocial connotations to drug habits
as giving some people a sense of identity and social belonging:
“ . . . the lure of its ability to confer a sense of belonging, interdependence of fate, and
common purpose to individuals who would otherwise feel themselves to be standing alone
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in a hostile world . . . ”(pg.10, [351])
It is also typically more difficult for socially marginalized individuals to overcome their addictions.
People with comorbid mental illness, for example, tend not to ‘mature out’ of their addictions.[33,
412] In the context of tobacco, this has resulted in the “hardening hypothesis” (see section 2.2.2).
Furthermore, a recent study in over 20,000 smokers found that few factors are as highly associated with
persistent smoking as depressive symptoms.[413, 414] The implication is that the social environment
plays an important role in conferring a resistance to drug addictions, and in this sense, the social
environment can be autonomy–promoting or autonomy–undermining.
Implications for tobacco control policy
The result of the above conceptual approach is a policy heavily focused on psychosocial intervention:
minimizing the social factors—such as stress and social dislocation—that contribute to addiction,
aiding the psychosocial integration of marginalized groups, and reviving their social and cultural
identities. Otherwise, the arguments above, along with those in section 3.2, have highlighted the
importance of social hardship24 in propagating addictions; minimizing this, and focusing support
on parents with young children and socially disadvantaged groups, could reduce the incidences or
severities of tobacco addictions along with these coexistent problems.
Therefore the self–medication hypothesis is attractive to the extent that it emphasizes the necessity
for a stronger psychosocial focus in treating and preventing addictions, and recognizes addiction
as a neurobiological disorder that originates—to a large extent—from social contexts. This applies
especially to the most socially disadvantaged groups: racial minorities, the socially marginalized,
people in low socioeconomic strata, and people with comorbid mental illness. A social environment,
then, is recognized as either harnessing or undermining one’s capacity to avoid addictive drug use.
What this means for addicted individuals is that they should be treated with support and respect,
in order to harness their capacity to resist drug use. Drug use itself is, however, not a suitable self–
medication as it makes the situation worse and does not address the psychosocial factors underlying
the addiction.
24Such as a comorbid mental illness, stress, and adverse childhood experiences (ACE).
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5.1.4 A definition of ‘autonomy’ in addiction
Addiction comprises relational autonomy
Social environments can be autonomy–suppressing or autonomy–promoting, and the welfare of indi-
viduals and of their community are interconnected. To return to the Rat Park experiments,25 stan-
dard laboratory cages are an example of autonomy–suppressing environments that lead to increased
self–administration of drugs in rats, while the enriched environment, “Rat Park”, is an exemplary
autonomy–promoting condition. In the context of human addiction, autonomy–promoting conditions
are those that provide opportunities for healthy lives, psychosocial integration, and that harness the
capacity to overcome an addiction. Autonomy–suppressing conditions are those that evoke stress,
pain, or other negative affective states, or that regularly expose individuals to drug–related cues.
Autonomy is undermined in addiction
To return to one of the research questions of this thesis: is addiction a condition that, by definition,
undermines autonomy, and if so to what degree and on which basis? Based on the neurological processes
described throughout chapter 3 and section 5.1.2, addiction is a condition that, by definition, does
not negate but undermines the capacity for autonomous action regarding the addiction,26 and the
degree to which this occurs is proportional to the severity of the addiction. Further, this capacity
can shift over time: when a casual drug user develops an addiction, when a mild addiction becomes
severe, or when an addiction becomes less severe as a result of successful intervention. It can also shift
over the life–course: for example, the capacity is increased in proportion to prefrontal development
during adolescence. Thus, autonomy in addiction should be considered as a dynamic capacity27 that
depends in part on neurological development, in part on the individual’s own efforts, and in part on
psychosocial factors.
Addictive preferences are internalized neurobiological adaptations
One may argue, then, that addictive behaviors are in line with the individual’s values28 and are there-
fore fully autonomous.[32] However, a strong value towards an addictive behavior is not necessarily
25Described in section 5.1.3.
26It is important to emphasize that autonomous actions are only undermined in the context of decisions regarding
drug use. Decisions in other life aspects are not necessarily affected on the grounds of having an addiction.
27In other words, autonomy is derived from a mental ability to act autonomously. Competency can affect autonomy,
but is not the same concept because autonomous action requires more than just competency; it also requires that the
action is in accord with one’s own motives, values, and reasons.
28For example, in the case of smokers who are addicted but nevertheless want to smoke and want to be addicted.
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formed through an autonomous process, because in addiction, autonomy–suppressing conditions can
result in the formation of adaptive preference formations: adaptations to unjust or difficult social cir-
cumstances that are then internalized as one’s own preferences.[142] This may be particularly true, for
example, for individuals suffering from comorbid mental illnesses that are not addressed, or people liv-
ing in harsh social circumstances with little support. A drug addiction then develops as an adaptation
to these conditions, and is internalized as a strong preference towards that drug. This internalization
can be observed on a neurobiological level (see evidence in section 3.1). Following Frankfurt, it may
be observed as actions based on one’s first–order desires.29[143] This process is not autonomous, be-
cause it does not contribute to self–realization, wellbeing, or the formation of autonomous values and
preferences.30 Thus, addictive behaviors cannot be considered autonomous on the basis that they are
in line with a said value.
Policy implications
The question of whether addiction undermines or negates autonomy is an important one, because they
justify different levels of intervention.31 Addiction undermines autonomy and autonomy in addiction
is relational, so conditions that contribute to the development of addiction, including the option to use
an addictive drug and the social conditions that contribute to addiction, are—potentially—autonomy–
undermining.
It follows that these conditions are not compatible with freedom, since free action requires that the
individual has the autonomous capacity to act in accord with one’s motives. In other words, freedom
does not arise from having an option to become addicted, or from conditions that contribute to the
development of addictions. Approaches based on preserving negative freedom through minimal state
interference are then inappropriate, because they assume that the necessary conditions for freedom are
pre–existent. In the context of addiction, however, they are not, since it is precisely the autonomy–
undermining conditions that trigger and propagate addictions. Therefore it is necessary to adopt an
approach that maximizes freedom in its positive sense, by creating conditions that protect or promote
autonomy. In the context of drug addiction, this requires states to eliminate the social conditions that
trigger addictions, provide social conditions that promote non–addiction, and restrict the availability
29Frankfurt’s hierarchy of desires was introduced in section 2.3.1. He argued that an individual who is consonant with
his drug use is a wanton, because his drug use is driven by first–order desires for the drug (“A wants to X”) rather than
a reflection on this desire (“A wants to want to X”). Frankfurt considered this to be a non–autonomous process.
30This point was also made in light of neurobiological evidence in section 3.1.
31As discussed in section 3.1.6, if autonomy is negated, the individual is considered incapable of avoiding drug use;
this may justify coercive interventions, such as coerced therapy. If autonomy is undermined, it means that the individual
can, to some extent, still avoid drug use (although the ability is affected somewhat). This does not justify coercive
intervention, but it may justify interventions that help to maximize the ability to resist drug use.
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of addictive drugs. States should also aim to minimize the factors that contribute to social injustice,
since these contribute in important ways to the social environments that trigger addictions in certain
groups of people.32
5.1.5 A summary of the relevant features of addiction
‘Addiction’: A neurobiopsychosocial disorder with social roots
Addiction is a disorder that should be thought of not as a behavior, but as a relationship to a behavior.
This relationship has distinct neurobiological and psychological features: the neurobiological features
described throughout chapter 3, and psychological patterns in which addicted individuals describe their
drug use as a coping strategy, beyond their control, or as simultaneously rewarding as it is destructive.
This relationship is largely rooted in social aspects, so addiction should be thought of not as a free
choice, a brain disease, or a self–medication, but more precisely as a neurobiopsychosocial disorder that
originates largely from negative affective states triggered by the social environment. Thus, emotional
factors such as desires and relationships are an important aspect of addictive decision–making: they
can trigger addictions and relapse, or predispose individuals to addictions in later life if they adversely
affect neurobiological development, particularly during critical developmental periods.
Autonomy in addiction is also subject to neurobiopsychosocial influences. As argued in section
5.1.4, social environments, along with drug use itself, can undermine one’s wellbeing and autonomy,
and the extent to which these are undermined is proportional to the severity of the addiction. Thus, the
concept of ‘addiction’ should not be thought of as categorical (i.e. ‘addiction’ versus ‘non–addiction’)
but as a dynamic continuum. On one extreme are drug users who are unaddicted, and whose autonomy
is unaffected by drug use. One the other extreme are drug users who are severely addicted and whose
autonomy is undermined to a significant extent. In between that are drug users whose addiction, in a
clinical context, would be described as “mild” or “intermittent”. The continuum is dynamic, however,
since addictions can progress into more severe forms, improve as a result of successful therapy, or
non–addictive drug use can progress into an addiction if, for example, the individual is exposed to
high levels of stress. However, in none of these cases is autonomy undermined to the extent that the
individual is entirely uncapable of resisting drug use.
Consequently, tobacco control policies should maximize freedom by providing autonomy–promoting
conditions; this, in turn, requires policymakers to acknowledge the complex social factors that underlie
32If states provide all the necessary social conditions, this does not absolve the TI or suggest that tobacco use should
not be restricted. There are additional reasons for restricting tobacco, such as its harm to others through the effects of
SHS, that warrant further restrictions—further discussion in section 5.2.
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addiction susceptibility, and that these contribute to the formation and sustaining of addictions.
Policy implications
The above points provide five important considerations for tobacco control policies. First, it is nec-
essary to minimize the social factors that can predispose individuals to tobacco addictions: social
injustice, ACE, poor parenting, stress, and so on. These issues are complex, and are already widely
recognized as problematic;[137] however, a better recognition of the important connection between
these and tobacco addiction—on neurobiological and psychosocial levels—can help governments to
develop better smoking cessation and prevention programmes. This should include a stronger focus
on socially disadvantaged groups who tend to be most predisposed. Second, the importance of emo-
tional factors in addictive decision–making means that smoking cessation interventions should take
into account the emotional and social contexts of smoking. Although current programmes based on
rational disincentives do work to some extent,33 policies should not assume that all addicted smokers
can simply exercise a rational decision to not smoke.
This leads into the third point, regarding moralism and the stigmatization of smokers. It was men-
tioned in section 4.2 that people addicted to illicit drugs—particularly those from socially marginalized
or poor communities—have been stigmatized and marginalized on the basis of their drug use being
morally repugnant. Although smoking has never been moralized to this extent, a moralistic approach
is starting to echo in recent attempts to denormalize tobacco. However, the arguments throughout
this thesis have shown that this approach would be counterproductive, for two reasons. First, since
a moralistic approach assumes that addicted smokers can exercise a rational decision to not smoke,
their smoking is (incorrectly) thought to reflect a weakness of character rather than a diminished
choice–making capacity.34 Second, addiction is, particularly in many severe cases, a coping strategy
against negative affect. Thus if addicted smokers are stigmatized for being unable to quit smoking, it
is likely to propagate guilt in these individuals who are then encouraged to smoke more in order to
cope with this guilt. This can make the addiction worse, and has the added effect of marginalizing
these people further from the mainstream and distancing them from treatment services.35
Fourth, although moralizing smoking is potentially counterproductive, having the option to smoke—
33Measures based on the WHO FCTC, for example, are based on this approach, and have been highly effective in
reducing smoking prevalence. However, severely addicted individuals tend to be less responsive to such measures—see
section 2.2.1.
34One may argue that, because autonomy is not negated in addiction, both elements are involved: a partially dimin-
ished choice–making capacity and partial weakness of character. However, this would be an oversimplification, because
addictive behaviors involve more than a partial loss of autonomy or a perceived ‘weakness’ of character; they are also
influenced by societal factors such as smoking normalization efforts by the TI.
35Further discussion and ethical analysis of these points is made in section 6.1.
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even if it gives some temporary pleasure—can undermine autonomy; it is therefore necessary to restrict
the availability of tobacco. The extent to which the availability of a drug should be restricted depends
on its addictiveness: heavy restrictions on tobacco are justified, due its high addictive potential. Fifth,
the discussion on autonomy throughout section 5.1.4 raises important points on the coercive treatment
of addictions. Since addiction is not a condition that voids the capacity for autonomy, coerced therapy
can only be justified on the grounds of hard paternalism. However, even in such cases, there is no
guarantee that therapy would work. Treatment approaches based on mobilizing the individual’s will
and resolve are non–coercive and perhaps more effective if they help people to regain a lost sense of
self–control. Therefore there are very few ethical grounds on which it is possible to justify the coerced
therapy of addicted smokers.36
5.2 Towards an ethical framework for tobacco control policy
This chapter so far has highlighted features of addiction that should be considered in tobacco control
policies, and has thereby built a conceptual foundation for the ethical framework of this thesis. The
next step is to incorporate these into an ethical framework for tobacco control policy, by building
on relevant ethical concepts and theories. These were introduced in section 2.3: Mill’s liberal theory
and public health ethics theories. These theories are revisited in sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 respectively,
and discussed in terms of their applicability to the ethical framework of this thesis. Human rights,
which have often been used to support both pro–tobacco and pro–regulatory arguments, are discussed
in section 5.2.3 in light of arguments made throughout this thesis. Section 5.2.4 builds on these
discussions to describe an ethical framework for tobacco control policy, which is conveyed through a
set of ethical considerations. Section 5.2.5 briefly summarizes and discusses this ethical framework,
and outlines its application and relevance to tobacco control policy.
5.2.1 Application of Mill’s liberal theory
Mill’s theory as an ethical basis: The harm principle
Mill’s liberal theory is instructive for the ethical framework of this thesis to the extent that people’s
actions should be restricted for the purpose of protecting others from harm (the harm principle).[42]
The harm principle already forms part of the ethical basis of the WHO FCTC, as it includes provisions
36Until now, most ethical issues related to the coercive treatment of drug addictions have been related to illegal drugs
(and not tobacco). However, some new interventions may become coercive, especially if a medicalized approach to
treating addictions is adopted. The implications this presents in the context of tobacco are discussed in section 6.4.
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to protect others through the implementation of smokefree laws in public indoor areas. There is also
emerging evidence that SHS exposure in public outdoor places, such as outdoor dining areas,[415]
sidewalk cafes, and parks,[416] is harmful, particularly when smokers are seated in proximity to others.
Thus, smokefree laws in some outdoor spaces may also be ethically justified if more evidence emerges.
Children, who are particularly sensitive to the effects of SHS, should also be protected from SHS
exposure in private indoor spaces such as cars and the home. Although implementing smoking bans in
private areas—particularly the home—may be ethically problematic and therefore difficult to enforce,
it is possible to encourage parents to create smokefree homes in non–coercive ways (discussed in section
6.1).
Mill’s theory as an ethical basis: Protecting children
Mill’s theory also considers interventions to protect children’s best interests to be ethical, as children
are not yet in “the maturity of their faculties” (pg.12, [42]). This justifies measures such as an age
restriction on buying tobacco. This age restriction is usually set at 18 years, but this thesis—using
neurobiological evidence—has argued that people should be protected from smoking initiation until
age 25, when prefrontal development is complete. Although people aged 18–25 years are arguably
capable of making sound judgements, they are vulnerable to developing an addiction if drug use is
initiated at this age; this is particularly the case for highly addictive drugs such as tobacco. An
early tobacco addiction could, in turn, undermine their neurobiological development. Thus there is
an argument for protecting young adults under age 25 as well as adolescents from tobacco, on the
grounds of their neurobiological vulnerability to drug use and addiction. Therefore Mill’s idea of
protecting children, which already forms the basis of some existing measures (e.g. minimum age of
sale laws), is also incorporated into the ethical framework of this thesis, and—for reasons related to the
neurodevelopmental schedule in early adulthood—broadened to include people aged below 25 years.
Limitations in applying Mill’s liberal theory
Measures that protect others and children could also be viewed as paternalistic, since—as discussed
in section 2.2.1—they also discourage smoking among adults. Within Mill’s liberal framework, pater-
nalistic interventions directed at adults are only justified if the adult is incapable of making voluntary
or knowledgeable decisions. Smoking is—to some extent—still voluntary and knowledgeable, but it
is not completely a ‘free choice’ as claimed in some pro–tobacco arguments, and the capacity for free
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choice hinges in part on the conditions provided by the state.37
Therefore the application of Mill’s liberal framework in this context is limited, because it assumes
that the necessary conditions for freedom pre–exist in addiction and that freedom should be maintained
by minimal state intervention. As a result, Mill’s liberal framework—as discussed in section 5.1.1—can
only account for non–addicted smokers, for whom a necessary precondition for freedom—autonomy—
is still fully intact. Yet they only comprise a minority of smokers, and can still develop an addiction
in response to various factors; some which may be triggered by an autonomy–undermining social
environment.
An ethical framework for tobacco control should therefore consider freedom in its positive sense.
It should also be more sensitive to the features of addiction,38 the social contexts and injustices that
contribute to addictions,39 and the interconnectedness between freedom and health. By broadening
Mill’s liberal framework and his concept of ‘freedom’, and developing his ideas further into the context
of tobacco addiction, it may be possible to arrive at an ethical framework that similarly holds freedom
as the basis of human individuality and flourishing. The main difference, however, is that this freedom
would originate from autonomy–promoting state interventions rather than a minimal state.
Summary
Mill’s liberal framework offers a starting point for thinking about the importance of preserving freedom,
and how a harm assessment can be used to justify interventions. It also includes two important aspects
that form the basis of some existing tobacco control measures and that will be applied into the ethical
framework in section 5.2.4: the harm principle, and the protection of children (in this case also
broadened to include young adults below age 25).40 However, Mill’s liberalism needs to be developed
further using other ethical frameworks that recognize the importance of providing infrastructural
conditions for health and minimizing health inequalities, and that are more sensitive to the relevant
features of addiction.
37This point also applies to non–addicted smokers, because they may develop an addiction in response to various
factors, such as exposure to intense emotional stress—see section 5.1.1.
38Those highlighted in chapter 3 and section 5.1; most notably its autonomy–undermining effects, and responsiveness
to social and emotional triggers.
39Those highlighted in section 3.2 and chapter 4, most notably ACE, social dislocation, stress, oppression, and other
social hardship.
40It is acknowledged that young adults aged 18–25 are capable of exercising rational decisions in many aspects of
life, and should not be denied the right to do so. However, in the context of the use of highly addictive drugs such as
tobacco, it is necessary to extend protections until the age at which people are—neurobiologically—more protected from
addiction, and the full development of their autonomous capacity in this context is enabled. See section 3.2.4 for further
discussion.
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5.2.2 Application of public health ethics theories
Libertarian paternalism as an ethical basis
Libertarian paternalism was introduced in section 2.3.3 as an influential approach in public health in
which people are encouraged to make healthier lifestyle decisions in a non–coercive way.41 Measures
that fit into the scope of libertarian paternalism include discouragement measures such as those under
the WHO FCTC,42 and incentives.[41] There is evidence that incentives work, to some extent, in
the context of addictions.[417] In contingency management programmes, for example, addicted drug
users are given vouchers worth a specific amount of money whenever a drug–negative urine sample
is provided. The value of the voucher increases with each consequent negative urine sample, but is
reset to a low value when a positive urine sample or no sample at all is turned in.[418] Although good
success has been reported in these programmes, it is uncertain how sustainable the effects of incentives
would be given the chronic nature of addiction, particularly in severe cases. Still, such programmes
show that individuals do tend to respond to better options in the context of drug use, and so providing
attractive alternatives to smoking may encourage some people to quit permanently, particularly if the
individual is not severely addicted.
To what extent is libertarian paternalism useful in the context of tobacco? Measures under the
WHO FCTC aim to discourage tobacco use. Based on experience with these measures,43 their effects
seem to become less effective as addictions become more severe. Another concern with discouragement
is that some measures, such as tobacco denormalization, are potentially stigmatizing for smokers.44
Thus, measures based on discouragement should be non–stigmatizing and assumed to work primar-
ily for non–addicted or mildly addicted smokers. Libertarian paternalism is useful, then, in that it
recognizes that human decision–making is not always in line with what the individual really wants,
and that healthy behavior should be encouraged in a non–coercive way. However, it is still focused on
preserving negative—rather than positive—freedom, and is insufficiently sensitive to the relational na-
ture of autonomy in addiction, the social conditions that underlie addictions, and the social injustices
that propagate tobacco–related health inequalities. Therefore libertarian paternalism can be incorpo-
rated into universal measures in which non–addicted or mildly–addicted people are discouraged from
41One may argue that it is still coercive in the sense that the state attempts to influence people’s decisions. However,
‘non–coercive’ here refers to the idea that the unhealthy option is still permitted, and that individuals are not strictly
forced into healthier options.
42Increasing the prices of tobacco, placing off–putting pictorial warnings on cigarette packs, media campaigns, and
banning flavourings and additives in cigarettes in order to make them less desirable—see section 2.2.1.
43See section 2.2.2.
44The moralization and stigmatization of smokers is unethical, and could be counterproductive for severely addicted
smokers. An ethical discussion on tobacco denormalization strategies is provided in section 6.1.
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smoking and addictions are thereby prevented, but this should be done in combination with measures
that are more sensitive to the contexts and features of severe addictions.
Stewardship as an ethical basis
The Nuffield Council’s stewardship model, introduced in section 2.3.3, stipulates that:
“Concerning goals, public health programmes should:
- aim to reduce the risks of ill health that people might impose on each other;
- aim to reduce causes of ill health by regulations that ensure environmental conditions
that sustain good health, such as the provision of clean air and water, safe food and
appropriate housing;
- pay special attention to the health of children and other vulnerable people;
- promote health not only by providing information and advice, but also by programmes
to help people overcome addictions and other unhealthy behaviours;
- aim to ensure that it is easy for people to lead a healthy life, for example by providing
convenient and safe opportunities for exercise;
- ensure that people have appropriate access to medical services; and
- aim to reduce health inequalities.
In terms of constraints, such programmes should:
- not attempt to coerce adults to lead healthy lives;
- minimise interventions that are introduced without the individual consent of those
affected, or without procedural justice arrangements (such as democratic decision-
making procedures) which provide adequate mandate;
- seek to minimise interventions that are perceived as unduly intrusive and in conflict
with important personal values.”(pg. xvii, [43])
The arguments of the stewardship model fit quite closely to those made in this thesis. In line with
Mill’s theory, it correctly recognizes the need for states to protect others from exposure to SHS (“aim
to reduce the risks of ill health that people might impose on each other”), and to protect the health of
children. However, it goes beyond Mill’s theory in that it also recognizes the need to pay attention to
the health of vulnerable people and to minimize health inequalities. Focus, in line with the arguments
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in this thesis, is on the infrastructural conditions and support systems for good health, including:
“regulations that ensure environmental conditions that sustain good health”, and “programmes to
help people overcome addictions and other unhealthy behaviours”. This may include the provision
of therapies that help people to overcome their addictions, minimization of tobacco–related cues, and
support systems for socially disadvantaged groups. The stewardship model also correctly advocates
for a non–coercive approach: to “minimise interventions that are introduced without the individual
consent of those affected”, and to “not attempt to coerce adults to lead healthy lives”.
The limitations of stewardship
Thus the stewardship model correctly recognizes freedom in both its negative and positive sense. It
also shares the goals of the ethical framework of this thesis: to minimize overall smoking prevalence,
prevent smoking initiation among children, minimize tobacco–related health inequalities, help people
to overcome addictions, and protect others from SHS. However, there are a few points of weakness in
the stewardship model. An ethical framework for tobacco control should avoid stigmatizing addicted
smokers, but it is not clear what the stewardship model’s stance is on this. It also does not specify
whether addictive decisions tend to be influenced by social or emotional contexts, or whether they
are purely rational in nature (and, therefore, whether addiction treatments should take into account
social or emotional factors). In other words, it is insufficiently sensitive to the relational features of
addiction. The stewardship model is also insufficiently context–sensitive. In the Nuffield Council’s
case study on tobacco,[43] for example, it is recommended that the TI acts in more socially responsible
ways. It is argued, for instance, that:
“It is ethically inconsistent for tobacco . . . companies advertising and selling their products
in developed countries to claim corporate social responsibility, and yet apply different
standards for protecting consumers in different countries . . . [the TI] should implement a
voluntary code of practice that universalises best practice in terms of consumer protection.”
(pg.113, [43])
Yet, evidence from chapter 4 indicates that expecting authentic corporate social responsibility
from the TI is likely to be problematic, because previous corporate social responsibility initiatives of
the TI were actually designed to encourage smoking, particularly among children.45
45For example, the TI had ‘corporate responsibility’ initiatives in the form of TI–funded anti–smoking campaigns for
children. However, these campaigns were actually aimed at encouraging smoking initiation among youth, because they
portrayed smoking as an adult–like behavior.[39]
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Other tobacco restrictions advocated by the stewardship model are similarly modest and context–
insensitive. It is recommended, for example, that tobacco companies refrain from: “understating
risks, and from exploiting the apparent desirability of . . . smoking, particularly in ways that appeal to
children and young people” (pg.116, [43]). However, ways in which the TI has targeted children in its
marketing go beyond simply understating risks and exploiting the desirability of smoking. In chapter 4,
it was argued that the TI are largely responsibility for normalizing smoking in the first place, and that
they have targeted children in indirect ways, for example by claiming that smoking is ‘for adults’, or
through movie placements. Further, the stewardship model recommends “the raising of the minimum
age for the purchase of tobacco from 16 to 18 years” (pg.116, [43]), but this recommendation does not
consider the neurodevelopmental factors that predispose people under age 25 to tobacco, which—as
argued in section 3.2.4—is an important basis for extending protections to all people aged below 25.
The case study also pays little attention to the social nature of tobacco addiction, and thus fails to
properly recognize the requirement for autonomy–promoting social conditions.
Limitations of the intervention ladder
The stewardship model also comprises an intervention ladder, which orders types of state intervention





- Change of default policy
- Enable choice
- Provide information
- Do nothing or monitor.[43]
This approach follows that of employing the least restrictive means in mitigating a harm.[155] The
intervention ladder is essentially an extension of Mill’s liberal theory and libertarian paternalism, as
its aim is to strike a balance between negative freedom and health. The main difference is that it
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will permit more intrusive interventions—such as choice elimination—in the most extreme cases: for
example, banning drink driving in order to prevent killing others in car accidents.
An issue with the intervention ladder, then, is that it camps freedom and health against one
another, even though in addiction there are important interconnections between the two. As argued,
addiction is a condition that undermines health and autonomy; interventions that aim to prevent
and treat addictions maximize health and autonomy, and therefore positive freedom. It logically
follows that, at least in the context of tobacco control policy, interventions that aim to prevent and/or
treat the most severe addictions should be prioritized; however, the intervention ladder cannot take
this into account as its aim is to balance health with negative freedom. In other words, an ethical
framework for tobacco control policy should not only be viewed as a code of restraint, but also as
a means of maximizing opportunities for positive freedom and the conditions that promote it on an
equal basis.[145]
A relational approach to tobacco control
A relational conception of public health, which recognizes the importance of relationships and the
community in promoting good health, is supported by three principles: relational autonomy, social
justice, and relational solidarity.46[45]
All three principles are relevant to the arguments in this thesis, as they reflect the importance of
relationships and the social environment in addiction. The principle of relational autonomy correctly
recognizes the need to provide autonomy–promoting conditions that can prevent the triggering and
sustaining of addictions. The principle of social justice aims to correct systematic social disadvantages
that contribute to ill health; it would advocate for support systems that help to prevent and treat
addictions among socially disadvantaged groups, in part by addressing the underlying factors that
contribute to addiction. The principle of relational solidarity, which argues for a solidarity committed
to social justice, would advocate for support systems that help the social integration of marginalized
groups, or social support to those who need it most; for example, parents with young children living
with a mental illness or in stressful circumstances. The principle of reciprocity relates closely to the
principle of relational solidarity, as it argues for support systems that enable individuals to fulfil their
ethical duties; for example, better support systems that help individuals to stay tobacco–free.[155]
Aspects of these principles, then, should be integrated into the ethical framework of this thesis.
46These principles were introduced in section 2.3.3, and their definitions are provided on page 51.
146
Building on transparency
The TI has been identified as a powerful adversary to tobacco control efforts, with a vast influence that
goes beyond influencing policy decisions directly. Transparency—which was introduced as an ethical
principle in section 2.3.3—is therefore important when considering the activities of the TI, but should
be built on to include further measures such as the regulation and exposure of the TI’s marketing and
research activities.
As discussed in chapter 4, the TI has influenced policies by propagating misleading argument and
claims about tobacco use, influencing scientific research, and normalizing smoking in a way that helps
to resist effective tobacco control measures. Addressing TI–related issues, then, should entail more
than simply exposing the TI’s involvement in policy decisions: it should also correct misperceptions
that the TI has propagated, and regulate and expose its marketing tactics so that people are better
protected. This approach should be particularly targeted to those who are more vulnerable to the TI’s
marketing practices, such as children. Transparency could also be used to communicate the ethical
basis and rationale of tobacco control policies, in order to gain better support for them and to protect
against counter–arguments propagated by the TI.
Summary
Libertarian paternalism and stewardship provide a useful starting point for thinking about how in-
terventions should strike a balance between negative freedom and health, provide conditions more
conducive to health, minimize health inequalities, and encourage healthier lifestyles free from tobacco.
What is missing, however, is sensitivity to some important features of addiction that have been de-
scribed throughout chapters 3 and 4: social, commercial, and relational influences, including the social
injustices that contribute to addiction, the interconnection between health and positive freedom in
addiction, and the relational nature of autonomy in addiction.
Relational autonomy, in recognizing the important effects of autonomy–promoting social condi-
tions, can strengthen the ethical framework and make it more context–sensitive. Along with the
ethical considerations discussed so far, it may also fit into a human rights–based approach to tobacco
control. What follows, then, is a discussion of human rights that are relevant to addiction and tobacco
control, and how they—based on the arguments of this thesis—may support a human rights–based
approach to tobacco control policy.
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5.2.3 Application of human rights
Human rights were introduced in section 2.3.4.47 It was mentioned that the right to health generally
forms the basis of pro–regulatory arguments, while rights to liberty, self–determination, and privacy
have been used to support pro–tobacco arguments. Other rights, relevant to the context of tobacco,
were also introduced: the right to life, the right to social conditions conducive to health, equality
rights, children’s rights, and the right to social and cultural participation. In this section, these rights
are returned to, and their relevance is discussed in light of the arguments presented throughout this
thesis.
Rights to life and health
The rights to life (UDHR article 3) and health (ICESCR article 12) form the ethical basis of the
WHO FCTC and the general basis of human rights arguments in support of tobacco control. In
ICESCR, the right to health is defined as a right to “enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of
physical and mental health”, which also includes the “prevention, treatment and control of epidemic,
endemic, occupational and other diseases”. Smoking is an epidemic that threatens the life of self and
others, and can have serious effects on one’s physical and mental health. Hence measures that aim to
minimize the public health–related burden of tobacco use are supportive of the rights to life and health.
This includes measures advocated by the WHO FCTC, any approach that provides infrastructural
conditions to facilitate non–addiction and minimize tobacco use (such as stewardship), or measures
based on the harm principle, which protect the rights to life and health of those who would otherwise
be exposed to SHS.
Right to social conditions conducive to health
This thesis has highlighted the importance of the social environment in the development of addictions.
This was argued to be particularly relevant for young children, whose neurobiological development is
particularly sensitive to these social influences. This idea is not reflected in current tobacco control
policy frameworks such as the WHO FCTC, but it is captured in frameworks that recognize the
importance of preserving positive freedom and relational autonomy. Such frameworks, then, also
support the right to social conditions conducive to health (UDHR article 25), defined as: “the right to
47They were introduced in reference to international human rights treaties under the United Nations (UN): the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),[161] the International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),[162]
the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),[163] the Convention on the Rights of the
Child (CRC),[164] the International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD),[166]
and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).[167]
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a standard of living adequate for the health and well–being of [persons] and of [their] family, including
. . . necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability,
widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond [their] control.” This could
include the provision of autonomy–promoting social conditions and support systems, to provide better
opportunities for people and their families to lead addiction– and tobacco–free lives. This applies
particularly to socially disadvantaged groups who may require additional support, and parents with
young children who need support in order to support the healthy development of their children. This
last point is also relevant to children’s rights, discussed below.
Right to social and cultural participation
In section 4.1 and beyond, it was argued that certain racial minorities—such as indigenous groups—
suffer disproportionately from addictions in large part because of the mass–scale destruction of their
social and cultural identities. Reinstation of social and cultural identity, or reintegration into the
mainstream society, should therefore—for these groups—be an important aspect of interventions to
support non–addiction. This idea is not captured in the WHO FCTC, but it is supported by relational
autonomy and social justice. In line with these, it is recognized in human rights that: “everyone has
the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community” (UDHR article 27). Going further,
ICCPR article 27 states that: “in those states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist,
persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other
members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or
to use their own language.” Thus in promoting relational autonomy on an equal basis, an ethical
framework that encourages the social and cultural participation of racial minorities is more supportive
of these human rights.
Children’s rights
Throughout this thesis it has also been argued that children, due to their vulnerability, should be
fully protected from tobacco, SHS exposure, and the marketing activities of the TI. This idea is
widely recognized in current policy frameworks such as the WHO FCTC and even in the most liberal
frameworks, such as Mill’s liberalism. It has been argued that these protections should be focused on
those who are—due to neurodevelopmental reasons—particularly vulnerable: adolescents and young
infants.
The WHO FCTC emphasizes the support of children’s rights more broadly through the CRC
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treaty. In line with articles in CRC, there are a number of rights that can be used to support various
measures to protect children. Children have a right to a “clean and safe environment” (CRC article
24), and a right to life, which requires that “governments . . . ensure that children survive and develop
healthily” (CRC article 6). Children also have a right to be protected from “the use of harmful
drugs” (CRC article 33). Measures that protect children from smoking initiation and SHS exposure
are supportive of these rights. Going further, it was also argued in section 3.2.2 that a resistance
to addiction can be conferred by promoting family solidarity and secure relationships between young
children and their primary caregiver(s). Thus a relational approach can also support the right of
children to be: “properly cared for and protect[ed] from violence, abuse and neglect by their parents,
or anyone else” (CRC article 19). Protecting children from the TI’s exploitative marketing practices
also supports children’s right to: “be protected from any activity that takes advantage of them or
could harm their welfare and development” (CRC article 36).
Equality rights
Issues related to social injustice have been highlighted throughout this thesis. They are not adequately
addressed by current measures since smoking is increasingly concentrated among socially disadvan-
taged groups, but may be better dealt with by ethical frameworks that emphasize the social factors
that contribute to addiction, particular in relation to socially disadvantage. Thus a relational approach
to tobacco control can lend more support to equality rights, in which individuals are all accorded equal
access to human rights: “without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, or other status” (UDHR articles 2
and 7, ICCPR articles 2 and 26, ICESCR article 2).
Racial minorities are also protected under ICERD, while people with disabilities are protected
under CRPD. This may include those with: “mental . . . impairments which in interaction with various
barriers may hinder their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others”
(CRPD preamble). Thus, severe forms of schizophrenia, depression, or substance abuse may fall
under this scope. Such individuals are entitled to: “enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of
health without discrimination on the basis of disability” (CRPD article 25). These rights may be used
to protect groups who are most vulnerable to tobacco–related health problems: the mentally ill, racial
minorities, and other socially disadvantaged groups. This includes protection from using tobacco as
well as the TI.48
48Although there are social barriers that limit the actualization of these rights, these rights could be emphasized in
support of tobacco control efforts, or restrictions on TI activity that targets these groups.
150
Rights to liberty and self–determination
Rights to liberty and self–determination have been used to resist tobacco regulations and to argue
for a “right to smoke”. However, these arguments rely on a negative conception of freedom, and
are therefore wrong–footed; freedom should be correctly broadened into its positive sense to include
freedom that arises from state interventions that protect or promote autonomy. As a result of the same
mistake, policy frameworks built on a negative conception of freedom (such as the WHO FCTC) are
often viewed as a compromise to liberty rights in order to advance a right to health. However, policy
frameworks that aim to advance relational autonomy are supportive of both health and freedom; it
logically follows that they are also compatible with the rights to health and liberty. Since they protect
autonomy, they also support the right to self–determination.
In other words, there is no liberty right to smoke—an autonomy–limiting option—but there is a
liberty right (UDHR article 3, ICCPR article 9) to options that do not potentially undermine auton-
omy. The right to self–determination is defined as a right to “freely pursue [one’s own] economic, social
and cultural development” (ICESCR article 1 and ICCPR article 1). Although there are economic,
social, and cultural aspects to smoking, it does not contribute to the development of any of these;49
hence there is no self–determination right to smoke.
Right to privacy
Otherwise, pro–tobacco arguments may focus on the right to privacy which is defined as individuals
not being subjected to: “arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence”
(UDHR article 12, ICCPR article 17). It may be argued that, provided that smoking is restricted to
private spaces where no one else is involuntarily exposed to SHS, a right to smoke may be construed as
a privacy right. However, this thesis argues that smoking, due to its addictiveness, does not contribute
to wellbeing, the integrity of identity, the development of personality, or the ability to establish and
develop relationships with others in order to merit protection as a privacy right. It is on the basis
of this argument that a previous legal appeal for the recognition of smoking as a privacy right was
denied.[419, 420] A privacy right to smoke may also be denied on the basis that smoking is sui generis
as a public health threat; it was emphasized in section 2.1.1, for example, that tobacco is the only
legally available substance that, when used correctly, kills half of its users. It is also addictive for most
users; it is therefore unlikely that a privacy right may be engaged in the support of tobacco use.
Furthermore, the welfare of an individual and of the community are strongly interconnected in
49See the arguments in chapter 4.
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the context of tobacco, due to the social nature of smoking and addiction and the widespread harms
that result from tobacco use. There are few circumstances, then, in which smoking may be considered
‘private’. This idea is also reflected in human rights, as they permit balancing in order to meet “the
just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society” (UDHR
article 29).
Summary
To summarize, there is a broad scope for the use of human rights as an ethical basis for tobacco control
policies, and these are well–aligned with the ethical arguments and concepts that have been presented
throughout this thesis. In particular, an ethical framework which focuses on relational autonomy—
creating autonomy–promoting social conditions, particularly for socially disadvantaged groups—would
support a number of important human rights not supported in current frameworks, such as the right
to social and cultural participation and the right to social conditions conducive to health. It would
also support the rights to liberty and self–determination, which are often used to support pro–tobacco
arguments. Human rights, then, should be integrated with the concept of relational autonomy into
an ethical framework for tobacco control policy.
5.2.4 Description of the ethical framework
It has been argued throughout this thesis that, due to the autonomy–undermining effects of addiction,
interventions that aim to prevent or treat addictions promote both health and positive freedom. For
addictions, which represent the majority of smokers, priority should be on such interventions. Policies
should also be sensitive to the social, relational, and commercial contexts of addiction and tobacco
use.
For these reasons, relational autonomy is foundational to this ethical framework as it recognizes
the interconnections between health and freedom and the importance of an autonomy–promoting
social environment. As argued previously, these are essential in addressing autonomy–undermining
disorders such as addiction, and in promoting non–addiction in a way that supports the most socially
disadvantaged groups. Relational autonomy, in supporting non–addiction, supports the rights to life
and health (UDHR article 3, ICCPR article 6, ICESCR article 12); by focusing on social conditions it
supports the right to social conditions conducive to good health (UDHR article 25); and in promoting
autonomy, it supports the rights to self–determination (ICESCR article 1, ICCPR article 1) and liberty
(UDHR article 3, ICCPR article 9).
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Existing policy frameworks such as the WHO FCTC, though partially effective, are insufficiently
sensitive to relational features of addiction or issues related to social injustice. Still, the foundation of
the WHO FCTC provides useful considerations for tobacco control policies. For instance, the harm
principle provides an ethical justification for protecting others from SHS. Libertarian paternalism sup-
ports measures that can effectively deter non–addicted people—particularly children—from smoking.
In line with current policies, an ethical framework should also protect young people from tobacco
and address issues related to TI activity. Though these ethical considerations are all limited by their
negative conception of freedom, they are autonomy–preserving in cases of non–addiction where auton-
omy is still considered intact. Thus an ethical framework centred around relational autonomy should
incorporate these aspects when considering the non–addicted population, but build on these with a
series of measures that go further in recognizing the social and relational aspects of addiction.
What follows is the description of an ethical framework for tobacco control policy that builds on
these ideas. Its approach is conveyed through a set of ethical considerations, with relational autonomy
at their foundation. They are discussed in terms of their potential effect on tobacco control policies
and relevance to human rights discussed in section 5.2.3. The framework is summarized as a list in
appendix C, and as a diagram—which shows the interconnection between relational autonomy and
the ethical considerations—in appendix D.
Goals of the ethical framework
An ethical framework for tobacco control policy should be centred around relational autonomy. It
should aim to preserve health by creating the conditions that promote good health, and to preserve
freedom through interventions that promote or protect autonomy. This justifies measures that aim to
minimize overall smoking prevalence,50 and that, more specifically: (1) minimize SHS exposure; (2)
prevent smoking initiation; (3) encourage cessation and help smokers to overcome their addictions;
and (4) minimize tobacco–related health inequalities.
50Tobacco control policies can adopt the goal of eradicating tobacco (such as a tobacco ‘endgame’), provided that the
measures implemented also aim to prevent and treat tobacco addictions. This is then considered to be a policy that
maximizes the opportunities for good health and non–addiction, which in turn increases the opportunities for health,
autonomy, and positive freedom. If the goal is tobacco control (rather than elimination) through measures that promote
health and non–addiction, opportunities for health and positive freedom are also created, although to a lesser extent.
This thesis advocates for both, because whether states can implement a tobacco endgame strategy depends in part on
governance, anti–tobacco climate and other factors; a full discussion of these is beyond the scope of this thesis.
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Focus on the social environment
Autonomy–promoting conditions should be created by minimizing the social factors that can predis-
pose people to addiction. Stress, adverse childhood experiences (ACE),51 and poor family dynamics
should be addressed by providing support systems. These, in turn, would protect the right to social
conditions conducive to good health (UDHR article 25). Secure relationships between young children
and their primary caregiver are important in protecting children from developing addictions in later
life, so secure family relationships should be encouraged by providing support to parents, particularly
those who are raising young children within a stressful environment. Social dislocation should be
minimized by helping racial minorities—such as indigenous groups—socially integrate or to have their
social and cultural identities reinstated. This would also support their rights to cultural participation
and identity (UDHR article 27, ICCPR article 27).
It is also important to recognize the relational contexts of decision–making while addicted. It is
known that smoking cessation tends to occur in social clusters: partners quitting together, and friends
quitting together.[81] Thus there should be a stronger focus on involving peers, family, partners, and
other important relationships in helping individuals to overcome their addictions. A similar concept
should be used in preventing youth from initiating smoking. Such programmes have already been
piloted with reported success.[421, 422]
Minimizing tobacco–related cues in the environment
In recognizing that exposure to tobacco or tobacco–related cues can be autonomy–undermining, re-
lational autonomy also facilitates changes in the social environment that minimize the exposure to
tobacco and tobacco–related cues. As argued in section 5.1.4, minimizing the exposure to tobacco–
related cues and reducing the availability of tobacco can prevent relapse and enhance cessation success:
for example, by banning the display of tobacco products, limiting the number of tobacco retailers,
banning TAPS, and restricting smoking in public areas including outdoor spaces. In supporting
people’s choices to live without addiction more easily, such measures support the rights to life and
health (UDHR article 3, ICCPR article 6, ICESCR article 12), as well as rights to self–determination
(ICESCR article 1, ICCPR article 1) and liberty (UDHR article 3, ICCPR article 9).
51Addressing ACE also supports children’s right to be protected from violence (CRC article 19).
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Focus on socially disadvantaged groups
Policies should minimize tobacco–related health inequalities by focussing on the needs of socially dis-
advantaged groups such as people from low socioeconomic strata, the homeless, people with comorbid
mental illness, and racial minorities.52 This supports equality rights (UDHR articles 2 and 7, ICCPR
articles 2 and 26, ICESCR article 2) and the rights of those protected by specialized human rights
treaties, such as racial minorities (ICERD) and people with severe mental illness (CRPD). Accord-
ingly, socially disadvantaged people should be protected from TI exploitation and more social oppor-
tunities and support systems should be available to them. People with mental illness—particularly
schizophrenia, depression, and substance use disorders—should have their needs met through therapy
and support programmes. Undoubtedly the importance of social justice as a constituent of promoting
relational autonomy has already been widely recognized in public health.[45] However, tobacco addic-
tion has important interconnections to these issues which need to be recognized and reflected more in
tobacco control policies. This could be done by, for example, weaving tobacco control interventions
into support programmes designed to tackle these issues.
Reciprocity
Reciprocity53 requires that individuals should be facilitated in fulfilling their ethical duties. Thus it
applies in cases where an ethical obligation is put on individuals, and the state facilitates them in
this obligation by providing support or an alternative option. For example, it is argued above that
there should be secure relationships between young children and their primary caregiver. Reciprocity,
then, would require that the state provides support systems54 to parents with young children in order
to ease pressure off parents and help them to raise their children more effectively. Support systems
should particularly be targeted to parents with young children who lack support: parents who are
raising a child without support from a partner or extended family, suffering from a mental illness,
or who are raising their children within a stressful socioeconomic environment. It is also argued (on
the basis of the harm principle—below) that smokers should refrain from smoking in certain areas in
order to protect others from SHS. Reciprocity would require that smokers are assisted in doing so by,
for example, providing alternative places to smoke or cessation support.
52This reflects the idea of social justice, which has been described as an ethical principle elsewhere—see definition and
discussion on page 51.
53The idea of reciprocity has previously been referred to as an ethical principle—see page 50.
54Support may come in various forms; for example, financial support, support in allocating time to raise children
(e.g. an increase in paid maternity/paternity leave), support in raising children (e.g. better/more affordable childcare
or nursery facilities), or counselling services for parents who are suffering from mental illness or stress.
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Minimizing stigma
Stigma involves the identification and marking of a trait that is considered socially undesirable (e.g.
smoking), which then leads to a series of consequences that generally include the social marginalization
of people who exhibit the undesired trait (smokers).[423] In the context of smoking, stigma may evolve
as a result of perceptions of smoking as a voluntary behavior that holds smokers morally culpable,55
fears of being harmed by SHS exposure, or laws and social structures that segregate smokers from
non–smokers.[424]
Tobacco control policies should avoid stigma, as it puts stress and guilt on individuals which can
make an addiction worse and lead to their marginalization from necessary treatment services. This is
a particularly important consideration for measures that aim to denormalize tobacco.56 Where there
are multiple ways in which to achieve a desired goal (for example the denormalization of tobacco to
prevent smoking uptake among youth), the least stigmatizing should be chosen and where stigma is
a possibility, there should be additional interventions that aim to minimize stigma among affected
groups. These may entail measures such as education initiatives in which a neutral or supportive
approach towards smokers is encouraged.
Non–coercive addiction treatment
For the purpose of this ethical framework, ‘coercive treatment’ refers to the forced treatment—such
as medical treatment—of addicted smokers.57 As argued, coercive interventions may be carried out
on addicted individuals on the (erroneous) assumption that they are, because of their addiction, not
autonomous. Such interventions are unethical because an addiction does not negate a person’s ability
to avoid tobacco use. Though medical therapies may be given with informed consent, treatments
should prioritize helping individuals to overcome their addictions by mobilizing their will and resolve,
training their capacity for volitional self–control, and focusing on positive changes within the social
environment.58 Mobilizing will and resolve in severe tobacco addictions may include, for example,
helping the individual to identify reasons to quit smoking and playing on those reasons in further
55As discussed in section 4.2, this happened in the context of illicit drug use as the use of psychoactive drugs became
increasingly perceived as an immoral choice. This resulted in a ‘moral choice’ theory of addiction, in which addicted
drug users were stigmatized, socially marginalized, and often punished by law for their drug use.
56Further discussion on this point is provided in section 6.1, in light of recent attempts to denormalize tobacco.
57Other measures may also be considered coercive in certain circumstances. For example, tobacco taxation may raise
prices to a level at which poorer smokers are forced to cut down, though it is unlikely they would have to quit completely.
In such cases, free or affordable alternative options—such as nicotine replacement therapy (NRT)—should be provided.
Not giving adults an option to initiate smoking may be considered coercive, though this is more accurately an ‘option
elimination’ rather than a ‘coerced therapy’ as it would not force them into withdrawal or unwanted medical procedures.
58For further discussion on this last point, see the above discussion ‘focus on the social environment’.
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therapy. Training one’s capacity for self–control could entail, for example, neurobehavioral therapies
and learning how to become more aware of tobacco–related cues. In supporting non–coercion, this
also supports the right to consent.
Building on existing frameworks
In encouraging better health among the population, three ethical considerations—all which build on
current policy frameworks—should be incorporated into tobacco control policies: libertarian paternal-
ism, the harm principle, and the protection of young people.
Libertarian paternalism recognizes the importance of encouraging a tobacco–free lifestyle. It should
be applied to in a non–stigmatizing way,59 to encourage non–smoking particularly among non–addicted
people such as casual smokers, youth, and the non–smoking adult population. Youth may respond
more to certain discouragement measures—such as smokefree laws, retail restrictions, warning labels,
and taxation—so these measures should be targeted specifically to them. The emphasis of libertarian
paternalism on encouraging a healthy lifestyle supports the rights to life (UDHR article 3, ICCPR
article 6), health (ICESCR article 12), and children’s rights to life and healthy development (CRC
article 6).
The harm principle, which is derived from Mill’s liberal philosophy, protects others—especially
children—from tobacco–related harm including SHS exposure. It protects non–smokers’ rights to life
(UDHR article 3, ICCPR article 6) and health (ICESCR article 12), children’s rights to life and healthy
development (CRC article 6), and children’s right to a safe and clean environment (CRC article 24).
Accordingly, it requires that all indoor areas, especially those in which children are present, are made
smokefree. As argued in section 5.2.1, it may also apply to some outdoor spaces where smokers are sat
in close proximity to others, such as outdoor dining areas. In implementing smoking restrictions, the
stigmatization and social marginalization of smokers should be avoided by implementing additional
measures.60
Building on Mill’s theory, an ethical framework should also protect youth—which in this context
includes all children, adolescents, and young adults below age 25—as much as possible from smok-
ing initiation, addiction, and the TI. Relevant interventions include fully protecting youth from the
marketing practices of the TI (including TAPS);61 implementing measures that deter youth from ini-
59To avoid clashing with other aspects of the ethical framework—see above discussion on ‘minimizing stigma’.
60See the above discussion on ‘minimizing stigma’ and discussion in section 6.1.
61Protecting youth from the TI’s more deceptive practices may also include educating youth on these practices so that
they can be better protected from them. This point is developed further below, in the discussion ‘dealing with tobacco
industry activity’.
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tiating smoking,62 and regulating the retail environment such that individuals below age 25 cannot
initiate smoking.63 This supports a number of rights, most notably children’s rights to life and healthy
development (CRC article 6), protection from harmful drugs (CRC article 33), and protection from
exploitation by the TI (CRC article 36).
Dealing with tobacco industry activity
Tobacco control policies should address issues that result from TI activity, described in chapter 4.
Achieving co–operation from or dismantling the TI is, due to its vast political and economic power,
practically difficult. Instead, this framework advocates for a two–pronged approach: regulation and
education. TI marketing and involvement in academia, research, and politics should be regulated.
In addition, policymakers, academics, researchers, and the general public should be educated on the
TI’s marketing tactics in order to better protect people from them. This applies particularly to
groups such as youth and socially disadvantaged minorities, who tend to be targeted most by the TI.
Protecting these groups from the TI also supports the rights of children (CRC article 36) and the
mentally ill (CRPD article 16) to be protected from exploitation. Counter–strategies of the TI should
also be anticipated when developing tobacco control measures, and tobacco control policies should be
transparent about their ethical basis in order to build public support for tobacco control measures
and to minimize opportunities for the TI to thwart these measures with misleading counter–debate.
5.2.5 Discussion of the ethical framework
The ethical framework for tobacco control policy, described in section 5.2.4, has incorporated infor-
mation throughout this thesis into a set of ethical considerations with relational autonomy at their
foundation. It builds on ethical frameworks that already exist, such as Mill’s liberalism, libertar-
ian paternalism, stewardship, ethical principles for public health, and human rights. These have
been made more context–sensitive by considering the features of addiction (particularly its effects
on autonomy), the sociorelational contexts in which addictions develop, and the sociohistorical and
commercial contexts that have led into the current public health situation with tobacco. This ethical
framework therefore builds on current tobacco control measures—most of which are based on libertar-
ian paternalism—by emphasizing the importance of the social environment in preventing and treating
tobacco addictions, the importance of social justice, and the interconnectedness of tobacco addiction
62These are discussed above in relation to libertarian paternalism.
63This could be achieved by raising the minimum age of sale of 25. However, it has also been suggested that tobacco
sales could be phased out to all younger generations to prevent initiation across the life–course. An ethical discussion on
this is provided in section 6.2.
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with other important social issues. The framework also lends a stronger ethical foundation for tobacco
control policies by providing an ethical justification for the measures it endorses and by showing how
these measures are supportive of human rights.
Interrelation between ethical considerations
The ethical framework describes a number of ethical considerations that policies should take into
account. They are all based on the idea that policies should preserve health and positive freedom by
maximizing relational autonomy. Relational autonomy therefore forms the underlying foundation of
the ethical framework and is a common thread between the ethical considerations.
The ethical considerations are not assigned any particular order of importance, because their scope
varies depending on the particular context. For instance, considerations related to ‘non–coercive
addiction treatment’ apply to the addiction treatment setting, whereas considerations that build on
current measures (libertarian paternalism, the harm principle, and protecting youth) apply more in
the context of preventing the development of addictions and tobacco–related diseases among non–
addicted smokers or non–smokers, particularly youth. Meanwhile, the first five considerations—focus
on the social environment, minimizing tobacco–related cues, focus on socially disadvantaged groups,
reciprocity, and minimizing stigma—are concerned more with preventing addictions and ethical issues
concerning addicted smokers, while the last consideration—dealing with tobacco industry activity—
focuses on the tobacco industry. Thus the relevance and importance of each consideration depends on
the policy that is being analyzed, and the specific concerns raised by that policy.
Some ethical considerations interrelate and complement each other, while others may conflict.
Where conflict is inevitable, a balance between ethical considerations may be established by creat-
ing a trade–off between the ethical considerations or by targeting certain measures to the relevant
populations. For example, ethical considerations that focus on social change in order to prevent
and treat addiction—for example focus on the social environment, focus on socially disadvantaged
groups, and minimizing stigma—complement each other as they all seek ways in which to provide
a supportive, autonomy–promoting social environment. This applies particularly for those who are
most predisposed to severe addiction. Ethical considerations that focus on measures to deter smok-
ing, particularly among youth, apply particularly to non–addicted smokers or non–smokers and are
also complementary to each other: libertarian paternalism, the harm principle, and protecting youth.
However, in some cases deterrent measures may come into conflict with other ethical considerations
(such as minimizing stigma), in which case a balance should be established: implementing measures
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to deter people from smoking, but in a way that minimizes possible stigma towards smokers as much
as possible. This may be done by avoiding certain measures or by implementing additional measures,
some which may be targeted to protect those most likely to be subjected to stigma.64
Application and relevance
The ethical framework does not advocate for a single ‘one size fits all’ policy, because which tobacco
control policy is implemented depends in part on political, economic, cultural, and other such factors—
a discussion of which is beyond the scope of this work. For example, some states may opt for a tobacco
‘endgame’ if there is strong support, while others may opt for tobacco control or a harm reductive
approach. Therefore this ethical framework is intended to be used a guidance tool for tobacco control
policies. Accordingly, any given tobacco control policy may be assessed in light of the ethical framework
and its considerations, in order to give indications on how ethical issues associated with that particular
policy may be avoided. The framework also provides an ethical grounding for tobacco control policies,
which allows the rationale of a policy to be better articulated; this, in turn, can help to improve
the credibility of the policy and gain public support. In other words, the ethical framework benefits
tobacco control policies in two ways: (1) it offers a comprehensive ethical assessment of tobacco control
policies that cannot be provided by existing frameworks, and (2) it can help to gain support for a
given policy by providing a robust ethical justification for that policy.
Practicability
While a full discussion on the practical implementation of this ethical framework is beyond the scope
of this work, an initial concern may be that it calls for interventions that require a lot of resources. For
example, it is argued that autonomy–undermining social environments should be addressed; this may
include state programmes that focus on issues such as ACE. The welfare of the community and of its
individuals are strongly interconnected, and evidence throughout this thesis has shown that a healthy
community is more likely to produce healthy individuals; healthy individuals, in turn, contribute to the
productivity and flourishing of a healthy community. Therefore, even individuals who are not directly
affected by these issues—or tobacco–related harm—will still benefit by contributing to the collective
benefit brought about by such state programmes. Furthermore, to tackle related social issues such as
ACE does not necessarily require tobacco control programmes to allocate specific funds for preventing
64For example, the most potentially stigmatizing measures may be avoided in favour of less stigmatizing ones, while
measures to reduce stigma—such as education initiatives—may be implemented. Further discussion on this point is
made in section 6.1.
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ACE; if state programmes already exist to counter child abuse, tobacco control could simply be woven
into these as an interrelated issue. Hence the ethical framework recommends—at the very least—that
the interconnectedness of tobacco addiction to these issues is recognized.65
65In other words, tobacco control could be integrated into social programmes that address social disadvantage, or
social programmes could be integrated into tobacco control programmes. How they are integrated depends on various




Application of the ethical framework
A number of more recent approaches to tobacco control policy were introduced in section 2.2.3. They
are all based on the idea that current regulations based on the World Health Organization Framework
Convention for Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC), while effective, should be supplemented with an
additional approach that addresses the remaining issues. This approach may entail the denormalization
of tobacco or a tobacco–free generation (TFG) proposal to prevent initiation among youth; providing
cigarette alternatives—such as low nitrosamine smokeless tobacco (LN–SLT) or electronic nicotine
delivery systems (ENDS)—to addicted smokers, or a medicalized approach that draws on genetic and
vaccine research. However, these strategies are all potentially ethically problematic.
The aim of this chapter is to provide an ethical analysis of these approaches by applying the
ethical framework developed in chapter 5. This is done by first discussing ethical implications related
to each approach—in reference to the literature, current debates, and the arguments throughout this
thesis where appropriate—and then proceeding with an ethical analysis in reference to the framework
developed in this thesis. This chapter is divided into five sections: section 6.1 looks at tobacco
denormalization; section 6.2 at the TFG proposal; section 6.3 at tobacco harm reduction; and section
6.4 at nicotine vaccines and genetic tests. Section 6.5 then provides a summary of the arguments
throughout this chapter, and the implications of these arguments for future tobacco control policies.
6.1 Tobacco denormalization
Tobacco denormalization1 was introduced in section 2.2.3. As discussed in section 4.3, the tobacco
industry (TI) has made considerable efforts over the last few decades to ‘normalize’ smoking as a
1‘Tobacco denormalization’, as mentioned in section 2.2.3, refers to measures used to indicate that tobacco use is not,
or should not be, a normal social activity.
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socially desirable behavior. These efforts have, in turn, played a very important role in increasing
smoking prevalence and encouraging smoking initiation among children. As mentioned in section 4.3,
children are particularly responsive to normalization cues;2 thus tobacco denormalization is essentially
the reverse of smoking normalization, which similarly aims to change the social connotations of smoking
in a way that influences smoking initiation patterns among youth.
Ways to denormalize tobacco
There are various ways in which it is practically possible to denormalize tobacco use.3 First, cues that
contribute to the normalization of smoking can be omitted by banning all tobacco advertising, promo-
tions, and sponsorships (TAPS), banning tobacco displays, and by implementing plain packaging.4 As
discussed in section 4.3, youth are particularly responsive to TAPS and other smoking normalization
cues, and tobacco packaging is used by the TI to forge early ‘smoker identities’. Restricting these is
therefore likely to minimize smoking initiation among youth. Second, smoking as a social behavior can
be made more rarely observed by implementing smokefree laws in indoor and outdoor public spaces.
Smokefree laws are argued to be the most effective means of denormalizing smoking, as they reduce the
general visibility of smoking and weaken the association between lifestyle and smoking, particularly
when implemented in recreational settings.[425] In endgame strategies, smoking bans are focused on
outdoor areas where children often go—such as playgrounds, schools, and parks—to protect children
from smoking initiation and to focus denormalization efforts on youth.
Otherwise, media and educational campaigns can be used to denormalize tobacco more explicitly,
in various ways. First, media campaigns can be used to address misperceptions regarding smoking
as a social behavior through an approach termed ‘social norms marketing’.[425] For example, youth
typically overestimate smoking prevalence among their peers, which may encourage them to initiate
smoking. Media campaigns can then be used to educate youth, by informing them that only a
minority of their peers actually smoke. This strategy can also be used to address other common
misperceptions, for example ideas that smoking helps to relieve stress, or that addictive smoking is
a free choice. Second, media campaigns can expose the deceptive marketing practices of the TI; this
approach is more accurately TI denormalization rather than tobacco denormalization. Third, media
2It is estimated by some epidemiologists, for example, that up to half of all smoking initiations are triggered by movie
placements that normalize or glamorize smoking—see section 4.3.
3Not all of these strategies may be ethical, however—further discussion below.
4As discussed in section 2.2.1, it is possible for the TI to market tobacco by ‘brand stretching’, in which non–tobacco
products are marketed under the same logo and design as a tobacco product. This is more difficult, however, with a
plain packaging mandate which prohibits any logos or designs on tobacco packaging. In this way, plain packaging is an
effective tool to minimize any opportunities for the TI to indirectly advertise their products.
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campaigns can actively portray smoking as a socially undesirable or unacceptable behavior. An advert
campaign by the UK’s National Health Service, for example, portrays smoking as an unattractive trait
that leads to romantic rejection and social isolation, with the tagline: “if you smoke, you stink”.[425]
Smoking, then, is discouraged not by highlighting its health effects, but by emphasizing its negative
social connotation.
The denormalization of tobacco can thus be achieved in various ways. All tobacco denormalization
measures share a similarity with other discouragement measures (for example those based on the WHO
FCTC), in that their aim is to discourage smoking without prohibiting it. However, they go a step
further by attempting to change how individuals perceive or feel about smoking; altered perceptions
and feelings, in turn, influence behavioral patterns related to smoking. As mentioned in section 2.2.3,
this may occur in ways that are potentially stigmatizing to smokers or in a way that may exacerbate
tobacco–related health inequalities.
6.1.1 Ethical issues related to tobacco denormalization
Stigma
There is evidence that tobacco denormalization strategies are stigmatizing to smokers, often as an
unintended by–product of the policy.[425] Tobacco denormalization strategies that stigmatize smokers
can reduce smoking prevalence, both by reducing smoking initiation among youth and encouraging
smoking cessation among adults.[426] It has been argued that stigma is therefore ethically justified on
consequentialist grounds, provided that the stigma is temporary and helps to reintegrate individuals
who are stigmatized. Since smoking prevalence is higher among some disadvantaged groups, it was
also argued that these groups stand to benefit more from this temporal stigma.[14]
However, it has also been argued that socially disadvantaged groups are more resistant to dis-
couragement measures, and may actually respond to stigma by smoking more as a coping strategy
against the guilt and stress propagated by the stigma.[427] This thesis, similarly, has argued that this
is largely because these groups tend to suffer from more severe addictions; addictive decisions are, in
turn, very much influenced by emotional factors, with stress being a particularly potent trigger. The
result is that, in severely addicted individuals, stress and guilt (and therefore stigma) act as a relapse
trigger through dopaminergic pathways, stress pathways, and the endorphin opioid system (EOS),
and in this way can actually contribute to the sustaining and triggering of tobacco addiction.
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Segregation and social marginalization
There is also evidence that smokers, in response to tobacco denormalization and stigma, may form
‘smoking islands’: social groups in which smoking is viewed as socially acceptable. Individuals in these
‘islands’ tend to be marginalized from the non–smoking mainstream,[81] and are less responsive to
tobacco control policies and the effects of tobacco denormalization.[428] The threat of social marginal-
ization may also encourage some smokers to hide their smoking, which in turn could compromise their
healthcare and distance them from treatment services.[423] Studies have found that some smokers with
symptoms of smoking–related diseases are likely to delay seeking treatment because of concerns about
stigma, and that smokers who perceive more stigma are more likely to hide their smoking status from
healthcare professionals.[15] However, as argued in section 5.1.4, treatment is necessary; particularly
for severely addicted smokers who lack adequate support.
Furthermore, measures that segregate smokers from non–smokers, such as outdoor smoking bans,
may be perceived as overly restrictive or stigmatizing if they make it more difficult for smokers to
integrate with non–smokers.[429] Although segregation is temporary,5 it may discourage smokers from
visiting places where smoking is not permitted. There is also evidence that some smokers, feeling
unable to smoke in public, smoke more in private places such as the home as a result of public
smoking bans.[78] This, in turn, contributes to the formation of ‘smoking islands’. It could also result
in others in the home, such as children, being exposed to higher levels of SHS. One interesting point
to note here is that, in section 2.2.1, it was mentioned that some smokers have responded to smokefree
laws by actually smoking less in their own homes. This is thought to be a result of raised awareness
on the detrimental effects of exposing others in the home, particularly children, to second–hand smoke
(SHS).[77] However, the points made here suggests that not all smokers respond to smokefree laws
equally, and that some may respond in more counterproductive ways.
Tobacco–related health inequalities
Stigma may also be compounded for smokers who are already stigmatized for other traits. This
particularly applies to people with a low socioeconomic status, the mentally ill, or racial minorities;
notably, groups among whom smoking is concentrated. This, in turn, may exacerbate tobacco–related
health inequalities. Yet, tobacco–related health inequalities are becoming more strongly recognized
as a significant problem for tobacco endgame strategies, as smoking prevalence decreases further and
the inequality gap increases.[430] Tobacco–related health inequalities have also been expressed as a
5As in, segregation is only necessary while the smoker is actively smoking.
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major concern and priority in all endgame strategies that plan to denormalize tobacco. The Scottish
strategy, for example, states that:
“We will not achieve our ambition of a tobacco–free Scotland without addressing the stark
socio–economic inequalities in smoking prevalence rates. . . . Tackling health inequalities
and their underlying causes is part of our collective responsibility to advance the right to
life and to increase life expectancy, taking steps to protect us all, particularly children,
from risks to life. Such measures are also clearly required to advance the right to the
highest attainable standard of health.”(pg.2, [98])
Thus, to minimize tobacco–related health inequalities is not only viewed as a practical matter,
but also as a collective responsibility to promote equal access to the rights to life and health, and
to protect children. These ethical ideas fit very closely to those of the ethical framework developed
in this thesis: emphasis on protecting human rights, protecting the healthy development of children,
the importance of social justice as an underlying cause of health inequalities, and recognition that
overcoming these is a collective responsibility shared by society, the state, and individuals themselves.
The Scottish strategy, accordingly, aims to focus its efforts on low–income groups, prisoners, and the
mentally ill, and to integrate tobacco control measures into support programmes that focus on health
inequalities, child health, and social care.[98] However, these strategies may be blunted by parallel
denormalization efforts that contribute to the stigma and marginalization of socially disadvantaged
smokers. Furthermore, although all endgame strategies mentioned in section 2.2.3 have prioritized the
targeting of groups among whom smoking prevalence is higher, the exact strategies behind this remain
unclear. In Finland, for example, socioeconomically deprived groups are to be targeted through media
campaigns, although the exact content of these campaigns has not been specified.[99]
Implications
It is necessary to seek ways in which to denormalize tobacco that do not stigmatize or marginalize
smokers; particularly those who are at a social disadvantage or who are severely addicted. This point
was already highlighted in the development of the ethical framework in chapter 5; recent attempts
to denormalize tobacco are a case in point. What follows, then, is an ethical analysis of tobacco
denormalization strategies, in reference to the ethical framework for tobacco control policy developed
in this thesis.
167
6.1.2 Ethical analysis of tobacco denormalization
The ethical framework developed in this thesis argues that tobacco control policies should promote
relational autonomy. This also entails minimizing smoking prevalence and addressing the following:
exposure to SHS, smoking initiation, cessation and helping people overcome their tobacco addictions,
and tobacco–related health inequalities. The purpose of the tobacco denormalization strategies dis-
cussed is to discourage smoking initiation among younger generations. Focus, then, is on preventing
initiation while other aspects of tobacco use—SHS exposure, cessation, and tobacco–related health
inequalities—may be affected as a by–product of the strategy. In what follows, tobacco denormaliza-
tion strategies are analyzed in reference to the framework and each of its ethical considerations that
support relational autonomy as described in section 5.2.4.
Building on existing frameworks
Protecting young people: Tobacco denormalization strategies focus on protecting younger generations
from smoking initiation by creating a social environment in which they do not want to start smoking.
Removing cues that normalize smoking, such as TAPS, protect youth from the TI. Media campaigns
that denormalize the TI, targeted to youth, can also protect youth from the deceptive marketing prac-
tices of the TI. Measures that make smoking a rarely observed activity in society, such as smokefree
laws in public spaces (both outdoor and indoor) can protect youth from initiation, especially if smoke-
free areas are implemented in areas where they often go: for example playgrounds, youth centres, and
schools. Therefore all denormalization strategies, particularly those targeted at youth, can protect
them from smoking initiation. This, in turn, supports children’s rights to life and healthy development
(CRC article 6), protection from harmful drugs (CRC article 33), and protection from exploitation by
the TI (CRC article 36).
Libertarian paternalism: Tobacco denormalization strategies aim to discourage smoking among
youth. Although there is not much evidence that tobacco denormalization increases cessation, there
is strong evidence that it increases smokers’ motivations and attempts to quit.[425] For smokers who
are not (or only mildly) addicted, this means that tobacco denormalization movements can have a
positive motivational influence. This is also reflected in rates of smoking prevalence, which show a
marked decrease after the implementation of discouragement measures (see section 2.2.2). However,
for more severely addicted smokers, having a motivation to quit does not necessarily translate into
successful cessation. The implication is that denormalization measures should be implemented along
with cessation programmes and therapies that help addicted smokers to quit. This feeds into the idea
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of reciprocity (discussed below).
Harm principle: Certain tobacco denormalizing measures, such as smokefree laws in some outdoor
areas, may offer extra protection from SHS. It was also mentioned in section 6.1.1 that smokers—as a
result of denormalization movements—may avoid smoking in their homes or quit altogether, thereby
protecting others in the home—particularly children—from SHS. However, it was also argued that
some denormalization measures, such as smokefree outdoor areas, may result in some people smoking
more in their homes. Denormalization strategies should prevent this effect by providing alternative
options for smokers (see discussion below on reciprocity), or by helping them to find places to smoke
such that others in the home are not exposed to SHS.6
Focus on the social environment, minimizing tobacco–related cues, and minimizing stigma
Put together, these ethical considerations require policies to minimize social factors—such as stress—
that predispose people to addictions, to minimize tobacco–related cues in the environment, and to
exert social pressure in a supportive, non–stigmatizing way. Therefore denormalization movements
should remove normalizing tobacco–related cues in the environment and promote pro–regulatory social
movements, while avoiding the stigmatization of smokers. This requires a separation of the denor-
malization strategies that are potentially stigmatizing from those that have a more neutral social
connotation.7
As mentioned above, there are various ways to approach tobacco denormalization: (1) tobacco
normalization cues, such as TAPS, could be removed from the social environment; (2) smoking can
be made more rarely observed by implementing smokefree public areas; (3) media can be used to
address misperceptions regarding smoking; (4) the TI could be denormalized; and (5) smoking could
be portrayed as socially undesirable. Of these five approaches, the last is most obvious in encouraging a
negative social connotation towards smokers, and is therefore unethical.8 The other four, however, are
less likely to produce a negative social connotation towards smoking—or smokers—because their focus
6In Scotland, for example, the ‘REFRESH’ project aims to encourage parents with young children to not smoke in
the home. This is done by going into the homes of smokers with young children, measuring the air quality in the home,
and educating the parents on the effects this can have on their child. They are then provided with personalized advice
on how air quality in the home can be improved, for instance by suggesting alternative places to smoke. See [98].
7In separating actions that are ‘potentially stigmatizing’ from those that have a ‘neutral social connotation’, it is
recognized that even the more socially ‘neutral’ actions may—to some degree—be considered stigmatizing. The point,
then, is that they lie along a continuum, and actions that lean further towards being ‘socially neutral’ should be prioritized
over those that lean further towards ‘stigmatizing’.
8Media campaigns are not necessarily stigmatizing if smoking is indirectly portrayed as socially undesirable as a public
health matter; for example with the message that ‘smoking is unhealthy’. This indirectly implies that, since smoking is
unhealthy, it is also socially undesirable. However, this would be more accurately described as a health–related warning
campaign. More direct messages, such as ‘smoking is unhealthy and socially undesirable’ has more potential to stigmatize
smokers as it portrays smokers as unhealthy and socially undesirable.
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is on portraying smoking as a rare (but not necessarily a stigmatizing) activity, or on denormalizing
the TI. Denormalization of the TI is likely to produce a negative perception of the TI, but not smokers,
as smokers are then portrayed as victims of the deceptive practices of the TI.9[425] Such movements
support relational autonomy, and may therefore—as argued in section 5.2.4—also support the rights to
life and health (UDHR article 3, ICCPR article 6, ICESCR article 12), social conditions conducive to
good health (UDHR article 25), self–determination (ICESCR article 1, ICCPR article 1), and liberty
(UDHR article 3, ICCPR article 9).
Focus on socially disadvantaged groups
Tobacco denormalization efforts should support equality rights (UDHR articles 2 and 7, ICCPR article
2 and 26, ICESCR article 2) by paying attention to the needs of socially disadvantaged groups: racial
minorities, the mentally ill, and people in low socioeconomic strata. As mentioned in section 6.1.1,
such groups may be subjected to compound stigma, if they are already stigmatized for a trait that puts
them at a social disadvantage, and in addition are stigmatized for smoking. Problems with stigma
are likely to be exacerbated if such groups remain unresponsive to tobacco denormalizing measures,
for example by forming ‘smoking islands’; hence these groups should be included in denormalization
movements in a non–stigmatizing way, and a neutral or supportive towards them should be encouraged.
These groups should also be protected from exploitation by the TI, and provided better opportunities
and support to overcome their tobacco addictions. As with the Scottish strategy, this could be done
by weaving tobacco control into social support programmes. Denormalization measures could also
be targeted to these groups by focusing on how the TI has contributed to tobacco–related health
inequalities by creating the misleading idea that smoking is a suitable self–medication. This last point
relates to the discussion on dealing with TI activity (below).
Reciprocity
Smokers should be helped in overcoming their addictions, rather than being socially pressurized or
stigmatized into quitting. As mentioned above (in discussing libertarian paternalism), tobacco de-
normalization movements can provide a motivation to quit but they do not necessarily provide an
ability to quit,[425] so denormalization should be coupled with cessation therapies that help to enable
severely addicted smokers to quit.
9Denormalization of the TI is not unethical, because the TI’s activities can hardly be described as acceptable—see
chapter 4.
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Further, some denormalizing measures—such as smokefree outdoor areas—put further restrictions
on where people can smoke, which can possibly—as mentioned in section 6.1.1—make smokers feel
stigmatized or segregated from non–smokers. Reciprocity, then, would approach this issue by providing
alternative places where people can smoke such as smoking shelters within designated outdoor non–
smoking zones. Smokers could also be encouraged (rather than forced) to comply to outdoor smoking
bans, by educating them on the importance of denormalizing tobacco to protect younger people from
smoking initiation and by creating smokefree areas in a bottom–up (rather than top–down)10 manner.
Non–coercive addiction treatment
In discussing reciprocity (above), it was argued that tobacco denormalization measures should be
accompanied with cessation services to help smokers quit. Such cessation services should focus on
helping smokers identify reasons for quitting, building their motivation to quit, and train them to
exercise self–control over their cravings and addictive actions. Focus should also be on the social
factors that trigger relapse, and encouraging positive support from significant relationships e.g. family
and friends. Although priority should be on these types of intervention, medical therapies or nicotine
replacement therapies could also be administered to further assist smokers in their quit efforts.
Dealing with tobacco industry activity
The ethical framework advocates for stricter regulations on TI marketing and activity in research,
lobbying, and debate. All these measures can help to denormalize tobacco. The TI may also be de-
normalized via media campaigns that expose the TI’s deceptive marketing practices, and by drawing
on internal TI documents that demonstrate the TI’s persistent targeting of youth and socially dis-
advantaged groups. Denormalization of the TI is also effective in gaining public support for tobacco
regulations.11 Denormalization efforts could also focus on disspelling myths that the TI has propa-
gated about tobacco; for example, ideas that smoking is a marker of adulthood, is stress relieving,
or that addiction is a ‘free choice’. The latter may also help to reduce stigma for addicted smok-
ers, since—as mentioned in section 6.1.1—one of the reasons why stigma evolves is the perception of
smoking as a voluntary behavior that holds smokers morally culpable. Social norms marketing may,
10‘Bottom–up’ here refers to tobacco control measures that originate from building support from the public; for
example, a community movement that encourages people to smoke in designated areas. ‘Top–down’ measures originate
from laws to which people are required to comply; e.g. a law that only permits people to smoke in designated areas.
11For example, in the Netherlands the public has typically been very resistant to tobacco control measures. More
recently, however, lobbying activities of the TI in Dutch politics were exposed. Since then the Dutch public has started
to become more supportive of tobacco control efforts, and regulations on tobacco have become a significant topic of
discussion. See [431].
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similarly, be used to address common misperceptions.12 These approaches, in making people more
aware of the TI’s exploitative practices, can support the rights of children and the mentally ill to be
protected from exploitation by the TI (CRC article 36, CRPD article 16).
6.2 The tobacco–free generation proposal
The TFG proposal was introduced in section 2.2.3. As mentioned in section 2.2.3, the proposal raises
questions regarding the extent to which smoking should be regulated in order to protect youth from
smoking initiation. Also, due to its specific targeting of younger generations, it may lead to a neglect
of other important and ongoing issues, such as the low success rates in smoking cessation or tobacco–
related health inequalities. This section, then, discusses in greater detail the ethical objections and
implications that may arise as a result of the TFG proposal (section 6.2.1), and provides an ethical
analysis of the TFG proposal in reference to the ethical framework developed in this thesis (section
6.2.2).
6.2.1 Ethical issues related to the TFG proposal
Free choice arguments
The TFG proposal may be contested on the grounds that it is overly restrictive on individual freedom.
In a UK debate, for example, the TFG proposal was termed authoritarian, “fascist”, and incompatible
with liberal values.[432] However, as argued throughout this thesis, having the option to develop
an addiction is not compatible with the notion of freedom, because addiction is a disorder that is
autonomy–undermining. Cigarettes are, by design, highly addictive and addicting for most users;13
therefore it is not unethical to deny the option to initiate smoking, particularly if this involves children
and young adults who, as argued in section 3.2.4, have not yet fully developed their capacity for making
rational, long–term decisions and who are neurobiologically more vulnerable to developing addiction.
However, one may argue that addictions are less likely to form in adults who initiate smoking after
age 25, and so the TFG proposal is unethical where it involves older, consenting adults who choose to
12As discussed above, social norms marketing can be used to correct misperceptions on smoking prevalence, which
is typically overestimated by adolescents. In some schools, this approach has been used to discourage alcohol use with
messages such as: “the majority (66%) of student–athletes drink alcohol once per week or less often or do not drink at
all” and “the majority of athletes (71%) do not use alcohol to relieve academic pressures”.[425] This makes alcohol use
appear uncommon, but necessarily morally repugnant, while at the same time disspelling myths regarding its use.
13One may argue that having an option to smoke is not freedom–undermining provided that the individual does not
develop an addiction. However, non–addicted ‘casual’ smokers represent a minority of smokers, and even they can
develop an addiction in response to stress or other triggers—see the discussion in reference to neurobiological evidence
in section 3.1.
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initiate smoking. In such cases, further ethical justification for the TFG proposal over a less restrictive
approach—such as raising the minimum age of sale to 25—may be necessary.
Protecting youth through less restrictive means
The importance of protecting young people above age 18 from initiation is increasingly recognized.
The TI has understood the importance of targeting people in the age 18–21 bracket, since this is a
critical time for solidifying nicotine addictions. The TI typically attempts to deter these individuals
from quitting, or to recapture those who have quit.[433] Accordingly, in places such as Hawaii and
the city of New York the minimum age for tobacco sale has been raised to 21 years.[434] This thesis
has argued that people should be protected from smoking initiation until age 25, so an alternative—
perhaps less restrictive—alternative to the TFG proposal is to raise the minimum age of sale to 25
years. What are the advantages, then, of the TFG proposal over raising the minimum age of sale?
The answer to this question requires a deeper exploration of the nature of initiation among youth.
As discussed in section 4.3, smoking is commonly viewed by youth as a rite of passage into adult-
hood. This is clearly reflected in the marketing campaigns of the TI, which has long recognized that
smoking is initiated as a marker of adulthood which is later sustained through nicotine addiction.
Laws that permit smoking in later life, similarly, reflect the idea that smoking is a normal adult be-
havior. Not permitting smoking to younger generations, regardless of their age, sends the message
that smoking is not a rite of passage and not a normal activity at any age. Another important aspect
of the TFG proposal is that it progressively denormalizes smoking as an outdated behavior, as the age
gap between youth and the youngest smokers increases.[106] Denormalization is, in turn, an effective
strategy for deterring smoking initiation (see the discussion in section 6.1).
Furthermore, research suggests that most underage youth who smoke do not buy tobacco them-
selves, but obtain it from older peers. These older peers are, generally speaking, established smokers
themselves, able to legally buy tobacco, and in frequent contact with younger people who buy tobacco
from them.[433] So another effect of the increasing age gap is that, over time, it becomes more difficult
for younger generations to obtain tobacco from people born just before the cut–off date. Advocates
for the TFG proposal generally acknowledge that some children, particularly those born around the
cut–off date (e.g. in 2000 and 2001) will initiate smoking regardless of the new law. However, it is
argued that this effect will wear off as smoking prevalence gradually drops, smoking is progressively
denormalized with each year, and the age gap between tobacco–free generations and those born just
before the cut–off date increases.[106] In other words, the TFG proposal is—potentially—advantageous
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over raising the minimum age of sale to 25 in that it gradually increases the age gap between smokers
and tobacco–free generations. However, whether this would be advantageous in reality remains to be
seen, since neither intervention—a law restricting tobacco sales to over 25’s or the TFG proposal—has
been implemented or piloted anywhere.
Slippery slope arguments
Another ethical objection to the TFG proposal is based on a slippery slope argument:14 the argument
that it will justify the phasing out of other unhealthy products such as alcohol, coffee, and sugary
food. However, as argued in section 5.1.1, tobacco is sui generis as a legal product that represents
such an extensive health threat: it is—by design—far more addictive than any other legal product,
both in terms of its pharmacological addictiveness and the proportion of users who are addicted, and
kills half of its users. Unlike other legal products such as alcohol, sugar, and coffee, there is no level
at which smoking or exposure to SHS can be considered ‘safe’, and so the general precaution ‘use in
moderation’ does not apply to tobacco. The implication is that, as argued in section 5.1.1, restrictions
on tobacco should not be extrapolated to other substances: a similar phase–out on coffee, alcohol, or
sugary food would require a separate justification. In other words, the slippery slope argument does
not apply.
Stigmatization of smokers
It has also been argued that the TFG proposal’s prohibitive approach will lead to the ‘demonization’
of smokers.[435] As in the case of many illicit drugs, such as heroin and cocaine, prohibition could lead
to a moralized approach to policy (see section 4.2), and the stigmatization and social marginalization
of smokers. However, the TFG proposal, unlike many illicit drug policies, does not criminalize smokers
because the restriction is on tobacco sales, not tobacco use. Hence the burden of compliance would
lie on tobacco retailers, not smokers.[106] The TFG proposal is also unlikely to result in a moralistic
approach to tobacco policy, because it is based on public health principles rather than the idea that
smoking is morally repugnant. However, this should be emphasized in social movements that promote
or support the TFG proposal (further discussion in section 6.2.2).
14‘Slippery slope’ arguments were described in section 5.1.1. In the context of tobacco, they are based on the idea that
a restriction on tobacco will justify restrictions on other unhealthy, legal products such as alcohol or sugary food.
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Inequality issues
The TFG proposal may also be considered unethical on the basis that it permits a choice to smoke to
the people born before the cut–off date, while denying it to those born before it. It may be argued that
this presents an inequality of liberties, which is based on an arbitrary premise (date of birth).[432] In
the UK, for example, it was argued that:
“A ban of this nature is totally incompatible with the fundamental principle of equality for
all adults before the law. There can be absolutely no debate that the rights and obligations
of a person born on 31st December 1999 are identical with those of someone born on 1st
January 2000.”[435]
However, as this thesis has argued, it is not unethical to deny one the option to initiate smoking,
because having this option is not compatible with the notion of ‘freedom’ (see above discussion on ‘free
choice arguments’). Going further, policies that support non–smoking support relational autonomy
as they protect people from tobacco addiction. Thus, people born before the cut–off date do not have
unequal liberties. They also do not have an unequal advantage to ‘rights and obligations’, since—as
argued in section 5.2.3—there is no right to smoke, and if anything, a right to liberty is actually
supported by measures that contribute to the prevention or treatment of addictions. The only viable
argument related to inequalities, then, is the consequentialist argument that the TFG proposal could
lead to strain between individuals born before and after the cut–off date. Smokers born before the
cut–off date could also be stigmatized as a result of the progressive denormalization of smoking. This
may result in ethical issues such as those discussed in section 6.1. These issues are discussed further
in section 6.2.2.
Further concerns
The TFG proposal may also be contested on the grounds that it only targets smoking initiation, and
therefore has an overly narrowed scope: other important issues, such as SHS exposure, overcoming
addictions, or tobacco–related health inequalities, are not addressed. There are further concerns that
the TFG proposal will not work, since previous attempts to prohibit alcohol were unsuccessful and
resulted in poor compliance, illicit trade, and a public health crisis as a result of illegally produced
alcohol contaminated with methanol.[436] With tobacco, similarly, if the public opposes the TFG
proposal, there could be an increase in illicit tobacco trade. It was also argued that youth may feel
more compelled to initiate smoking as a result of the TFG proposal’s ‘forbidden fruit’ effect.[435]
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Public opposition could, in turn, lead to compliance issues and public protests which may impede the
success of the TFG proposal. Based on the history of the TI,15 it is almost certain that the TI will try
to propagate or support any arguments that oppose the TFG proposal. Ways in which these issues
could be averted are discussed below,16 in reference to the ethical framework for tobacco control policy
developed in chapter 5.
6.2.2 Ethical analysis of the TFG proposal
The ethical framework of this thesis is based on supporting relational autonomy. This requires policies
to minimize overall smoking prevalence and to address smoking initiation, exposure to SHS, cessa-
tion and overcoming addiction, and tobacco–related health inequalities. The TFG proposal directly
addresses the first aspect (smoking initiation), while other aspects may be affected indirectly. How-
ever, it has relatively little focus on relational aspects such as the social conditions that may trigger
smoking initiation among socially disadvantaged youth, or ways in which the TFG proposal—besides
outlawing tobacco sales to younger generations—could help to support an autonomy–promoting social
environment. What follows, then, is an ethical analysis of the TFG proposal in reference to the ethical
framework described in section 5.2.4.
Building on existing frameworks
Protecting youth: The TFG proposal protects an entire cohort from smoking initiation and addiction
because the retail environment is regulated such that people aged under 25 years cannot initiate
smoking. It does this by phasing out the ‘rite of passage into adulthood’ effect, by progressively
denormalizing smoking, and by phasing out tobacco sales to groups that are often targeted for TI
promotions. This in turn supports children’s rights to life and healthy development (CRC article 6),
protection from harmful drugs (CRC article 33), and protection from exploitation by the TI (CRC
article 36). Since the TFG proposal protects younger cohorts from tobacco–related death and disease
throughout the life–course, it also supports the human rights to life (UDHR article 3, ICCPR article
6) and health (ICESCR article 12).17
Libertarian paternalism: In order to maximize these effects and to protect youth further from the
15As in, the TI’s deceptive marketing practices and attempts to subvert effective tobacco control policies with normal-
ization efforts, scientific research, biased arguments, and other strategies—see chapter 4.
16A full discussion of practical issues related to the TFG proposal, such as illicit trade, is not done here because—as
mentioned in chapter 1—this kind of analysis would require a more in–depth inquiry into localized factors that are
beyond the scope of this work. The discussion below therefore only touches on the aspects most relevant to this work.
17I have co–discussed elsewhere ways in which the TFG proposal is potentially supportive of human rights such as the
rights to life and health, without unduly violating rights to liberty, self–determination and privacy—see [174].
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TI, the TFG proposal should be implemented along with measures that deter youth from smoking and
that restrict TI activity: warning labels, taxation, and restrictions on TAPS.18 Harm principle: The
TFG proposal would, over time, protect people from SHS exposure as smoking is progressively phased
out. However, smokefree laws are arguably more effective at protecting people from SHS in the short
term, and should not be neglected in favour of the TFG proposal. In other words, effective tobacco
control measures in line with the WHO FCTC should be implemented alongside the TFG proposal
in order to avoid neglecting other important tobacco–related issues besides smoking initiation, and to
maximize the impact of the TFG proposal.
Focus on the social environment and minimizing stigma
The social and relational nature of addictive decision–making should be taken into account, and—in
supporting the TFG proposal—efforts should be made to prevent or treat addictions by providing
autonomy–promoting social conditions. This can help people born after the cut–off date who, despite
the tobacco phase–out, initiate smoking anyway and develop tobacco addiction. Accordingly, social
conditions that contribute to addiction—such as stress, poor family dynamics, and adverse childhood
experiences (ACE)—should be addressed. This could be done by weaving the TFG movement into
support programmes designed to tackle these issues and by recognizing the interconnectedness of
these issues to smoking initiation and addiction. Social and relational factors should also be used to
encourage cessation. As mentioned in section 5.2.4, given the relational nature of smoking initiation
and addiction, smoking cessation should not be encouraged to individuals but among peer groups who
have initiated smoking together.[422] Cessation should also be encouraged by harnessing support from
family and friends.[421]
Although the TFG proposal does not directly affect current smokers, some smokers may feel
encouraged to quit if society sends the message that it is moving towards a tobacco–free state.[16] A
positive influence from social relationships (for example, between younger and older generations) could
then be used to support people in older cohorts to give up smoking. Tobacco–free youth could, for
example, encourage their parents to quit smoking. In these ways, the TFG proposal could incorporate
a psychosocial approach to cessation that encourages non–smoking within social clusters. This idea
matches research that indicates smoking cessation generally occurs in this way,[81] and that a common
reason for cessation is pressure from loved ones.[80] Social pressure should be exerted in a supportive
manner, without stigmatizing smokers who are unable to quit. A negative portrayal of smokers should
18This also supports an environment with minimal tobacco–related cues, protecting addicted smokers from relapse.
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be avoided (see section 6.1). Such an approach would, in turn, support the rights to life and health
(UDHR article 3, ICCPR article 6, ICESCR article 12), and social conditions conducive to health
(UDHR article 25). In maximizing the ability of people—both those born before and after the cut–off
date—to quit smoking, the rights to self–determination (ICESCR article 1, ICCPR article 1) and
liberty (UDHR article 3, ICCPR article 9) are also supported.
Reciprocity and non–coercive addiction treatment
As argued above, a TFG movement may encourage some smokers to quit; yet having an increased
motivation to quit does not necessarily result in successful cessation (see section 6.1). Reciprocity: It
is important for TFG movements to provide cessation services, both to people born before and after
the cut–off date. Incorporating these ideas as an integral aspect of the TFG proposal would also help
to minimize the gap between groups born before and after the cut–off date. Non–coercive addiction
treatment: Such cessation services should employ a non–coercive approach, in which social changes
to support non–addiction are encouraged, (see above discussion on ‘focus on the social environment’),
and in which individuals are helped in identifying reasons to quit and ways in which to maximize
resistance to addictive cravings.
Focus on socially disadvantaged groups
The TFG proposal would, in theory, minimize tobacco–related health inequalities as it phases out
smoking initiation to everyone born after the cut–off date. However, compliance may be unequal,
because people from socially disadvantaged backgrounds tend to engage more in illicit or problematic
substance use.[36] This may lead to tobacco–related health inequalities as a result of non–compliance.
Non–compliant youth could, in turn, be socially marginalized and stigmatized as a result of the
progressive denormalization of smoking. It is important, then, for TFG movements—in supporting
relational autonomy—to recognize that tobacco addiction is not an isolated problem but strongly
interconnected to the issue of social injustice. It is also necessary for TFG movements to monitor
compliance across different social groups, and to encourage the least compliant groups—in a non–
stigmatizing way—to become part of the TFG movement. This could be done by providing them
with cessation therapy and addressing the social factors that propagate addiction. Paying attention
to the needs of socially disadvantaged groups in turn supports equality rights (UDHR articles 2 and
7, ICCPR article 2 and 26, ICESCR article 2).
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Dealing with tobacco industry activity
To maximize the effect of the TFG proposal, all TI activities targeted towards young people—
particularly TAPS—should be strictly regulated. The TFG proposal should also be supported by
a movement that educates people—particularly youth—on the TI’s practices, particularly its target-
ing of children and young adults. This, in turn, helps to raise awareness on the necessity to protect
youth from smoking initiation, and can help to build support and compliance to the TFG proposal.
The public, policymakers, and other stakeholders should also be properly educated on the ethical
basis and rationale of the TFG proposal, including its health and human rights aspects. It should be
emphasized, for example, that people below age 25 are particularly vulnerable to developing addiction,
and should be protected from initiation. It should also be emphasized that the option to smoke is not
compatible with freedom, and that there is no ‘right to smoke’; so the TFG proposal is not restrictive
beyond a point that is unethical, or a violation of liberty rights. TFG movements should also address
popular misconceptions: fears that the TFG proposal will criminalize or demonize smokers or that it
will result in a slippery slope towards banning alcohol and unhealthy food.
6.3 Tobacco harm reduction
Tobacco harm reduction, which was introduced in section 2.2.3, would involve providing cigarette
alternatives such as LN–SLT or ENDS to addicted smokers in order to help wean them off cigarettes.
As discussed in section 2.2.3, both products are potentially harmful and may be used by the TI to
subvert effective tobacco control policies. Nevertheless, if LN–SLT or ENDS can contribute to the
minimization of tobacco–related public health impacts without creating further implications, their
use is not fundamentally incompatible with the ethical framework of this thesis. What follows is a
discussion of the potential ethical implications that may arise as a result of permitting a market for
LN–SLT and ENDS (section 6.3.1), and an ethical analysis in reference to the ethical framework of
this thesis (section 6.3.2).
6.3.1 Ethical issues related to tobacco harm reduction
The message of tobacco harm reduction
Those who advocate for tobacco harm reduction generally argue that smokers should have access to
less harmful alternatives if they are unable or unwilling to quit using nicotine. Not permitting this
option is then considered moralistic and in conflict with public health principles.[437] The TI, however,
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also strongly advocates for tobacco harm reduction. The tobacco company Philip Morris, for example,
argues that tobacco harm reduction should be sought on the grounds that tobacco use, despite public
health efforts, will continue:
“Harm reduction policies are based on the view acknowledged by virtually all public health
organizations that tobacco use will continue well into the future . . . The recognition that
people will continue to smoke has led many public health authorities to the conclusion
that developing tobacco products that have a reduced risk of causing disease is a crucial
element of tobacco policy.”[438]
However, this view goes against other strategies such as tobacco denormalization and the tobacco–
free generation proposal, that aim to near–eliminate tobacco consumption. It sends the conflicting
message that tobacco use will continue, while endgames imply that states are moving towards becoming
tobacco–free. Further, endgame ideas, as well as current tobacco control policies based on the WHO
FCTC, send the health message that smokers should be encouraged to quit smoking completely and
that non–smokers should never initiate. However, products such as LN–SLT and ENDS have been
promoted with the conflicting message that reducing tobacco consumption—rather than complete
cessation—is sufficient.[17] It is argued, then, that policies should continue to encourage complete
cessation and not become too distracted by a harm reductive approach.[439] Others have warned
that the TI is simply using harm reductive sentiments to sustain addictions to nicotine, in order to
undermine current tobacco control efforts and encourage smoking among youth.[440]
Potential to reduce harm
It was mentioned in section 2.2.3 that both LN–SLT and ENDS are, albeit less harmful than cigarettes,
still potentially harmful to self and others. A question, then, is whether the harm threshold of these
products is sufficiently low to be considered under a tobacco harm reduction strategy. For LN–SLT,
the harm threshold relative to cigarettes is low,19 so if cigarette smokers make a complete switch to
LN–SLT, they are significantly less likely to suffer health complications. Others around them would
also be less exposed to SHS. This applies particularly to smokers who are unable or unwilling to quit
using nicotine, or for whom conventional cessation therapies, such as nicotine patches or varenicline,
do not work.[441] Thus it has been argued that there is a case, from an ethical and public health
perspective, to permit severely addicted smokers access to LN–SLT.[18, 19] For ENDS, however, the
19As mentioned in section 2.2.3, the harm threshold of LN–SLT in relation to that of cigarettes is 5–9%—see [113].
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potential harms and benefits of a complete switch from cigarettes are less clear, and it is uncertain
whether the vapour from ENDS is harmful to the health of others.20 Accordingly, it is recommended
that the use of ENDS in public places is subject to the same restrictions as tobacco, and that their
use and marketing is regulated until more evidence emerges.[17]
Potential as a cessation strategy
There are further questions regarding the potential use of LN–SLT and ENDS as smoking cessation
aids. It has been argued that many smokers are able to quit without a cessation aid, and so replacement
products such as LN–SLT and ENDS are unnecessary.[102] However, most cessation attempts are
unsuccessful, even with conventional cessation aids.21 This thesis also argues that tobacco addiction
can be extremely difficult to overcome, particularly for individuals regularly exposed to tobacco–
related cues, stress, and other addiction triggers; therefore more effective approaches to cessation are
needed.
Smokers who do not respond favourably to conventional cessation aids could then have the option
of switching to LN–SLT or ENDS.[120] However, evidence so far indicates that the use of ENDS is more
likely to result in dual use with cigarettes rather than a complete switch to ENDS.[17] Similar issues
may be observed with LN–SLT,[19] especially in places where it is poorly regulated. Furthermore,
simply switching from cigarettes to another product does not necessarily take into account the social
or relational factors that contribute to an individual’s addiction; yet this thesis argues that, due to
the social and relational nature of addictive decision–making, a sociorelational approach should be
adopted in smoking cessation. This should involve the positive influence from family, friends, and
other important relationships, and address the social circumstances that trigger addiction. It was also
argued that individuals are capable of training their own resistance to addiction, and so cessation
therapies should attempt to harness the will, resolve, and self–control of addicted smokers. Failing
that, however, LN–SLT and ENDS could still be provided as a last–resort option for severely addicted
smokers who are unable or unwilling to quit using nicotine, or who need access to an alternative
product while undergoing cessation therapy.
20This is, as mentioned in section 2.2.3, because ENDS are relatively new to the market and an assessment of their
long–term impact on the health of self and others has not yet been possible—see [17].
21In section 2.1.1, for example, it was mentioned that, even with approved cessation aids, success rate for cessation is
just 25%.
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Concerns raised by tobacco industry activity
As mentioned in section 2.2.3, there are also concerns that the TI will market LN–SLT and ENDS
in ways that will worsen the current public health situation. As mentioned in section 4.4, recent
attempts of the TI to find a ‘safe alternative’ to cigarettes echoes earlier attempts of the TI to find
a ‘safe cigarette’; however, this was essentially a strategy to improve the TI’s corporate image, and
actually made the public health situation worse.[39] Similarly, the TI’s current marketing activities,
particularly for ENDS, are concerning. ENDS are promoted as ‘healthy’ and ‘safe’ even though their
health benefits and safety remain unproven. They are advertised as a useful cessation aid despite the
fact that they seem to result mostly in dual use. ENDS are also promoted as appropriate products to
use in smokefree public areas,[120] even though the ENDS vapour is not necessarily safe for others. The
latter has also raised concerns that the unregulated use of ENDS in public will renormalize smoking as
a social activity. This, in turn, may undermine current tobacco denormalization efforts.22 Otherwise,
the marketing of ENDS emulates similar ideas as those in earlier promotions of tobacco: ENDS as a
symbol of independence, lifestyle choice, success, and glamour.[17]
ENDS are also marketed to youth and designed in ways that encourage initiation.[442] This could,
in turn, result in nicotine addiction or sustained use of ENDS. There are also concerns that it acts
as a ‘gateway’ into smoking cigarettes. Some ENDS take the form of everyday items such as pens
and USB memory sticks,[17] and are sold in a wide variety of flavours that mimic sweets, with names
such as ‘coconut bomb’, ‘peppermint blast’, and ‘vanilla cupcake’.[442] Consequently, youth experi-
mentation with ENDS has increased significantly in recent years, and many of these youth are also
using cigarettes.[17] Similarly, the use of LN–SLT among youth is a concern, especially in places where
SLT is poorly regulated and designed to be highly addictive. It was mentioned in section 2.2.3 that,
in places such as South Africa and India, the use of SLT seems to encourage nicotine addiction and
cigarette smoking in later life, and that this is in large part due to a lack of regulation.
The unregulated marketing of LN–SLT and ENDS can also trigger dual use in addicted smok-
ers. One study, for example, found that adverts for ENDS can trigger cravings for cigarettes in
addicted smokers and ex–smokers.[120] According to the neurobiological evidence in section 3.1.1,
TAPS are tobacco–related cues that can trigger cravings and relapse, and are in this sense autonomy–
undermining. The similarities between LN–SLT/ENDS and cigarettes suggests that adverts and pro-
motions of LN–SLT and ENDS may also act as tobacco–related cues, and are therefore potentially
22This could, in turn, encourage smoking initiation among youth since they are especially responsive to tobacco
(de)normalization measures—see section 6.1.
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autonomy–undermining and should be restricted.
The need for a regulatory framework
From the above, it is clear that many issues associated with the use of LN–SLT and ENDS are a result
of loose regulations on their use, marketing, and design. A proper regulatory framework is therefore
key if these products are to be incorporated into tobacco control policies as a harm reductive strategy.
Accordingly, the WHO recommends restrictions on ENDS that are similar to those currently imposed
on cigarettes. These include tight regulations on the advertising, promotions, and sponsorships of
ENDS; banning the use of ENDS in public places; warning labels and media campaigns that inform
consumers on the potential risks of using ENDS; and prohibiting sales to youth. The WHO also
recommends restrictions on the nicotine content in ENDS and omitting all flavours, harmful additives,
and toxic by–products.[17] A similar regulatory framework could also be secured for SLT in countries
where the use of SLT is permitted, or places in which the use of LN–SLT may be considered as part
of a harm reductive strategy.[18]
6.3.2 Ethical analysis of tobacco harm reduction
LN–SLT and ENDS are not necessarily incompatible with the ethical framework of this thesis, pro-
vided that they: (1) significantly reduce the health risks to cigarette smokers and others; (2) help
addicted smokers to completely quit using cigarettes; and (3) do not undermine other tobacco control
efforts, particularly the protection of youth from initiation and developing addiction. In line with the
ethical framework, greater emphasis should be on autonomy–promoting social conditions in support-
ing relational autonomy. LN–SLT and ENDS both have a potential to reduce tobacco–related health
risks for severely addicted smokers, provided that their use, marketing, and design is strictly regulated
within a framework similar to the one recommended by the WHO.[17] Additional recommendations
are provided in reference to the ethical considerations that form the ethical framework of this thesis,
and in considering relational autonomy—the underlying foundation of these considerations.
Building on existing frameworks
The harm principle: LN–SLT and ENDS are both potentially harmful to others, particularly to
children exposed in utero or while breastfeeding, so pregnant and breastfeeding women should be
encouraged to quit using LN–SLT and ENDS. This, in turn, protects children’s right to a healthy
development (CRC article 6). Although the precise health effects on others as a result of exposure to
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ENDS vapour is uncertain, it may affect the health of others in a similar way to SHS. To prevent this,
the use of ENDS should be banned in all indoor public places, at least until their long–term safety
has been proven. This, in turn, supports others’ right to health (ICESCR article 12), and children’s
right to a clean and safe environment (CRC article 24).
Protecting youth: Youth should be completely protected from the use and marketing of ENDS and
SLT by restricting all advertising, promotions, and sponsorships of LN–SLT and ENDS, and banning
all flavours and designs of LN–SLT and ENDS that may be attractive to youth. Youth should also
be protected as much as possible from experimenting with these products. Since LN–SLT and ENDS
are only intended to be used by those who are already addicted to cigarettes, their provision should
be limited to addicted smokers. This could be done, for example, by supplying LN–SLT or ENDS
on prescription to addicted adult smokers who have failed to quit with other cessation approaches
or who wish to switch to a less harmful alternative. This approach, by making LN–SLT and ENDS
less available, also sends the message that these products are intended for cessation—not recreation—
and thereby minimizes the likelihood that youth will experiment with them. This, in turn, protects
children’s rights to life and healthy development (CRC article 6), protection from harmful drugs (CRC
article 33), and protection from exploitation by the TI (CRC article 36).
Libertarian paternalism: For the purpose of harm reduction, LN–SLT and ENDS are not intended
to be a recreational product but a cessation option for severely addicted smokers. In other words,
addicted smokers should be able to benefit from the reduced health risks of switching to LN–SLT
or ENDS, while youth should be prevented from initiating their use altogether. This therapeutic
application should be reflected in their regulation. This, as suggested above, could be achieved by
having LN–SLT and ENDS available on prescription rather than simply discouraging their use.
Minimizing tobacco–related cues in the environment
As mentioned in section 6.3.1, adverts, promotions, and sponsorships of products similar to cigarettes—
such as LN–SLT and ENDS—can trigger cigarette cravings in addicted smokers or ex–smokers. They
therefore act as tobacco–related cues and should be restricted. The use of ENDS emulates smoking,
which is another potential relapse trigger so their use should be restricted in public places.
Focus on the social environment, social disadvantage, reciprocity, and stigma
Focus on the social environment: The social and relational contexts of addiction should be recognized.
Cessation programmes, then, should encourage a positive social influence from peers, family, partners,
184
and other important social relationships to help people overcome their tobacco addictions. Focus on
social disadvantage: In this respect, focus in particular should be on the needs of socially disadvantaged
groups, who are more likely to have severe addictions and less likely to respond to other tobacco control
measures. They may also be marginalized from treatment services if they are stigmatized as a result
of their smoking. Socially disadvantaged people may therefore benefit from making a complete switch
to ENDS or LN–SLT, especially if a lack of support or stress from their social circumstances makes it
difficult to completely quit using nicotine.
Reciprocity: People should be facilitated in living tobacco–free lives. Tobacco harm reduction is
compatible with this approach if LN–SLT and ENDS are provided as a last–resort option to severely
addicted smokers. Providing them with an alternative can also bring them closer to other treatment
services. Minimizing stigma: However, particularly when referring to socially disadvantaged people,
interventions related to the use of LN–SLT and ENDS should be non–stigmatizing towards smokers
or people using LN–SLT or ENDS.
Non–coercive addiction treatment
Smokers should not be forced into cessation or switching to the use of LN–SLT or ENDS. Instead,
cessation strategies should help smokers to mobilize their will and resolve to quit, and train their
capacity for self–control through neurobehavioral therapies or by becoming more aware of tobacco–
related cues. These approaches, along with those that pay attention to changes within the social
environment, should be prioritized in cessation. Failing that, however, LN–SLT and ENDS could be
provided to smokers who are still unable or unwilling to quit using nicotine, or who wish to use a less
harmful alternative to cigarettes while undergoing therapy. In such cases, smokers should be urged to
make a complete switch to LN–SLT or ENDS rather than engaging in dual use with cigarettes.
Dealing with tobacco industry activity
As part of a tobacco harm reduction policy, potential ways in which the TI may use LN–SLT or ENDS
to undermine effective tobacco control policies should be anticipated. It is also necessary to expose the
the TI’s deceptive marketing practices to the general public, policymakers, and other stakeholders, and
to clearly communicate the reasons why LN–SLT and ENDS should be subjected to a tight regulatory
framework. It is apparent from section 6.3.1 that the TI’s involvement in popularizing products
such as LN–SLT and ENDS is problematic; these issues should be avoided by implementing a strict
regulatory framework on the marketing and use of LN–SLT and ENDS such as that recommended by
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the WHO,[17] and regulate or closely monitor TI involvement in any scientific research on LN–SLT
and ENDS. Ethical issues associated with the TI’s marketing of LN–SLT and ENDS, as well as the
products themselves, should be communicated to the public. This, in turn, may increase the public
acceptance of restrictions on LN–SLT and ENDS.
6.4 Nicotine vaccines and genetic tests
Two medicalized approaches to preventing nicotine addiction—nicotine vaccines and genetic tests
for nicotine addiction susceptibility23—were introduced in section 2.2.3. As mentioned in section
2.2.3, concerns have been raised regarding the efficacy, application, and ethical implications of these
two interventions. This is largely due to their potential for coercive use, the involvement of vested
interests such as the TI, and the potential of these interventions to medicalize and geneticize nicotine
addiction. What follows is a discussion of some of the potential ethical implications of nicotine vaccine
and genetic tests (section 6.4.1) and an ethical analysis of these two interventions in reference to the
ethical framework of this thesis (section 6.4.2).
6.4.1 Ethical issues related to nicotine vaccines and genetic tests
Issues related to genetic tests for nicotine addiction
The role of genetic factors in conferring a susceptibility to nicotine addiction was discussed in section
3.2.1. It was argued that, based on current research, they are unlikely to play an important role,
particularly in light of evidence that illustrates the environmentally–sensitive neurodevelopmental
and epigenetic processes that can contribute to addiction susceptibility. Thus it is highly unlikely that
genetic tests for nicotine addiction will have much potential as a useful predictive tool; either to target
‘high–risk’ individuals for interventions such as the nicotine vaccine, or as a way of informing future
lifestyle behavior.
These genetic tests may also result in a number of undesirable consequences. Individuals identified
at a genetic ‘low risk’ of developing tobacco addiction may feel encouraged to smoke, even though
nicotine addiction can still develop in non–addicted smokers at a ‘low’ genetic risk (for example in
response to stress or social hardship). Conversely, ‘high risk’ individuals may experience anxiety,
stigma, discrimination, or be subjected to unwanted interventions such as the nicotine vaccine.[127]
23As mentioned in section 4.5, there are other genetic tests being developed in this context: genetic tests for suscepti-
bility to tobacco–related diseases such as lung cancer and cardiovascular disease, and pharmacogenetic tests to determine
which cessation therapy is most suitable for a smoker. For the purpose of this discussion, focus is primarily on genetic
tests that predict susceptibility to nicotine addiction.
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The belief that nicotine addiction is influenced by genetic factors can also make smokers less confident
about their ability to quit, and more likely to believe that medical—rather than social—interventions
are necessary for successful cessation.[443] Otherwise, genetic tests for nicotine addiction provide
permanent information on one’s inherited traits. Some of this information may be stigmatizing,
or become a source of stigma or discrimination if future research shows an association with other
disorders, such as behavioral disorders or addictions to illicit substances. Interventions such as the
nicotine vaccine will not protect individuals from these disorders, or from the discrimination and
stigma associated with them.
If genetic ‘high risk’ associations are found in certain groups, such as a racial minority, they may
be subjected to compound stigma on the basis of having a genetic ‘inferiority’. The idea of a con-
nection between race and genetic inferiority is highly contentious, and goes against the principles of
the ICERD human rights treaty;[166] nevertheless, as mentioned in section 3.2.1, geneticists have re-
searched variants of the MAO–A gene in New Zealand’s Maori population to see if they contribute to
an increased tendency towards aggressive behavior. Further, an association between race and intelli-
gence was explored in The Bell Curve. The basic argument was that Hispanic and African Americans
are genetically predisposed to a lower IQ.[444] However, this study turned out to have fundamental
methodological flaws; it is now known that race is not a reliable predictor of intelligence.[445] Likewise,
a predisposition to addiction—based on the evidence illustrated throughout section 3.2—has less to
do with hard–wired genetics than the stressful, oppressive social circumstances that many racial mi-
norities are exposed to. Consequently, a geneticized approach to predicting a susceptibility to nicotine
addiction in racial minorities is likely to be stigmatizing, scientifically inaccurate, and a distraction
from important social factors that predispose them to addiction.
Issues related to the nicotine vaccine
The nicotine vaccine, similarly to genetic tests for nicotine addiction, may result in unwanted behaviors.
Nicotine vaccination does not protect individuals from the act of smoking or the chronic health effects—
to self and others—that accompany it; nevertheless, some vaccinated individuals may feel encouraged
to smoke.24 This may apply in particular to adolescents who are at the highest risk of smoking
initiation, yet too young to give consent; if they are vaccinated against their will, they may smoke
despite having the vaccination.
24An interesting comparison may drawn with the Human Papillomavirus (HPV) vaccine. The vaccine protects females
from cervical cancers caused by sexually transmitted HPV, so there have been fears that the HPV vaccine could encourage
girls to engage in more sexually promiscuous behaviors. See [446].
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Is the coercive vaccination of children ethical in this context? Coercive nicotine vaccination in
children has been contested on the grounds that it limits a child’s right to an open future.[447] This
right to an open future is, in this argument, assumed to include the right to enjoy the beneficial effects
of nicotine:
“For some [smoking] provides pauses and breathing spaces in a hectic daily life, for others
[smoking] is an important part of group interactions. Active nicotine vaccination not only
blocks the effects of nicotine, it also blocks the child from choosing to exploit the social
functions of smoking.”(pg.345, [447])
However, the option to initiate using a drug that is extremely harmful to self and others, highly
addictive, and therefore autonomy–undermining is not compatible with the notion of freedom. Further-
more, the potential benefits of smoking—described in section 3.1—are relatively small and transient
in comparison to its harms, both to self and others. Hence a child’s right to an ‘open future’ does
not cover the option to initiate smoking. It logically follows that the vaccination of children against
nicotine cannot be considered unethical along this reasoning. However, it may be considered unethical
on the basis that the nicotine vaccine cannot prevent the act of smoking, so children are still exposed
to the health risks of smoking, even if they can no longer become addicted to nicotine or enjoy other
nicotine–related benefits from smoking.
Since the nicotine vaccine can also be used to aid smoking cessation, there are further concerns that
addicted individuals may be subjected to coercive vaccination on the grounds that they are unable
to avoid drug use.[128] It has been argued that such a treatment could ‘restore’ the autonomy that
is lost as a result of having an addiction.[30] However, this thesis has argued that addiction does not
negate autonomy. In the context of tobacco addiction, coerced nicotine vaccination—even in the case
of severe addictions—is therefore unethical and likely to be highly counterproductive. It would also
be inhumane, as it forces addicted smokers into nicotine withdrawal against their consent.
The medicalization of nicotine addiction
Another important contention to the nicotine vaccine is the highly social nature of smoking, partic-
ularly smoking initiation. As discussed in section 3.2.4, youth usually initiate smoking as a result of
peer pressure, or in response to the idea that smoking is a normal or socially desirable adult behavior.
Accordingly, this thesis argues that an important aspect of preventing smoking initiation is to tackle
the social factors that contribute to initiation.
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It may then be argued that the nicotine vaccine, like many other vaccines, confers a form of ‘herd
immunity’,25 and thereby tackles some of the social aspects of smoking. Vaccinated individuals, for
example, are less likely to take up smoking if it is less rewarding, or more likely to quit in early
adulthood. This, in turn, may reduce smoking initiation among peer groups, or contribute to the
denormalization of smoking as a common adult behavior.[450] The idea of social herd immunity has
also been explored in the context of cocaine vaccination.[451] In both cases, it is based on the idea
that the use of addictive drugs is a socially imitated behavior, that spreads among peers like a ‘social
epidemic’.[452]
The arguments and evidence presented throughout chapters 3 and 4 clearly indicate that addiction
and tobacco use are highly subject to social influence, and so this thesis does not dispute the idea that
they are—at least to some extent—a type of social epidemic. The solution should then be rooted in
social change. A fundamental flaw of the nicotine vaccine, then, is that it approaches the idea of social
contagion from a medicalized perspective, without necessarily addressing the social factors responsible
for this contagion.26 In other words, it assumes that nicotine is the only ‘disease vector’ that people
should be inoculated against, whereas in reality there are other important influences such as the social
environment and the TI. These should not be neglected in pursuit of an overly medicalized strategy.
Medicalization is not necessarily unethical in itself; nicotine addiction, for example, has important
neurobiological features that should be recognized. However, over–medicalization is problematic,[454]
as it may result in a straying from effective tobacco control measures that address important social
factors, such as those based on the WHO FCTC, as well as more recent strategies such as tobacco
denormalization or the TFG proposal.
Vested interests
A final issue—especially in the context of genetic tests—is the role of vested interests such as the TI
and the direct–to–consumer (DTC) genetic testing industry. As discussed in sections 2.2.3 and 4.5,
the TI has funded research on genetics and vaccines and is keen on promoting the idea that there are
25If a sufficiently large proportion of a population is vaccinated against a disease, herd immunity will prevent disease
transmission to members who are not immune. This is important for some vaccinated individuals who are unable to
build sufficient immunity. Therefore the use of vaccines is often justified not only for individual protection, but also
community protection via herd immunity.[448] In the context of nicotine vaccines, if a sufficiently large proportion of
youth are vaccinated against nicotine, smoking becomes less desirable and therefore less common. This may reduce peer
pressure to smoke, and protects individuals who are susceptible to developing nicotine addiction through a ‘social’ form
of herd immunity. I have also discussed this idea elsewhere—see [449].
26Interestingly, the idea of ‘inoculating’ youth against smoking initiation has been explored from a social perspective.
This involves reinforcing negative perceptions about smoking in pre–adolescents, in order to prevent them from softening
their views and experimenting with smoking in later adolescence.[453] This strategy, similarly to nicotine vaccination, is
intended to confer an ‘immunity’ to smoking; only that ‘social inoculation’ does this by reinforcing perceptions, while
the nicotine vaccine does this by modulating the immune system.
189
‘safe smokers’.27 The TI could also mislead the public into believing that a predisposition to nicotine
addiction is genetic, and can be ‘cured’ by medical means. However, this would be inaccurate; evidence
in this thesis shows that even ‘casual’ smokers can develop an addiction in response to stress or other
hardship, and that predisposition, as well as prevention and treatment, are all rooted in social aspects.
There are also concerns over how the DTC genetic testing industry will try to capitalize on the belief
that nicotine addiction is ‘genetic’.[455] A pharmacogenetic test related to smoking, called ‘NicoTest’,
is already commercially available. NicoTest assesses whether smokers wishing to quit would respond
better to cessation therapy with bupropion or nicotine replacement therapy (NRT). However, the test
was found to be based on poor and selective scientific evidence; most of which was produced by people
involved in the commercial development of NicoTest.[456] The way in which popular media reported
the NicoTest is also concerning, as it was described as a test for ‘the smoker’s gene’.[457, 458] However,
the evidence in section 3.2.1 shows that there is no ‘smoker’s gene’, and that to promote such a gene
is misleading.
6.4.2 Ethical analysis of nicotine vaccines and genetic tests
The ethical framework of this thesis is based on the conception of addiction as “a neurobiopsychosocial
disorder that originates largely from negative affective states triggered by the social environment”
(quoted from pg.137). Consequently, a policy that adopts an overly medicalized approach is unlikely
to be compatible with the ethical framework developed in this thesis, unless it can be made more
responsive to the social contexts of tobacco use and addiction. What follows is an analysis of nicotine
vaccines and genetic tests for nicotine addiction in light of the ethical considerations in the framework.
Ethical considerations not supported by either intervention
Nicotine vaccines and genetic tests are medicalized approaches to preventing and/or treating nicotine
addiction. Consequently, they pay little attention to the social factors that can predispose people to
addiction, and may even undermine these by encouraging the perception that nicotine addiction is
genetically ‘hard–wired’. This could, in turn, distract focus from important measures that address
the social factors that trigger or propagate addictions: tobacco–related cues, tobacco normalization
efforts by the TI, and weak social support structures. For this reason, neither intervention sufficiently
focuses on the social environment or on minimizing tobacco–related cues in the environment.
27It was argued that this is ethically problematic, because the TI could use vaccines and genetic tests to falsely reassure
smokers or to encourage vaccinated or ‘low risk’ youth to initiate smoking. Popular conceptions that nicotine addiction
is ‘genetic’ could be used to protect the TI in litigations, under the misleading claims that smokers are addicted because
of their ‘genetics’, or that smokers at a low genetic risk of addiction are smoking by ‘choice’—see section 4.5.
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The ethical framework argues that the needs of socially disadvantaged groups, who are more
likely to smoke, should be addressed by focusing on the social circumstances that predispose them to
addiction. However, nicotine vaccines and genetic tests do not focus on these and, as argued above,
may distract policies from them by overly medicalizing the issue. Moreover, tobacco–related health
inequalities may be exacerbated if these groups have no access to nicotine vaccination for cessation
purposes.28 It was also argued in section 6.4.1 that genetic tests could result in the stigmatization
or discrimination of racial minority groups if they are thought to be more genetically susceptible to
addictions and other ‘undesirable’ traits. For these reasons, neither intervention has an adequate focus
on minimizing issues related to social disadvantage or stigma.
In the context of nicotine vaccines or genetic tests, it is also difficult to build on existing frameworks.
The harm principle advocates for the protection of others from tobacco–related harm, particularly SHS.
However, neither intervention aims to minimize SHS exposure. They may even result in increased
SHS exposure if focus is shifted from effective tobacco control measures (e.g. smokefree laws) to a
medicalized approach, or if people are encouraged to smoke as a result of having a genetic ‘low risk’
or nicotine vaccination. Libertarian paternalism advocates for measures that deter the non–addicted
population, particularly youth, from smoking. However, discouragement measures may be undermined
by interventions that imply that smoking—at least for some people—is ‘safe’. It was also argued that
all children, adolescents, and young adults below age 25 should be protected from smoking initiation,
addiction, and the TI. However, neither intervention can protect children from smoking initiation or
TI marketing; the TI may even respond by arguing that smoking is safe for vaccinated or genetically
‘low’ risk children.
Are both interventions fundamentally incompatible with the ethical framework?
A remaining question, then, is whether there is any potential for nicotine vaccines or genetic tests for
nicotine addiction to be incorporated into an ethical tobacco control policy. The use of genetic tests
is particularly ethically contentious, because they are fundamentally flawed: as discussed in section
3.2, a susceptibility to addiction is not hard–wired but socially influenced, even where genetic factors
are involved. This gives a large scope for ethical implications and for vested interests, notably the
TI and the DTC genetic testing industry, to propagate misleading beliefs about nicotine addiction.
This could, in turn, undermine effective, universally targeted tobacco control measures such as those
under the WHO FCTC. Based on these reasons, genetic tests for nicotine addiction are not considered
28The nicotine vaccine is not likely to be very cost–effective, and so it has been argued that it may propagate tobacco–
related health inequalities if people in low socioeconomic strata are unable to afford the vaccine. See [459].
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compatible with the ethical framework of this thesis and will not be considered further here.
The prophylactic use of nicotine vaccines in adolescents is, based on the above discussion, also
likely to be ethically problematic. Nevertheless, the nicotine vaccine could—similarly to LN–SLT
and ENDS—be provided as a last–resort cessation therapy for smokers who wish to use it as a self–
binding strategy. What follows, then, is an ethical analysis of nicotine vaccines in reference to the
remaining ethical considerations: non–coercive addiction treatment, reciprocity, and dealing with
tobacco industry activity. Together, they provide indications on how an intervention such as the
nicotine vaccine may be used in more ethical ways.
Non–coercive addiction treatment
Therapies should focus on harnessing the will and resolve of addicted smokers, training their capac-
ity for self–control, and making positive changes within the social environment. Therapies such as
the nicotine vaccine should not be administered coercively. The nicotine vaccine may, however, be
administered voluntarily as a self–binding strategy for smokers who wish to quit. By lowering the
reward value of smoking, this strategy could also enhance the motivation to quit, or the capacity for
self–control. Therefore the non–coercive nicotine vaccination of addicted smokers is not necessarily
incompatible with the ethical framework. It supports the right to consent and—if it helps people in
overcoming their addictions—rights to liberty (UDHR article 3, ICCPR article 9), self–determination
(ICESCR article 1, ICCPR article 1), life (UDHR article 3, ICCPR article 6), and health (ICESCR
article 12).
Reciprocity
People who wish to quit smoking should be facilitated in doing so. As argued above, there may be
certain people who opt for a nicotine vaccine in certain circumstances; perhaps to enhance a motivation
to quit or in cases where other interventions are not effective. Therefore smokers who wish to overcome
their addiction should not be denied nicotine vaccination, provided that they are attempting other
treatments and have consented to having the vaccine.
Dealing with tobacco industry activity
It is important to regulate marketing and research activities of the TI and other vested interests
(such as the DTC genetic testing industry) in this area, and to anticipate ways in which they may
use this research to undermine tobacco control efforts. Misleading claims made by industries should
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be corrected and communicated to the public, policymakers, and other stakeholders. These include
ideas that addiction susceptibility is genetic and therefore immutable; that genetic tests are based on
accurate and unbiased evidence; that medicalized interventions should take precedence over social ones;
and that vaccines confer an ‘immunity’ to smoking. Furthermore, contact between vested interests and
scientific researchers working in relevant fields should be regulated or exposed to keep a better track
of conflicts of interests that may result in misinterpretations of scientific data. Researchers themselves
should also be made aware of ways in which their research may be misrepresented outside the scientific
community.[460] They should also be encouraged to actively dispute any misleading claims in popular
media, and to avoid accepting funds from vested interests such as DTC genetic testing companies and
the TI.
6.5 Summary
The discussions throughout this chapter demonstrate the extent to which four recent approaches to
tobacco control are compatible with the ethical framework, and how potential issues can be minimized
by drawing on the ethical considerations in the framework.
Section 6.1 discussed how tobacco denormalization efforts may result in the stigmatization of
smokers, especially those in socially disadvantaged groups. This is incompatible with the ethical
framework, which aims to minimize stigma and tobacco–related health inequalities. Consequently,
tobacco denormalization efforts should not promote a negative social connotation of smoking, and
instead focus on social norms marketing, denormalizing the TI, and minimizing tobacco–related cues.
Accompanying strategies were suggested in order to make denormalization efforts more in line with
the ethical framework. These include the provision of adequate cessation services, so that those
who are motivated to quit as a result of denormalization efforts are facilitated in doing so. Policies
should also try to encourage—rather than force—smokers to become part of tobacco denormalization
movements by educating them on the importance of tobacco denormalization in protecting children,
and by providing them with alternative places to smoke in outdoor smokefree areas.
Section 6.2, in analyzing the TFG proposal, explored the limits of prohibition. It was argued that,
though the TFG proposal is likely to be considered overly restrictive, it still lies within the limits of
the ethical framework because having an option to initiate smoking is not compatible with the notion
of ‘freedom’. The TFG proposal may be advantageous over minimum age of sales laws in that it
progressively denormalizes smoking and makes it increasingly difficult for underage youth to obtain
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tobacco from older peers. However, more evidence is needed to ascertain this. To make the TFG pro-
posal more compatible with the ethical framework, it should be integrated into support programmes
for socially disadvantaged youth. The TFG proposal should also be used as a positive social move-
ment to encourage smoking cessation among older generations, and be accompanied with education
programmes that communicate the ethical basis of the TFG proposal, common misperceptions, and
ways in which the TI has targeted youth for smoking initiation.
Section 6.3 highlighted issues in finding better cessation options for addicted smokers, and in
regulating the influence of the TI. Products such as LN–SLT and ENDS have potential to be used
as appropriate harm reductive options, especially for severely addicted smokers who are unable or
unwilling to quit using nicotine. However, LN–SLT and ENDS should be used as a last resort,
because cessation should prioritize a sociorelational approach and training one’s internal capacity to
resist smoking. Furthermore, due to the myriad of issues that result from poor regulations on the use,
design, and marketing of LN–SLT and ENDS, these should be strictly regulated. It was suggested
that policies could make LN–SLT and ENDS available to addicted smokers on a prescription system,
while educating the public on the reasons why LN–SLT and ENDS need to be tightly regulated.
Section 6.4 explored the limits of medicalization in addiction. It was argued that the over–
medicalization of addiction, through interventions such as nicotine vaccines and genetic tests for
addiction susceptibility, can result in a number of ethical implications. Genetic tests were considered
incompatible with the ethical framework of this thesis, due their scientific inaccuracy and large poten-
tial for misuse by vested interests such as the TI and the DTC genetic testing industry. The nicotine
vaccine may have a scope for ethical usage as a last–resort cessation option; however, its preventive use
in children is likely to be ethically contentious, and smoking initiation should be prevented through
interventions focused on the social aspects of initiation.
These strategies, though distinct in their approaches, may complement one another. For example,
it was argued in section 6.1.1 that tobacco denormalization measures may distance some smokers from
treatment services. This is likely to apply especially to smokers from socially disadvantaged groups
who are subjected to compound stigma. However, it was also argued in section 6.3.1 that a harm
reductive approach can bring them in closer proximity to treatment services. So implementing these
strategies together, and targeting harm reductive options to socially disadvantaged groups, may further
minimize issues related to stigma and tobacco–related health inequalities. All strategies also highlight
the importance of protecting youth from smoking initiation, and of providing better cessation options
for smokers. Tobacco denormalization measures and the TFG proposal may motivate some smokers to
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quit, which increases the demand for cessation services. LN–SLT, ENDS, nicotine vaccines, and other
cessation therapies suggested in this thesis may then fulfil this demand. Further issues of importance,
highlighted in all strategies, is that effective tobacco control measures—such as those based on the
WHO FCTC—should not be neglected. Education of the public is also crucial, especially where
restrictions are involved, or where there is scope for the TI to spread misperceptions or undermine the





7.1 Research findings and implications
Tobacco control policies, it has been argued, should aim to maximize individual freedom by providing
conditions that promote or protect autonomy. The approach to enable autonomy, however, has been
a particular one that requires an interventionist approach in which policies tackle the complex social
factors that contribute to the formation and sustaining of tobacco addictions, and in which the relevant
roles of the state, the community, society, as well as individuals themselves are recognized. It is a
theory of enabling autonomy, then, rather than a theory in which having options trumps everything
else.
The features of tobacco use and addiction that should guide tobacco control
The first sub–aim of this thesis was:
To discuss the relevant features of tobacco use and addiction that should guide tobacco
control policies, in terms of public health impacts and neurobiological impacts.
Tobacco use, even in comparison to the use of illicit drugs and alcohol, is a serious threat to public
health which also affects societies and the environment. The regulation of tobacco, then, is not simply
an issue of balancing public health against the individual freedom to smoke, since tobacco use has
serious and ubiquitous impacts that illustrate the interconnectedness between individual action and
the welfare of others. Furthermore, second–hand smoke (SHS) is harmful and potentially deadly to
others, particularly children. Interventions that protect others from SHS exposure, such as smokefree
laws, are therefore justified on the basis of the harm principle. Measures that discourage smoking are
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also justified, on the grounds that they protect public health and the welfare of the community. These
measures also support the rights to life and health, and children’s rights to healthy development and
a safe, clean environment.
Tobacco is—by design—also highly addictive, even in comparison to illicit drugs such as cocaine
and heroin. Consequently, most tobacco users experience some degree of addiction. Addiction, in
turn, has important effects on neurobiological functions that can affect decision–making and behavior.
Changes in dopaminergic mesolimbic, mesostriatal, and mesocortical pathways results in neurobiolog-
ical shifts towards habitual, cue–conditioned behaviors and a reduced ability to inhibit these through
the prefrontal cortex (PFC). The result is that exposure to tobacco–related cues, such as tobacco
advertising, promotions or sponsorships (TAPS) or watching someone smoke, often results in tobacco
cravings that can be very difficult to control. Addiction also influences the functioning of the endor-
phin opioid system (EOS), which is involved in emotional attachment and the relief of pain and stress;
the result is that emotional factors—such as emotional stress and pain—can also trigger addictive
behaviors.
Policies, then, should minimize tobacco–related cues in the environment by restricting TAPS and
smoking in public spaces, and should focus on the emotional factors—such as stress and pain—that
trigger and sustain addictions. Policies should also not assume that addicted smokers can simply
exercise a rational decision to not smoke, even in light of better options. Restrictions on tobacco
should not be offset on the basis that smoking is pleasurable or stress relieving. Neurobiological
evidence does indicate that, during intoxication, nicotine increases activity in dopaminergic pathways
and the EOS in a way that elicits a sense of pleasure and relaxation (the nicotine ‘high’). However,
outside intoxication, homeostatic adaptations in these pathways result in overal reduced activity, and
addictive nicotine use contributes to these adaptations; so the idea that smoking is an effective means
of counteracting stress or dysphoria is a common misconception.
The neurobiological effects of addiction can have particularly strong impacts on children and young
adults below age 25, because development of the PFC is not complete until approximately age 25.
The implication is that, for people below this age, the ability to avoid tobacco use is not properly
developed and may be diminished if smoking is initiated before age 25. Individuals under age 25 are
thus more likely to initiate smoking, and more susceptible to addiction; this is reflected by the fact
that smoking initiation is limited almost exclusively to people below age 25, and that most tobacco
addictions develop by this age. Most policies already protect people below age 18, but they should
also protect people aged 18–25 on the basis of their neurobiological vulnerability to addiction.
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Tobacco control policies are already based on the idea that smoking should be discouraged, that
others should be protected from SHS exposure, and that children should be protected from smoking
initiation. This thesis builds on these ideas by drawing on neurobiological evidence, to argue that
people aged below 25 years should be protected from smoking initiation, and that more focus should
be put on the social factors that can trigger and sustain addictive tobacco use. Neurobiological
evidence is also used to illustrate that the idea that smoking is pleasurable or stress–relieving is a
common misconception, and that restrictions should not be offset on these grounds.
Autonomy, health, and freedom in tobacco addiction
The second sub–aim of this thesis was:
To determine how tobacco addiction affects autonomy, and how tobacco control policies
should aim to maximize health and freedom.
To be autonomous is to have the mental ability to act in accord with one’s motives, reasons, and
values. In the context of tobacco use, ‘autonomy’ refers to the ability to avoid tobacco use. Addiction
is autonomy–undermining, due to the various neurobiological changes that occur in addiction; partic-
ularly the impaired ability of the PFC to inhibit cue–triggered drives. This often results in cognitive
dissonance: having a desire to smoke despite wanting to quit. This is also reflected in the low success
rates in smoking cessation. Despite these effects, addiction is not autonomy–negating because it is
possible for addicted smokers to resist tobacco use and to—at least partially—reverse neurobiolog-
ical changes through their own, top–down efforts. This effect, demonstrated in approaches such as
neurobehavioral therapy, can be potentiated by helping individuals to build their own capacities for
self–control, self–awareness, and the resolve to overcome the addiction. A supportive environment in
which addiction triggers—such as stress and tobacco–related cues—are minimized can also increase
this capacity.
Thus, autonomy in addiction is above a threshold at which more coercive means, such as coerced
therapy, are necessary; yet below a point at which no intervention is necessary. The observation
that social conditions can promote or undermine autonomy lends support to the idea that addiction
comprises relational autonomy. Freedom, then, should be construed in a positive sense: freedom
created by state interventions that protect or promote autonomy. This in turn requires interventions
that prevent or treat addictions. This is an important consideration for tobacco control policies,
because tobacco is addictive and therefore autonomy–undermining for most users. In other words,
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positive freedom is rooted in the social conditions that promote non–addiction, and the ability to
overcome one’s own neurological biases.
This argument builds on previous knowledge, by showing how neurobiological evidence supports
a relational conception of autonomy in addiction, and that policies should create positive freedom
through state interventions that promote non–addiction and therefore autonomy. This contrasts with
the argument that freedom should be created through minimal state intervention; this view is inac-
curate because autonomy—a necessary pre–condition for freedom—does not exist in addiction and
should be created by the state. The arguments made here can lend further strength to pro–regulatory
arguments: freedom, when correctly viewed, is supported by interventions that prevent and treat ad-
diction, which means that the maximizing of freedom in this context requires an interventionist rather
than a minimal state that prioritizes measures that promote non–addiction. This, in turn, supports
liberty and self–determination rights. Relational autonomy also reflects these ideas, and should form
the ethical foundation of tobacco control policies.
How tobacco control policies should account for addiction vulnerability
The third sub–aim of this thesis was:
To elucidate how tobacco control policies should account for the vulnerabilities of certain
groups of people to addiction.
Socially disadvantaged groups, such as certain racial minorities, people in low socioeconomic strata,
and people with comorbid mental illness are more susceptible to tobacco addiction. This is in part
because of neurobiological changes, similar to those observed in addiction, that occur prior to the
initiation of drug use. The most critical time period in which these changes are shaped is the first two
years of life, when neurodevelopmental processes—involving brain regions and pathways involved in
addiction—are particularly responsive to external stimuli such as the child–caregiver relationship. A
poor early affective experience can predispose the child to addiction later in life. Epigenetic processes,
many which are stress–sensitive, can also influence neurobiological processes in ways that predispose
individuals to addiction later in life. The implication is that policies should, in the prevention of
addictions, aim to facilitate better bonding between young children and their primary caregiver, and
focus efforts on parents with young children who are living with a mental illness or in stressful,
unsupportive circumstances.
200
Policies should also focus on the social processes that can trigger and sustain addictions. Stressful,
oppressive social environments in which people are socially dislocated contribute to the dysphoric,
unmotivated, and negative states of mind that trigger addictions. Indigenous groups in particular
have been severely dislocated from their societies and cultural identities as a result of colonization.
Building better support networks for indigenous groups and reinstation of their social and cultural
identities should be an important part of policies that aim to minimize addictions among these groups.
Improvement of social circumstances more generally, and providing better support systems of a social
and relational nature, can provide resistance to addiction. The role of genetic factors, in contrast, is
limited, since genetic processes also seem to depend in part on social processes. This is an important
point for scientific approaches that have looked for an ‘addiction gene’ in indigenous groups such as
New Zealand’s Maori; their higher prevalence of addiction is most likely due to social oppression or
hardship rather than genetic make–up.
It is generally agreed that social factors play an important role in addiction susceptibility. This
thesis builds on these arguments by showing how social disadvantage can confer a neurobiological vul-
nerability to addiction by acting on neurobiological circuits involved in the stress response, emotional
regulation, and social attachment. It also highlights the importance of an attuned child–caregiver
relationship during early childhood, and how issues related to poor childcare—such as abuse—are
interconnected to tobacco addiction. Policies, then, should focus on the social processes that con-
tribute to addiction susceptibility, and on helping parents who are raising young children in stressful
or unsupportive circumstances. The importance of social justice in tobacco control is also emphasized,
which in turn supports equality rights and the healthy development of children.
A conceptual account of addiction
The fourth sub–aim of this thesis was:
To develop a conceptual account of addiction that can inform an ethical framework for
tobacco control policy.
Addiction is a neurobiopsychosocial disorder that is largely rooted in social aspects, and should
be thought of as a relationship to a behavior. This relationship has distinct neurobiological features,
and psychological patterns that often reflect cognitive dissonance regarding drug use and an impaired
ability to avoid it. Emotional factors such as values, desires, and relationships are an important aspect
of addictive decision–making: they can trigger addictions and relapse, or predispose individuals to
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addictions in later life if they adversely affect neurobiological development, particularly during critical
developmental periods. Addiction therefore comprises relational autonomy: the social environment—
along with drug use itself—can undermine or promote autonomy, and the extent to which autonomy
is undermined is proportional to the severity of the addiction. Addictions are also dynamic: they can
progress into more severe forms, improve as a result of successful therapy, and non–addictive drug
use can become addictive, particularly in response to triggers such as stress. However, in all cases
individuals retain some ability to resist drug use.
This conception can be used to critique other theories of addiction that have influenced policies.
‘Liberal theories of addiction’ are correct to the extent that an addictive activity, such as tobacco use,
elicits a sense of reward. However, they do not capture other important elements of addiction, most
notably its autonomy–undermining effects; hence ‘liberal theories of addiction’ are more accurately
‘liberal theories of casual drug use’, and should not be used as a conceptual basis for addiction. ‘Moral
theories of addiction’ are also inappropriate, because they similarly assume that addictive behaviors
are freely chosen. They also put a moral judgement on addictive behavior, which can result in the
stigmatization and social marginalization of addicted drug users in an attempt to deter drug use. This
approach is likely to backfire, however, as the guilt and stress propagated by stigma often results in
stress and dysphoria, which—as neurobiological evidence indicates—are potent triggers for addictive
behaviors. ‘Brain disease theories’ go further in that they acknowledge the neurobiological processes
that undermine autonomy in addiction. However, they pay insufficient attention to the social factors
that can trigger and sustain addiction, and—incorrectly—advocate for an overly medicalized approach.
Focus should therefore be on a psychosocial approach. The ‘self–medication hypothesis of addic-
tion’ fits most closely with this view, as it assumes that addictive drug use is a coping strategy against
painful or stressful circumstances. However, it should be emphasized that it is a highly counter-
productive one, because addictive drug use—including smoking—actually contributes to the negative
states of mind the individual is trying to temporarily relieve. In other words, theories that argue
addiction is a coping strategy should not be used as a means to justify addictive drug use on the
basis that this is more humane. However, they do—correctly—advocate for more supportive social
circumstances in which individuals can be helped in overcoming their addiction, and there is a large
body of neurobiological evidence that can support this claim.
Considerations related to tobacco industry activity
The fifth sub–aim of this thesis was:
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To discuss how tobacco control policies should address ethical issues that arise as a result
of tobacco industry (TI) activity.
The TI has had an important influence in shaping the current public health situation with tobacco.
It has influenced public discourse, scientific research, social perceptions on tobacco use, and tobacco
regulations, often in opaque ways; the result is that there are various misconceptions regarding the
use of tobacco that still prevail in public discourse. In particular, ideas that smoking relieves stress, is
freely chosen, or is an exercise of liberty rights; more recently, the idea that a susceptibility to nicotine
addiction is conferred by genetic factors. The TI has also invested significantly in the normalization of
smoking, research focused on medicalized approaches to tobacco control (vaccines and genetics) and
tobacco harm reduction, and the targeting of vulnerable groups such as children, people with comorbid
mental illness, and racial minorities. The TI therefore remains a powerful adversary to tobacco control
efforts.
The issues represented by TI activity are well documented and it is widely known that tobacco
control policies should pay attention to possible ways in which the TI will try to undermine effective
tobacco control policies. It is also generally agreed that it is practically difficult to dismantle the
TI, due to the vast reach of its economic and political power. However, it is possible to regulate
the marketing, research, and lobbying activities of the TI, and to expose the misperceptions it has
spread to protect people from the TI’s marketing tactics through awareness. For example, it can
be used to show that the conceptual basis of the TI’s argumentation is wrong. Framing in tobacco
debates, then, is no longer an issue of health (pro–regulation) versus freedom (pro–tobacco); tobacco
control measures can be supported within a framework that emphasizes their protection of freedom
and health. This adds further strength to pro–regulatory arguments, and can be used to minimize
opposition based on—often misled—pro–tobacco arguments. Human rights can add further strength,
since the rights often drawn on in pro–tobacco debates (rights to liberty and self–determination)
actually support an interventionist approach. Education efforts should be focused on people most
targeted by the TI, such as children. It is also important to track and regulate the TI’s involvement
in more recent developments such as genetic research and tobacco harm reduction, and to reverse its
smoking normalization efforts.
An ethical framework for tobacco control policy
The central aim of this thesis was:
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To develop an ethical framework for tobacco control policy.
The ethical framework for tobacco control policy developed in this thesis conveys its ideas through
eight ethical considerations.
Focus on the social environment: Policies should minimize stress, adverse childhood experiences,
social dislocation, and poor family dynamics. For racial minorities (e.g. indigenous groups),
social integration or reinstation of their social and cultural identities should be encouraged.
Secure relationships should be promoted between young children and their primary caregivers.
Social relationships should be involved in smoking prevention and cessation programmes. These
support the right to social conditions conducive to good health (UDHR article 25).
Minimizing tobacco–related cues in the environment: Policies should ban all tobacco adver-
tising, promotion, and sponsorships, limit the amount of tobacco retailers, and restrict smoking
in public places. In supporting non–addiction, this supports the rights to life and health (UDHR
article 3, ICCPR article 6, ICESCR article 12), self–determination (ICESCR article 1, ICCPR
article 1), and liberty (UDHR article 3, ICCPR article 9).
Focus on socially disadvantaged groups: Policies should provide support to socioeconomically
deprived groups, socially marginalized people, racial minorities, and people with comorbid men-
tal illness. These groups should also be protected from targeting by the tobacco industry. This
supports equality rights (UDHR articles 2 and 7, ICCPR articles 2 and 26, ICESCR article 2)
and the rights of those protected by specialized human rights treaties, such as racial minorities
(ICERD) and people with severe mental illness (CRPD).
Reciprocity: People should be facilitated in fulfilling their ethical duties, for example by providing
support or alternative options.
Minimizing stigma: Policies should avoid interventions that are potentially stigmatizing, and should
promote a neutral or sympathetic approach towards smokers.
Non–coercive addiction treatment: Individuals should not be forced into treatment on the basis
of having an addiction. Treatment should focus on harnessing the will and resolve to quit,
training an individual’s capacity for self–control, and making changes in the social environment
to support non–addiction.
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Building on existing frameworks: (1) Libertarian paternalism: Measures should deter smoking
among non–addicted people, especially youth. This supports the rights to life (UDHR article 3,
ICCPR article 6), health (ICESCR article 12), and children’s rights to life and healthy devel-
opment (CRC article 6). (2) Harm principle: Others, especially children, should be protected
from second–hand smoke. This protects non–smokers’ rights to life (UDHR article 3, ICCPR
article 6) and health (ICESCR article 12), children’s rights to life and healthy development
(CRC article 6), and children’s right to a safe and clean environment (CRC article 24). (3)
Protecting youth: All children, adolescents, and young adults below age 25 should be protected
from smoking initiation, addiction, and the tobacco industry. This supports children’s rights to
life and healthy development (CRC article 6), protection from harmful drugs (CRC article 33),
and protection from exploitation by the TI (CRC article 36).
Dealing with tobacco industry activity: Policies should regulate all tobacco industry marketing
and involvement in research, academia, and politics. They should also anticipate the industry’s
counter–strategies, expose the industry’s marketing, research, and debate activities, especially to
vulnerable groups such as youth and socially disadvantaged. This supports the rights of children
(CRC article 36) and the mentally ill (CRPD article 16) to be protected from exploitation.
There should also be transparent communication regarding the ethical basis of tobacco control
policies.
These ethical considerations build on existing public health ethics theories, liberal theory, and
current tobacco control measures—most of which are based on libertarian paternalism—by empha-
sizing the importance of the social environment in preventing and treating tobacco addictions, the
importance of social justice, and the interconnectedness of tobacco addiction with other important
social issues. The framework also lends a stronger ethical foundation for tobacco control policies by
providing an ethical justification for the measures it endorses, and by showing how these measures are
supportive of human rights.
Addressing ethical implications associated with more recent strategies
The sixth sub–aim of this thesis was:
To discuss how tobacco control policies should address potential ethical implications as-
sociated with more recent strategies including tobacco denormalization, the tobacco–free
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generation (TFG) proposal, tobacco harm reduction, nicotine vaccines, and genetic tests
for nicotine addiction.
Concerns have already been raised in the literature regarding these strategies. This work builds
on these discussions, to provide an original ethical analysis of these interventions in light of the ethical
framework developed in this thesis. The four strategies, which all have quite distinct approaches
and issues, were analyzed in chapter 6. They all highlight the importance of educating the public,
regulating TI activity, protecting youth from smoking initiation, and the challenges in finding better
cessation options for smokers.
Approaches such as tobacco denormalization and the TFG proposal may motivate some smokers to
quit, which increases the demand for cessation services; it is necessary, then, to look for better cessation
alternatives. These should focus on social or relational interventions, such as involving friends, family,
a partner or other important relationships in cessation; social support systems targeted to socially
disadvantaged groups; minimizing tobacco–related cues such as TAPS; and helping smokers train their
capacities for self–control. A demand for better cessation options may be fulfilled with alternative
products such as low nitrosamine smokeless tobacco (LN–SLT) or electronic nicotine delivery systems
(ENDS), or a nicotine vaccine; however, these should not be prioritized over social and relational
interventions.
More specific ethical issues were also identified with each strategy. Tobacco denormalization efforts
may stigmatize smokers, particularly those in socially disadvantaged groups; this is incompatible with
the ethical framework. Thus stigma should be minimized by focusing on denormalization measures
that carry a neutral social connotation of smoking (and smokers); for example denormalization of the
TI. The TFG proposal, though restrictive, is still considered to be within reasonable limits because
having an option to smoke, particularly for young people, is not compatible with freedom. Permitting
the use of LN–SLT and ENDS has potential to help smokers, particularly those who are severely
addicted, to quit smoking; however, due to the issues represented by poor regulations on the use,
design, and marketing of LN–SLT and ENDS, these should be strictly regulated. Policies could make
LN–SLT and ENDS available to addicted smokers on a prescription system, and educate the public on
the reasons why LN–SLT and ENDS need to be tightly regulated. Nicotine vaccines, similarly, may
be provided as a cessation option for smokers. Their use in preventing addictions, however, is likely to
be ethically problematic, and genetic tests for nicotine addiction were also found to be incompatible
with the ethical framework.
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7.2 Limitations
There are a number of practical aspects that were beyond the scope of this discussion. The ethical
framework developed in chapter 5 advocates for a number of interventions that go beyond what is
recommended in current regulatory frameworks such as the WHO FCTC. It is unclear how these
measures fit into regulatory frameworks that already exist, whether global (e.g. the WHO FCTC), or
local (e.g. state legislations). It may be that legal, political, and practical realities impose limits on
certain interventions. These may or may not be related to TI activity, for example TI lobbying in the
political sphere. In the legal sphere, regulations on tobacco may be challenged using trade agreement
that exist under the World Trade Organization and bilateral or regional treaties. These are highly
relevant and complex issues that deserve consideration elsewhere, but were beyond this work as a
comprehensive analysis on these would require a deeper look at regulatory, political, legal, and other
such systems that may also vary between states.
Another issue with this framework is that it calls for interventions that may require a lot of
resources, such as social programmes that facilitate better bonding between young children and their
primary caregivers. This puts an economic and infrastructural demand on states, particularly those
where resources are limited. Although economic analyses and impact assessments are beyond the
scope of this work, it was suggested that, to minimize economic burdens, tobacco control could be
woven into state programmes that already exist to counter related social issues.
This thesis has taken an interdisciplinary though theoretical approach in which ethics, reviews
from the perspective of various sciences, and reflections upon policy are integrated. Focus, then, is
on ethical and practical considerations that are relevant for policies; a deeper philosophical enquiry
integrating political theory, moral theory, or jurisprudence theory is beyond scope. Chapter 5, in
this respect, draws on various conceptual approaches in addiction to build an account of addiction
that can be used as a conceptual basis for the ethical framework. It is possible to go further in
discussing the metaphysics of addiction, how this relates to questions regarding the nature of decision–
making, free will, the relational constitution of personhood, and so on. It is also possible to go further
into the philosophy of concepts used (e.g. health, freedom, pleasure), or the philosophical basis
of ethical frameworks used (e.g. human rights). However, these were considered beyond scope to
maintain focus on ethics insofar as it can guide policies, and how scientific approaches—most notably
neurobiological—can strengthen the ethical and conceptual foundation of tobacco control policies.
Analysis in this thesis was focused primarily on developed places where tobacco control policies
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are relatively advanced, in order to facilitate a more original analysis on the more recent issues in
tobacco control policy. For this reason, some region–specific issues were omitted from analysis. For
example, it was mentioned that in Asia there is a gender imbalance in smoking; smoking prevalence is
higher among men, but women are increasingly targeted by TI marketing. This raises issues related
to women’s rights. In countries with tobacco agriculture, tobacco farmers are often subjected to poor
working conditions which raises issues related to worker’s rights. For many developing countries, a
lack of economic resources means that it is particularly difficult to implement tobacco regulations,
resist legal challenge, or TI lobbying; however, a discussion of these issues requires a deeper analysis
of the infrastructures within these states, which is beyond the scope of this work. For this reason,
this thesis also does not advocate for a “one size fits all” approach to tobacco control policy; it is
recognized that local, cultural, infrastructural, and other such factors can influence policies, and that
a more tailored set of guidelines would require a deeper inquiry into these relevant contexts. Instead,
focus is on the development of an ethical framework for tobacco control policies more generally, with
which any given tobacco control strategy can be analysed in terms of its ethical and conceptual rigour.
The ethical framework developed in this thesis was used to analyze four recent approaches to
tobacco control: tobacco denormalization, the TFG proposal, tobacco harm reduction, and medicalized
interventions (nicotine vaccines and genetic tests). There are other recent approaches that could
have been included, such as tobacco endgames that target tobacco supply or that gradually eliminate
nicotine from cigarettes. However, these endgames require co–operation from the TI, which—as history
indicates—is practically difficult to achieve. Different variations of tobacco harm reduction have
been suggested, such as the gradual elimination of nicotine from tobacco, or permitting a market for
products such as LN–SLT and ENDS while concurrently phasing out cigarettes. However, most debates
on tobacco harm reduction focus on whether a market for alternative products should be permitted
in addition to (not instead of) a market for cigarettes, and so focus was kept on conventional tobacco
harm reduction. Otherwise, the limits of prohibition—discussed in reference to the TFG proposal—
could have been discussed in light of a complete prohibition of tobacco sale and import such as that
implemented in Bhutan. However, few places—except Bhutan—have considered such an approach.
7.3 Future research
This study opens up new questions, particularly in relation to how approaches recommended in the
ethical framework can be put into practice. Further research, then, could focus on practical, economic,
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political, and legal structures that may facilitate or impede their implementation, and ways in which
such challenges may be overcome. It was mentioned, for example, that the social support structures
recommended by the ethical framework may demand significant economic resources unless tobacco
control can be implemented as a part of current social support structures. Future analysis could,
for example, look at current social support structures and how they can be used to facilitate a more
ethical tobacco control policy. There may also be social barriers—for example social perceptions on
addiction—that limit the actualization of an ethical policy; future work could look at how these issues
may be addressed. Future studies might also look at whether the ethical framework can be developed
into a unified regulatory framework such as the WHO FCTC, or whether the framework should be
used to develop a set of tailored policies that better fit local requirements. Analysis may then look
at these local factors, for example cultural, social, political, regulatory, and other such variations.
Alternatively, the ethical framework can be used to analyze other tobacco control strategies, such
as tobacco endgames that target tobacco supply or nicotine content, a tobacco prohibition, different
variations of tobacco harm reduction, or other medicalized interventions should they be developed in
future.
Otherwise, the conceptualization of addiction developed in this thesis may inform a more philo-
sophical study that looks at how this conceptual approach influences ideas about free will, decision–
making, personhood, and the relational constitution of personhood. Neurobiological evidence that
supports these ideas may be useful in these philosophical enquiries. Some of the arguments made, and
the evidence used in support of these ideas—for example the importance of social justice in public
health—may also apply to other disorders, such as other addictions. This work therefore opens up
questions on how other addictive or unhealthy substances (e.g. alcohol, illicit drugs, unhealthy foods)
should be regulated, or how behavioral addictions (e.g. gambling, internet gaming) should be pre-
vented and treated. The work done here would suggest a similar interdisciplinary approach. In this
line of work, some of the interventions advocated for by the ethical framework could be researched
further and used to develop more effective prevention and treatment programmes for addiction. Such
research may focus on areas such as the application of neurobehavioral therapies in addiction, peer–
based prevention and cessation programmes, the positive effects of social integration on addiction
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‘Psychoactive drug’ refers to a drug that crosses the blood–brain barrier and elicits changes within
the central nervous system.
‘Drug of abuse’ refers to a psychoactive drug commonly associated with social or public health
problems. This could be due to addictive use, or due to non–addictive, but socially problematic
use e.g. alcohol binge drinking. Use of drugs in these manners is also referred to as ‘problematic
drug use’ or ‘drug abuse’.
‘Addictive drug’ refers to drugs, licit or illicit, that contribute to neurobiological changes—primarily
in dopaminergic reward pathways—that are associated with the clinical and behavioral features
that typify addiction. All addictive drugs are thus psychoactive. Though the extent of their
addictive potential varies per person, drug, mode of administration, and other factors, typical
examples include nicotine, alcohol, cocaine, opioids, and amphetamines.
‘Drug use’ is used interchangeably with ‘substance use’, or in the context of a specific drug e.g.
nicotine use’, to refer to any use of a psychoactive drug, for whatever purpose, both addictively
and non–addictively.
‘Addictive drug use’ refers to a type of drug use in which the individual has developed an addictive
relationship towards his/her use of a drug. This addictive relationship is characterized by various
neurological patterns, behaviors, and psychological features (such as craving) that are further
described and discussed throughout this thesis (particularly chapters 2 and 3).
‘Casual drug use’ is used interchangeably with ‘non–addictive drug use’, and refers to a type
of drug use in which individuals have not developed an addictive relationship towards their use
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of a drug.
‘Recreational drug use’ refers to casual drug use that is purely for the purpose of increasing posi-
tive pleasure.
‘Self–medicating drug use’ is used interchangeably with ‘maintenance drug use’, and refers to
drug use, often (but not always) addictive, for the purpose of treating negative symptoms such
as emotional stress, depression, or dysphoria.
‘Addiction’ is used interchangeably with ‘dependence’ and refers to a disorder characterized by dis-
tinct clinical and behavioral features, as well as neurobiological changes that can affect thoughts
and behavior. These, in turn, influence how an individual relates to an activity e.g. drug–taking.
These features and changes are described throughout chapters 2 and 3. It is recognized that
‘addiction’ is not a black or white concept; there are varying degrees of addiction that can range
from severe to mild.
‘Drug addiction’ refers to an addiction to an addictive drug.
‘Behavioral addiction’ is used interchangeably with ‘non–drug addiction’ and refers to an ad-
diction to an activity not related to drug use, for example gambling, shopping, or eating.
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Appendix C
Summary of the ethical framework
Goals of the ethical framework: To minimize overall smoking prevalence and to: (1) minimize
second–hand smoke exposure; (2) prevent smoking initiation; (3) encourage cessation and help
smokers to overcome their addictions; and (4) minimize tobacco–related health inequalities.
Focus on the social environment: Minimizing stress, adverse childhood experiences, social dislo-
cation, and poor family dynamics. For racial minorities (e.g. indigenous groups), social integra-
tion or reinstation of social and cultural identities should be encouraged. Secure relationships
should be promoted between young children and their primary caregivers. Social relationships
should be involved in smoking prevention and cessation programmes.
Minimizing tobacco–related cues in the environment: Banning all tobacco advertising, pro-
motion, and sponsorships, limiting the amount of tobacco retailers, and restricting smoking in
public places.
Focus on socially disadvantaged groups: Providing support to socioeconomically deprived groups,
socially marginalized people, racial minorities, and people with comorbid mental illness. These
groups should also be protected from targeting by the tobacco industry.
Reciprocity: Helping people to fulfil their ethical duties, for example by providing support or alter-
native options.
Minimizing stigma: Avoiding policies that are potentially stigmatizing and promoting a neutral or
sympathetic approach towards smokers.
Non–coercive addiction treatment: Individuals should not be forced into treatment on the basis
of having an addiction. Treatment should focus on harnessing the will and resolve to quit,
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training an individual’s capacity for self–control, and making changes in the social environment
to support non–addiction.
Building on existing frameworks: (1) Libertarian paternalism: measures to deter smoking among
non–addicted people, especially youth. (2) Harm principle: protect others, especially children,
from second–hand smoke. (3) Protecting youth: protect all children, adolescents, and young
adults below age 25 from smoking initiation, addiction, and the tobacco industry.
Dealing with tobacco industry activity: Regulating all tobacco industry marketing and involve-
ment in research, academia, and politics; anticipating the industry’s counter–strategies; exposing
the industry’s marketing, research, and debate activities, especially to vulnerable groups such




Diagram of the ethical framework
Figure D.1: A diagram of the ethical framework for tobacco control developed in this thesis. The
ethical framework comprises several ethical considerations (white boxes with smaller text), with rela-
tional autonomy as their foundation (white box in the centre). The scope of these considerations vary
and overlap; this is depicted in the grey boxes.
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